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Thi~

thesis explores a continuqus problem facing

who conduct American

diplomat~c

a.ff airs:

t~ose

the appointment of

I

amateurs,_. with no previous experience· in diplomacy, as am:bassadors representing the United States abroad.

This study

2

contends that the noncareer, nonprofessional appointment is
neither necessarily a bad thing nor should it be considered
undesirable, given the American system of conducting its
foreign affairs.

On the contrary this thesis argues that the

amateur ambassador can effectively serve to enhance

th~

needs of ·American foreign policy without having the same
professional training.accorded to the career foreign service
officer.
The historical literature about the merits of appointing professional career men from the American foreign service
versus the practice of selecting amateurs from the political

spoils system is reviewed.

Arguments from both sides of the

debate, as well as several middle-of-the-road positions, are
examined.

From these

a number

of questions are extracted

for use in the assessment of an amateur diplomat's

perfor~

mance.
A case study of an amateur diplomat chosen from the
political spoils system by President Herbert Hoover forms
the core of this thesis.

Clear in his commitment to the ad-

vancement of the career diplomacy for the United States,
Hoover nevertheless found room.for political spoilsmen.
His conduct of foreign affairs during the time of the Great
Depression in the. early 1930s, especially with regard to
Europe, sets the background for a detailed study of one such
compromise of the- ideal regarding professional appointments
which drew criticism.not only from the contemporaries at the
l.

f
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time but from historians as well.
At the tim·e of Frederic Sackett' s appointment, as Ambassador to Germany, he was an incumbent United States Senator from

Kentu~ky

deemed by that state's Republican party to

be a political liability and not capable of winning re-election to the Senate in 1930.

Sackett was also a wealthy

businessman (he owned several coal mines in Kentucky), a
lawyer, and a long-time political supporter of Herbert
Hoover.

Mindful of the domestic political considerations,

however, Hoover appointed Sackett as Ambassador to Germany
during the critical period of 1930-33 when Adolf Hitler
pushed for the ·control of the Reich.

At that time, most of

America's relations with Germany were in the sphere of business/ economics and, as a suc.cessful businessman himself,
Sackett superficially seemed suited for the job.

Yet, hav-

ing no real experience in the workings of American diplomacy,
Sackett fits into many of the stereotypes commonly applied
to the amateur appointee from the spoils system.
The central question confronted in this thesis is,
given the circumstances of his appointment, was Sackett the
amateur successful as an American ambassador? .
Utilizing primary source materials, including memoirs,
personal papers, newspaper articles and official government
documents, plus secondary accounts of the diplomacy of the
period, the events and actions surrounding Sackett's experience in Germany are explored.

Many historians dealing with

4

this period of American relations with Europe have been critical of Sackett's role in the events of the time and his
influence upon them.

Evaluations of his record are fre-

quently tied to the harsh judgement that, since America's
foreign policy toward Europe failed, his ambassadorship was
also a failure.

However, if Sackett's performance as ambas-

sador is considered in light of the assessment of his contemporaries, emphasizing his

~bilities

as a nonprofessional

diplomat as well as his role in the delicate events occurring in the Weimar Republic at the time, his tenure must be
rated as successful .

THE NON-CAREER AMBASSADOR
IN AMERICA'S DIPLOMACY
Case Study;

Frederic Mosley Sackett
Ambassador to Germany,
January, 1930 - March, 1933

by

STEPHEN A. NICHOLLS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
in

HISTORY

Portland State University
1979

1.

TO THE OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND.RESEARCH:
The members of the Committee approve the the::;;is of
Stephe~

A. Nicholls presented 26

Janua~y

1979.

Bernard.V. Burke, Chairman

David A. Smeltzer

APPROVED:
J

j

j

l

M'ichael ·Reartlon, Head, History Department

l
1·

I

of Graduate Studies and Research

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
There is no other point in his career when the budding
sc~olar

is more dependent upon other people than while he is

working on his master's thesis.

Not yet polished in the in-

tricacies of scholarly research, he must heavily rely on the
direction and advice of his

~entors.

My debts are huge.

If it were appropriate to dedicate a master's thesis,
then this should be

in~cribed

to Dr. Bernard V. Burke, pro-

fessor of history at Portland State University.
is really his.

This work

As both thesis adviser and chairman of my

graduate committee,

Dr. Burke assisted me through numerous

classes and seminars, stimulated my interest in American
diplomatic history, and provided major guidance in delineating my research subject.

More than this, he provided me with

a wealth of primary resource material which he painstakingly
collected from libraries and

archives throughout the United

States; material which, without his efforts and generosity,
would be beyond the reach of most graduate students.

(Unless.

otherwise noted, photocopies of manuscript material cited in
this thesis are in the possession of Dr. Burke at PSU.)

Dr.

Burke's insights and direction proved to be the single most
important aspect in the writing of this thesis.
A sincere note of appreciation goes to Dr. Jim F.
Heath.

His careful reading, editing and critique of this

,
I

I
iv
work strengthened its content, style and organization.

Dr.

Heath's help during this past year and his constant friendship throughout the many years.of my stay at Portland State,
have been sustaining encouragements.

The other members of

my graduate committee, Dr. Jesse L. Gilmore and Dr. David A.
Smeltzer, bravely read through this thesis and I thank them
for their constructive criticisms, questions, time and
patience.
Special thanks go to David Stubbs and David Yamasaki
for reading through this document, the latter while confined
to a hospital bed; and to

Ma~y

Dozark for typing the final

copy and seeing it through to its last stages.
My employer, Catholic Relief Services -- USCC, graciously allowed an extended leave of absence from overseas
assignment to enable my return to Portland to complete my
graduate program.

However, my deepest gratitude goes to

. .Maureen McNassar who broug.ht me back home and made me finish
the project I started

ye~rs

ago.

Stephen A. Nicholls
Sandy, Oregon
January, 1979

l
I
I
I

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
AC1:{NOWLEDGEMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

CHAPTER
I

II

III

THE HISTORICAL CONTROVERSY ................... .

6

On Behalf of the Professional............

7

In Defense of the Amateur ................

19

Searching for the Best Man ...............

30

Some Criteria for Judgement ..............

39

THE HOOVER COMMITMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

The American Diplomatic Corps:
1920s Status Report .................

48

The Hoover.Apprenticeship ................

53

The President' s Policy .......... -. . . . . . . . .

60

The Stimson Influence.....................

64

The Context for American Diplomacy
Toward Europe in 1930 ...............

68

A CASE STUDY: AMBASSADOR FREDERIC MOSLEY
SACKETT'S ASSIGNMENT TO GERMANY ....•.....

78

Mr. Sackett Goes to Washington ...........

81

Summons From the White House:
Sacke~t's Appointment ...............

88

Ambassad0.r Sackett and His Re~eption
In Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Sackett and Germany's Financial Crisfs ... 110

l

I

I
I

I

vi

CHAPTER

PAGE

l

Sackett's Popularity in Germany .......... 145

I

The Ambassador and the Election of

I

1932. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . 149

l

IV

CONCLUSIONS -- RATING AMBASSADOR SACKETT ...... 156

NOTES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 1 72
.

.

SELEC~ED BI_BLIOGRAPHY. . . . . • • • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . 199

".,
I

!
I

I
INT:EiODUCTION
With few exceptions, aspirants for the job of President of the United States. hav·e frequently made an iss~.e but
of promising to appoint professionals to all ambassadorial
posts and halt the age-old practice of placing noncareer
spoilsmen in diplomatic positions as "pay-offs" for campai~~

contributions, old favors or old

friendshi~s.

Once elected, however, the promises of the campaign
become memories.

The new president, subject· to the reali-

tie.s of his office, often compr9mises the lofty ideals he
enunciated before election day .. Indeed he will appoint
professional foreign servicemen to many of the higher level
diplomatic positions in· embassies, legations and within the
State Department itself, perhaps more so .than in previous
administrations.

N~vertheless,

a share of the available

positions -- often the more prestigious and comfortable
one~

-- go to people outsi4e the foreign

~ervice

who are un-

trained in the intricacies of diplomatic practice.
According to the United States Constitution, the power
and responsibility for appointing American diplomats is
c~early

invested in the Executive Branch of

governmen~

(Article II, Section 2) with the advice and consent of the
Senate.

Although some ambassadorial nominees are purely

political appointments, the Senate generally grants its

1
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approval as a routine matter and it usually does so without
undue delay.

In cases where the nominee is a former member

of the Senate, that body's long-standing custom is not
raise opposition to the appointment.

to

As courtesy to a sitt-

ing Senator nominated to hold a diplomatic post, his nomination by-passes the appropriate reviewing committee altogether
and is apprqved via Senatorial acclamation.

Despite the

constitutional responsibility of the Senate, the politics
of getting along with a new administration in the White
· House often leads to cursory review of the qualifications
of diplomatic nominations.
When an appointment of a diplomatic nonprofessional
is made by the President it commonly stimulates much in the
way of general criticism:

If the appointee is wealthy, he

bought the post; if he is a party politico, he is grossly
inexperienced to handle foreign affairs; if he is holding a
political office at the time of his appointment, he is being
gracefully gotten out of the way.

However, after he has

completed his assignment, little attention nor real assessment is made of the appointee's actual job performance or
the ratings given to him by his colleagues and contemporaries who worked with him.

Hence, any really fair assessment

of his contribution to the conduct of American foreign
affairs is denied.
The important role of the ambassador in the function
of foreign relations should not be underrated.

The Brookings

3

Institute, in a 1960 report to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee summarized the ambassador's function:
He is the· eyes, ears and voice of the United
States in the country of his assignment. It
is chiefly through him that governmental
relations with that country are funneled.
He is the.primary agency of negotiation with
the host.government and the image and embodiment of the United States to its officials.
For.the U.S. Government, he is the central
source of information on what its multifarious
agencies are doing under his general supervision.
He is the primary source of intelligence and advice to which his Government looks in formulating
its policies. He sets the bounds for the activities of all other U.S. officials within his jurisdiction and in times of emergency exercises a
large measure of authority over other Americans
as well. Probably more than any other official
below the level of Secretary of State, an Ambassador can make a shambles of U.S. relations with
another country or organization, or can save it
from irretrievable blunders.*
The contention of this paper is that perhaps the noncareer, nonprofessional appointment to diplomatic positions
is neither necessarily a bad thing nor should it be considered undesirable given the American system of conducting
its foreign affairs.

More often than not, the circumstances

of the moment and the state of world political and economic
conditions intervene to dictate the need for talents from
outside the regular diplomacy machine of the State Department.

Despite the criticism at the moment of appointment,

the only real assessment of a diplomat's performance can be

*Brookings Institute, United States Foreign Policy -Formulation and Administration (Washington, 1960), 110.

,
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made by looking at his record during his assignment.
In order to fully explore this thesis a "case study"
is taken from the Administration of Herbert Hoover.

While

Franklin Roosevelt was noted for his distrust of the

p~o

fessional dipl.omats and made no absolute promises to promote them, his predecessor in office was clear in his
commitment to the career diplomacy for the United States.
As the first president in modern times who vocally emphasized his preference and support of the

conc~pt

of a pro-

fessional diplomatic corps, especially after the passage of
the 1924 Rogers Act which essentially established America's
first career foreign service, Hoover personified the ideal
of professionalism above political expediency.

In fact,

Hoover appointed more career men to ministerial posts
around the world than had any president before him.

When

it came down to political necessity, however, even Hoover
found room for the political spoilsmen.
Chapte~

I of this paper deals with the historical

controversy over the merits of appointing professional
·diplomats from the career foreign service versus the practice of selecting amateurs from the political spoils"system.
Arguments from both sides of the debat"e, as well as several
middle-of-the-road positions, are presented and from these
a number of criteria are extracted to be used in the assessment of' an amateur diplomat's performance.
Chapter II concerns the Administration of Herbert

1

I

I
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Hoover in the period 1929-33 and delves into his commitment

I

to the professional foreign service at the time; the influence of his Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, on the
conduct of foreign affairs; and the environment and international problems, particularly with regard to Europe.-,.· ft.S
they were faced by American foreign policy makers.
Chapter III, building upon the previous section is a
case study of one of Hoover's noncareer ambassadors whose
appointment drew criticism not only from contemporaries at
the time but later from historians as well.

The subject

is Frederic Mosley Sackett, United States Ambassador· to
Germany during the critical period of 1930-33 when the
Weimar Republic went into eclipse and Hitler succeeded in
gaining the high position of Chancellor for the Reich.
Chapter IV, after reviewing Ambassador Sackett's
political and diplomatic careers, is an analysis of his
performance mad·e. against the criteria
with conclusions based

upo~

analysis.

li~ted

in Chapter I·'

.,

CHAP.TER I
'

THE HISTORICAL CONT·ROVERSY

Historians,· political scientists, diplomats and
politicians have cons.tantly disputed. the subject of.

~areer

noncareer appointments of American ambassadors,

VePSUB

often in the f·ramework of the contest between the prolessional and nonprofessiona~ for· co~tl'.'ol of Americ~'s foreign
policy.

Ame.rica' s

u,niqu~

self to a corresponding

status of

u~ique

demo~racy

has lent it-

blend of bo,th amateurs and

professionals representing the United

State~

abroad, es-.

pecially in the Twentie~h Century;. not commonly foun-d 'in
other diplomatic corps of the world.

This combination has ·

produced ·a qiplomat'ic repre.sentat~on. which se.ek~ to reflect
the ideals, styles, culture ·and pbiloso.phies which are considered tru1y "Anieric~n" ·while at the .same time a.spires to
a level of pr.ofessionalisnt' thoµght exemplary
world power.

The

e~erging

debate is

o~

r.e~atively

a great
basic;

I.n

which hands a,re the· United State~ and its for~ign p~licies ·
best served?
Some authorities insist ·that the. ·argument is as old
as t~e Republic itself.

Oth~rs··~~.el .1t .is ~ re~atively· n:ew

theme coming .into serious pl.ay 'only .. since· the 1920s when
. Qqogress·· leg.islate.d an upgradin·g.
i~· ·the etatus., tra.1n.1ng a,nd..
.
;

,

I
I
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salary grades of the professional foreign service inside the
State Department.

In light of these divergent views, the

matter of the relative fitness of American diplomatic representatives of both genres, but particularly from the
amateur ranks, is constantly questioned.
A number of questions arise which can be helpful in
assessing the merits of appointing to ambassadorial positions persons who come from outside the professional diplomatic corps.

First, however, it is useful to compare some

of the positions reflected by proponents of the
corps with the

argume~ts

professio~~l

raised by those who feel that

amateurs have a definite role to play in America's diplomacy.
On Behalf of the Professional
Writing in 1909, a former Assistant Solicitor and
Consulate official for the State Department said that while
representatives at the more important diplomatic posts have
always been carefully selected by the President in order to
reflect sympathy with his foreign policies,' lesser status
posts have been vulnerable to political patronage and have
"sometimes been bestowed without special regard for the
fitness of the

indiv~dual

for the place."

In his primer

entitled Our Foreign Serviae; The A.B.C. of Ameriaan DipZo-

maay, Fredrick Van Dyne, through the use of anecdotes, implicitly takes-to task the fact-of-life use of political
patronage appointments in diplomacy.

He cites Secretary of

-

I

i

8

State John Hay's reference to the custom of appointing to
foreign missions members of Congress who had been defeated
in re-election bids:

"A quiet legation is the stuffed

mattress which the political .acrobat wants always to see
ready under him in case of a slip."

Added to this was ·

Secretary William Seward's comment that "some persons are
sent abroad because they are needed abroad, and some are
sent because they are not wanted at home." 1
In the early part of the

Twen~ieth

Century, writers

had to rely upon anecdotes to make their point regarding
amateurs mainly because American diplomacy was largely
dominated by the nonprofessional appointed by partisan
officeholders.

By mid-century, however, after the 1924

Rogers Act insured a strong nucleus of careerists, the cause
for a more professional foreign service had

~ound

enough

friends to enable proponents to become increasingly more
forceful in their arguments against the appointment of
political spoilsmen to serve the cause of

Ameri~an

diplomacy.

Not unexpectedly, the most vehement voices against the
amateur appointments were those from persons who came u·p
from within the professional ranks.
Charles W. Thayer's Diplomat is essentially a call for
primary reliance upon the professional in the conduct o.f
American foreign affairs, especially at the runbassadorial
level.

As late as the end of the 1950s the spoils system

continued to dispose of so many diplomatic.posts such that,

l

I
I

I
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9
at the time of his writing in 1959, only four of 14 American
b

ambassadors in the important Western European posts were
held by professionals.

Only because of appointments to the

non-European posts, especially those in out-of-way places
that do not ordinarily attract office seekers, was the percentage of professionals on a global basis somewhat higher.

I·

"Even so," Thayer stated,· "about half our embassies are
still headed by amateurs whose only training has been as
successful bankers, salesmen or race-horse breeders."

Not

all were failures, he admits, and indeed "some have revealed
the rare talents of a born diplomat." 2

But on the whole,

the United States continues the "export of fools in the
guise of

diplomats."~

Because the system permits it, the essential requisites of good foreign representation are all too often overlooked when they get in the way of domestic political expediency.

Hence, American

~epresentatives

abroad are often

wealthy men with social ambitions who were able to enhance
their chances for a diplomatic post by means of a signif icant contribution to a winning political party.

Newspaper

edit.ors who support a presidential candidate "can often
count on an embassy for themselves or some.member of their
families," and lawyers helping a candidate out of a messy
situation get ambassadorial

ap~ointments.

Further, Thayer

asserts, "Exile to an embassy overseas has long been a way
to sidetracking political appointments."

The national

10

committees of both major American political parties continuously keep an eye out for possible

op~nings

for loyal party

workers regardless of their qualifications to hold a diplomatic post.

4

In Thayer's view the most important

qualific~tiQA

for

a diplomat is good political sense, the ability to sense
the significance of political force on a given problem and
to guage the resultant reaction.

The ambassador must be '

able to distill from available political data what.meaning
it may contain and to "detect from a combination of observations trends of opinion, of subtle shifts in policies."

Yet,

too often, the ·inexperienced diplomat assumes the role of
advocate for his host country vis-a-vis his own.
to be loved, he becqmes blinded by his hosts.

Anxious

"The result

is that his dispatches take on the color of a lawyer's brief
rather than a·dispassionate objective report."

And on the.

occasions when "his love is rebuffed," the spurned ambassador may take every occasion to condemn his host unfairly.

5

Being a lawyer does not necessarily provide the political savvy needed to be a good diplomat !or "law in some
respect~

is even less suited as training for a diplomatic

career than the military profession."

Thayer adds, "In

fact [Sir Harold] Nicolson maintains that the 'worst kind
of diplomats are missionairies, fanatics and lawyers.'"
There are strong· superficial arguments involved in the
similarities between law and diplomacy; they both deal with

11

debate and compromise, require an ability to negotiate and
a good knowledge of human nature.

"But when the lawyer

turns to international problems, these similarities lead
him to the false conclusion that diplomacy is a form of '
law."

In diplomacy, as opposed to law~ right is not alWftYS
t}

i.

distinguished from wrong, legal from illegal, and traditions, customs, histories and moral concepts vary greatly
in different countries.

The lawyer, Thayer states, is prone·
I .

to getting bogged down in the fine print of diplomacy without ever really getting to its substance.

6

Thayer is especially critical of the idea that businessmen are well suited to diplomatic careers.
It is widely believed, particularly in America,
that diplomatic negotiations are essentially
business deals and that the best negotiator
is therefore a· shrewd Yankee horse trader
operating under the cover of a pair of striped
pants. As a result a number of succe~sful
businessmen without diplomatic experience
have found themselves pantless and shirtless
at the end of a negotiation with experienced
diplomats.
Here the fundamental differences include style and politics.
Whereas business is conducted within a framework of regulated systems under the "law of contracts" with a heavy
emphasis on· "advertising one's ·saleable points," unlike the
businessman, the diplomat cannot pick and choose his associates but must deal with the

politica~

power that rules.

Nor is the diplomat's negotiation ever final, since differences over even the most precisely worked out agreement or
plan will arise.

7
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Thayer's book,

therefore, .is largely a statement on

behalf of the well-trained professional diplomat serving
.the public interest above and beyond the bonds of political debts, petty blackmailers and prestige seekers.
decries the point that, all too often, those

He

professiou.~l

diplomats who make it to the rank of ambassador "often find
their careers suddenly terminated when their resignations
are accepted by a party in power in need of patr9nage posts."
Despite the establishment of the career foreign service in
1924, even professionals are expected to resign their commissions when a new administration takes over the White House.
"After every election," Thayer wrote, "the party patronage
staff within the State Department sits down with the professional personnel director to divide the spoils.

It has

become a political tradition for presidential candidates
to pledge their support of the career principle and to
promise not to replace career ambassadors.

However, in

view of the automatic resignation procedure, "it is relatively easy to circumvent such pre-election pledges." 8
The fact that, statistically speaking, the number of
professional diplomats has increased over the years does
not impress Thayer.
This statistical game is fairly simple to play no
matter what inroads the patronage committee has
made on the embassies, since the number of embassies has in recent years steadily increased
with the creation of new independent states,
many of which political office seekers do not
consider desirable. 9
'·

,

I
I
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Thayer acknowledges there are some arguments in favor
of noncareer appointments.

Every political generation produces a half dozen
or more individuals capable of making a distin- .
guished contribution to diplomacy without going
through the long and arduous training of the professional service.

But nothing will replace experience or the knowledge of a
country and its disposition which presumably the professional has . .i
A

0

more devastating assessment of the amateur as com-

pared to the professional in diplomacy comes from Ellis
Briggs, a former career diplomat, who contends that no
single factor is more discouraging to the career man than
the practice of awarding ambassadorial posts to nonprofessionals, especially when the beneficiary "is an outright
purchaser or one whose claim to consideration rests on
dubious or publicly weakened foundations."

His book,

Farewell to Foggy Bottom -- The Recolleations of a Career
Diplomat, is the retired diplomat's parting shot at the
(

problems he has seen in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. 11
Briggs terms those defending nonprofessional appointments as "apologists" and he does not see much defense in
appointing even outstanding men and women who are successful in other areas and who might have talents and abilities
for a special posting to diplomatic positions.

He argues:

The point is that practically no outsider, however
talented, can be so effective at representing the
United States abroad as can th'? outstanding professional trained for the job -- the officer who

,

I

!
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has risen to the peak of a competititve professional career and who has .already proved in
important missions successfully completed, his
fitness for the topmost positions in the diplo-

matic service.J

2

A particular sore point in Briggs' view is that in a coveted
post a nonprofessional usually "bumps" the career chief of
mission and "only in rare instances has another post been
found for the displaced professional."

Th~s

method, Briggs

asserts, severely damages the -career man's credibility and
effectiveness. 13
A further argument Briggs presents against the use of
the nonprofessiorlal is that, despite his reputation, he is
apt to be unwelcome to the foreign government "already disillusioned by past experience with amateurs."

The host

government would put up with the appointment hoping that he
would be restrained by a knowledgeable deputy, or in hopes
that the nonprofessional "will soon return to his campus,
fleshpot or factory.

rrl

4

The host government puts up with

such amateur appointments only in hopes of putting the man
in their pocket or out of fear of offending whichever administration might be in the White House at the time.

And

often the amateur ambassador's role is held to a minimum, in
which case the business of the foreign government with the
United States is adequately protected at the expense of the
business of the United States with the foreign government
involved.

"The only losers," Brigs:s states, "are the Ameri-

can government and people."

Further he asserts it is a

15
"shameful thing that the American. government, for the
greater satisfaction of a handful of politicos of the
dominant party, goes on handicapping itself in its dealings
with 0th.er nations.".i s
Few amateurs can compete with. professional foreign
service officers because, as a

newcome~,

he lacks experience

in the practical functioning of diplomacy, he works in a
strange atmosphere, and must use tools that are new to him,
according to Ambassador Briggs.

Diplomacy is an imprecise

business and there is a "feel for and a familiarity with
it" which are acquired "by skill of operation of the machine
of foreign affairs and in no other fashion."

The only thing

that is predictable about diplomacy is its unpredictability
and
... that is one of the things that a foreign service officer learns day by day and year by year
as he progresses through the grades of a competitive service. That is one of the things that cannot _be learned overniyht, not even by the most
gifted amateur envoy. 6
Personal popularity of a diplomat, Briggs states, is
not essential for a successful performance and the amateur
is rarely aware of this.

Respect is more important than

good public relations but "a political ambassador is often
convinced that cultivating his public relations garden is
the most important activity in which he

cou~d

possibly en-

gage abroad."
An ambassador is an appointed official. Moreover,
he is not accredited to the peopZe of a foreign

,

I
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country but to· their goVePnment, which is not
operating a popularity contest or seeking to
determine whether Mr. Universe will turn out
to b~ the Charge d'Affaires of Upper Volta or
the ambassador of the United States. What the
foreign government is trying to find out is
what the United States will do if the tariff
on frozen poultry is raised, and what it wants.
from the American representative within its
gates is dependability and accuracy of judgment in reflecting the Washington point of
view -- just as the American government values
the same attributes. in the foreign diplomatic
representatives assembled in Washington. 17
If Briggs is hard on the amateur diplomat his view is,
nevertheless, quite representative of a general feeling
held within the ranks of the United States Foreign Service,
especially since the 1920s when the career service was upgraded in status and qualification demands.

After more than

30 years in the State Department Briggs himself is a product of that early foreign service and it is likely that
his bias is based in large part upon career abuses endured
or opportunities lost due to interference by a political
appointment.
A prominent careerist, Hugh Gibson, raised the question that the political appointee is perhaps more beguiled
by the flattery and social attentions given an ambassador
than would the professional who most likely would recognize
the attention for what it was -- a courtesy and consideration calculated to lubricate the "wheels of diplomacy."
The political appointee ·accepts such courtesies as being
extended to him personally and often succumbs to such charms
··;

by extolling the virtues of the country to which he is

1

I

I

17

I

assigned.

"This often leads to his bec.oming an active pro-

pagandist for the country to which he is accredited," that

is., sort of "placed in one's pocket" as it wer.e, and vociferously

promoti~g

his host

interests rather than

couµtry'~

the interests of the United States. 18
A less extreme point of view.is reflected by another
former ambassador and career foreign service officer of the
same generation as Briggs.

In an article for FoPeign

Af-

faiPs concerning the future of professional diplomacy in

America, George Kennan does not criticize the politically
appointed representative but offers vigorous support for
increased reliance on· the career officer,
not to serve as a museum exhibit of the external
habits and demeanor of the average American [as
has often been an argument posed in favor of the
noncareer diplomat), but to constitute an effective channel of communications with the bther .
government and a perceptive observer of life
in other countries.
His article, and indeed much of his personal activity after
leaving the foreign service in 1950, advocated improvements in the training, quality, salary and status of the
U.S. diplomatic corps. 19
1

Outside the realm of the professionals themselves,
there have been ardent def enders of the career man as opposed to the political appointee, some of which have
emerged from politicians.
based

appointment~

~rompted

by several politically-

to the foreign service made during the

Eisenhower Administration, the United States Senate, during

18
the swnmer of 1957, engaged in a dehate over the issue.
This is significant since, under the American Constitution,
the Senate shares responsibility with the President for the
quality of American diplomatic representation abroad.
Major criticisms came from Democratic Senator Hubert
Humphrey who blasted the Eisenhower Administration for
having "forgotten his campaign pledge of 1952" by appointing
political campaign contributors as ambassadors instead of
the "best men and women, the ablest and most reliable in
the land," as he had promised.

Although the Secretary of

State (John Foster Dulles) had pointed out that under
Eisenhower, the highest percentage ever 9f career professionals were at that time serving as chiefs of mission
(more than 70 percent in

195~,

Humphrey noted), still, a

significant number of American ambassadors were.large
financial contributors to the Republican part in 1956. 20
Humphrey's charge was reinforced by New York Times
columnist James Reston who also castigated Eisenhower for
not living up to his avowed principle.
The issue is not whether the Eisenhower Administration is being more political in its ambassadorial appointments than the Democrats, or
whether these jobs should b~ given to the top
-career men in the foreign service, but whether
the appointments have met the President's
principie of appointing the best men available,
regardless of party, wealth or foreign service
record.
What had occurred by 1957, in Reston's view, was that the
administration had reverted to the "porkbarrel system"

19

of appointments.

2

i

In his Senate speech, Humphrey asked that the United
States "stop treating our ambassadorial appointments as
though they were casual or relatively unimportant," and he
pleaded for greater dependence on the foreign service.

ffe
,:

felt it necessary to judge appointments on the basis of
individual merit, background, experience, education and
knowledge of languages.

Humphrey also stressed that the

Senate itself should be more·careful in its screening of
referrals from the Ptesident i~ the future.

22

In Defense of the Amateur
If the period during the Eisenhower Presidency

pro~

duced an abundance of criticism of politically appointed
amateurs to ambassadorial positions, the charges did not go
long without a response from those generally finding good
aspects to be considered on behalf of the amateur diplomatic appointee.
An interesting rebuttal came from one of the wealthy
amateur appointments made by President Eisenhower -- Mrs.
Claire Booth Luce.

In her essay "The Ambassadorial Issue:

Professionals or Amateurs?", published in Foreign Affairs,
she attempted to weigh the relative merits of both sides of
the dispute and emphasized that the issue was in her view a
relatively new one essentially arising since the passage of
the Rogers Act of 1924, which provided for better training
of c·areer diplomats.

It had not, she argued, emerged as a

20

major issue until after the Foreign Service Act of 1946,
wherein the rank of "career

ministe~"

was created which en-

j

professionals. to move higher up in the ranks without

able~

jeopardizing their position within the foreign service. 23
In defense of the Eisenhower Administration Luce
pointed out that, as of 1955, all important "sensitive or
crucial" posts had career men in charge with 22 out of
posts held by noncareer appointments.

i6

Although the major

European capitals were included in her list as less sensitive posts, she stated that the nonprofessionals at these
had some previous experience in foreign affairs.

24

But the

crux of her statement was, like it or not, money remained a
factor in getting and maintaining embassies especially in
the European capitals.

While private wealth. should not be a

determinate factor in making an appointment, "the President
today faces the necessity of picking only very rich men
certain posts."

fo~

Rome, London and Paris, for example, "are

posts around which a dollar curtain has long been drawn.
They can be assumed for any reasonable length of time only
by men with private fortunes." 25
Luce further argued it was often desirable to have a
"Somebody with a capital S" -- a proven man of distinction
representing the United States abroad rather than merely a
\

competent but relatively unknown career man.

For when a man

has made it in his own country, has acquired great prestige
through his own efforts, has demonstrated interest in public

21

affairs, has wide contacts with other leaders, and enjoys
the prestige that comes from personal friendship with a
President or Secretary of State, such factors give him much
influence in the country of his appointment.

And as for

the "political pay-off" appointment, she stated, this ·vnt-s
nothing new since virtually all appointments made by the
"Top Politician" including career envoys, were by definition political appointments: 26
Certainly there is a large measure of public
agreement on what constitutes a "political payoff." In American political practice, the personal convictions of an appointee; the size of
his private fortune; the campaign contributions
he has made in the past to the party of his
choice; the private services he has rendered
the party; his personal relation to key figures
in government (such as his blood relationship,
friendship or business association with them)
all are considered to be circumstances which
such as neither qualify nor unqualify him as
a candidate for any high office. But when
these same circumstances are presented as
be_ing qualities or virtues of the candidate's
person; especially when they seem to be his
only qualifications for the job to which he
aspires, it can be assumed -- and the assumptions is generally a valid one -- that the appointe~ is a "political payoff." 27
As a rebuke to the Senate, Luce argued that the upper
house of Congress existed as a check on Presidential appointments and can disqualify them when there are grounds to do .
so, even in cases where the designate is a "crony" of someone high in government.

So if a mistake occurs, the .fault

lies as much with the Senate Foreign Relat'ions Committee as
with any one involved in the process;

" ... too many of the

Senate's members -- opposition no less administration --

22
still regard ambassadorships as a part of the political
spoils s.ystem. " 2 8
In point of fact, the Senate has rarely failed to confirm a President's nomination to the diplomatic service regardless that many might have been based on political motivations.
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"While the Senate has occasionally balked at

particular nominees coming from outside the foreign service,
its proper inclination,"
Edgar S.

Fu~niss

according to Richard C. Snyder and

Jr., "has been to respect the desire· of the

President to have a crony, confidante or a career man representing him personally abroad."

In their 1954 study of

American Foreign Policy, Snyder and Furniss· argue that
despite past abuses, there was much to be said in defense
I''

of the President's right to go outside the foreign service
I

in naming his personal representative to foreign posts.
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The· success of a mission generally depends upon the extent
to which the representative correctly in.terprets the foreign
policy position of his own country to his assigned head of
state as well as how he correctly reports back to the-United
States the policies, goals and practices of his host government.

"The nature of this dual role demands from the diplo-

mat the quality of objectivity," according to Snyder and
Furniss.

31

But. in the American system of democr.acy the

ambassador is more than the representative of the people of
the United States; he is the personal representative of the.
President who appoints him.

32
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Before the Foreign Service Act of 1946 there was a
statutory requirement that a foreign service officer, when
appointed ambassador, had to resign from th:e service.

"This

provision served to emphasize the intimate, political relationship between an ambassador and the President," the
authors state.

Granting the existen,ce of past abuses in

that the political appointive power was used to reward
"worthy supporters" of the President -- and that, in the
past, the caliber of such men was apt to be low -and Furniss

S~yder

argue the continual raising of qualifications

has tended "to increase the ability of political appointees,·
to lower the ratio between political appointees and men in
the career service, and to increase appointments of able

.
'

{'

men."

This way, the President can still bring to his diplo-

macy '.'men of highest qualifications whose experience and
s.tature have been gained elsewhere"; busines8men for
example.

3 3

It is frequently_ important, the authors state, that
both the President and

th~

foreign governmerit

the ambassador is in fact as well as in theory

involve~
th~

know

personal

representative of the President, "that he speaks for the
President, knows the mind and thoughts of the President,
has access to him if need be; that he is, in other words,
something beyond a civil servant, a single
complex bureacracy." 34

m~mber

of a

Perhaps more than courtesy is in-

volved when the United States Senate speedily approves a

24
President's nomination.
gene~ally.recognizing

In doing so, perhaps the Senate is

and respecting the time honored

privilege of the President to place his own men as he deems
best. 3 s
In a study for the United States Senate's Committee
on Foreign Relations concerning the formulation and ad.ministration of American foreign policy, the Brookings Institute
suggested that while ambassadorial appointments from outside
the career service would face many on-the-job difficulties,
such appointments can make, and have made, significant contributions.

The major question confronted by the Institute

was not whether there ought to be noncareer appoin~ments to
high embassy posts or not; but rather what the balance
between career and noncareer appointments should be? 36
In 1960 when their report was published, 24 out of 75
chiefs of mission were noncareer appointees and these frequentiy had a better knowledge of American society than did
the career types, thus making them more representative of
America to foreign communities to which they were assigned.
Invariably the political appointees had "strong roots of
support and influence

~t

home- that can be of service in

strengthening relations with other governments."

In addi-

tion, they often demonstrated exceptional ability in one or
more fields of endeavor and in some c·ases brought valuable
executive skills to the job.

"They inject a fresh, nonpro-

fessional view," the report stated, and they reflected "one

25

of the strengths of the American system of relatively high
mobility between Government and private life." 3 ·7
One of the major reasons why only six of the major
Western European posts were .held by career officers in 1960,·
according to the Brookings report, was due to the fact ipat
private means were still "considered necessary to supplement the available governmental allowances" in some of the
more important posts.

38

If blunders occur, it is apt to be due to insufficient .training in the fundamentals of diplomacy received by
the noncareer appointments, as they are seldom in the service long enough to get it.

This places a heavier burden

on subordinates, but the Brookings report did not suggest
that only the professional should be relied upon.
The important consideration is that the post of
chief of mission is of such vital importance in
building effective relations with other nations
that it should be filled with only the most
·highly qualified individuals -- whether career
or noncareer. 3 9
Closely following the 1960 Brookings report was
Kenneth W.. Thompson·' s American Diplomacy and

~mergent

Patterns which contains a rather vehement defense of the

noncareer appointment, sometimes at the expense of the
career foreign service officer . . His thesis, like that of
Snyder and Furniss, is based largely on the President's
dominant role in foreign policy making.

Since it is the

President who makes the central decisions in foreign policy,
he must have the right to select top diplomatic officials

26

just as he has the right to choose the members of his cabinet.

Thompson argues that being forced to retain an ambas-

sador associated with a

predece~sor's

foreign policy or

holding conflicting beliefs with a President's philosophy
could have an unfortunate effect on the President's foreign
policy.

And further, to avoid atrophy and a conservative

"stand-pat" approach to foreign policy, the introduction of
fresh ideas and new leadership via the introduction of a
nonprofessional can help an administration rise above this
problem.

40

"An additional argument for the amateur derives from
the possibility of attracting men of outstanding talent" to
serve -- although they are not in the regular foreign service -- and perhaps such talent would have had.the previous
opportunity to be tested in the political arena.
r·elies heavily on history to support his argument.

Thompson
In the

Colonial and Nineteenth Century periods of American History
there simply was no qualified corps of professional diplomats through which presidents could conduct foreign affairs.
Nor for that matter did congress appropriate any significant sums to provide for such a service.

Diplomats in the

ear:lier days had to be drawn from the "old masters" of
American politics.

Later presidents were able to draw upon

the talents of a broad group of educators, journalists,
university presidents, businessmen, plus a "fair share of
scholar-diplomats." 4 l
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As late as 1914, "not a single one of our missions in
the great capitals could boast a professional as its head."
But in little over four decades, Thompson states, the change
toward more professionals was "a little short of breathtaking."

By 1939, out of 51 chiefs of mission, 25 were

drawn from the career ranks and, by 1956 the
increase to 48 out of 75.
7~

out of 97.

rat~o

would

As of March, 1960, the ratio was

Of the mission chiefs in the Kennedy Admin-

istration, 70 percent were career officers and, of the 28
political appointees, half were drawn from education, law.
or journalism while nine came from other government positions.

42

In

othe~

words, the professionals had little room

for complaint.
Such a stride was due in large measure to the passage
of the aforementioned 1946 Foreign Service Act which provided raises in the salaries for ambassadors and staff and
which facilitated the rise of professional foreigh service
officers to at least the rank of minister without losing his
career status.

Despite this rise in the star of the career

man, Thompson argues that the performance of the nonprofessional has not been bad nor has it proven detrimental to
Am.erican foreign relations.
ministers and

c~arge

4 3

"More than 2, 000 ambassadors,

d'affaires have served their country in

a little more than a cent.ury and a half," Thompson wrote.
"Few obseryers could have foreseen the achievement or
failures of individual ambassadors in advance.

While all

28

would agree that the times are too serious to send innocents abroad, the requisite qualities of the successful
envoy are difficult to assay. in advance." 4 4
Clearly when it comes to making a diplomatic appointment, the goal should be pr6fessionalism "within a broad and
inclusive definition that recognizes excellence and capacity
.manifested within and outside the Foreign Service.'' 45
Thompson bases this

conte~tion

on the assertion that, des-

pite their professional training, foreign service officers
"have all too frequently lacked the administrative experience essential to their task."

Thompson sees a problem in

stressing the specialized responsiblity of the foreign service officers in economics, politics, eta., at the expense
of diplomatic know-how.

"The diplomat.today, no less than

yesterday, must be a man of extraordinary human resources." 46
Debunking the myth that "political appointees are all
amateurs," especially where ambassadors are concerned, is
one of the goals of James L. McCamy's The ConduatI of the
New Diplomaay.

He argues that, despite the increasing trend

since 1924 to appoint career men to ambassadorial

positio~s,

they are the ones who carefully preserve the myth of the.inept amateur.

47

McCamy's major statement in

thi~

regard is that "Not

all noncareer ambassadors are amateurs," in that, especially since the years after World War

~I,

only one in five

noncareer appointments had no previous government experience

29

in foreign affairs.

48

Many had gained some experience in

foreign affairs while serving in the military; others, such
as W. Averill Harriman whose diplomatic career spanned four
Democratic Presidential administrations, were called upon
to assist the war effort from essentially private careers.
"Mr. Harriman is hardly an amateur.

Yet he is certainly a

political appo:intee," McCamy asserts, "a partisan who serves
his party as well as his country." 49
Those without government experience are not necessarily incompetent, Mccamy states, as "some extremely successful ambassadors got their first government experience in
foreign affairs in their first posts, although they may have
had international experience in journalism, business or
civic affairs."

Citing such examples as Claire Booth Luce,

Arthur Dean and Eugenie Anderson, McCamy suggests that
"good ambassadors" do come out of Congress, political
parties and law firms, among others.

50

Yet, writing in 1964, Mccamy is perhaps overly selfassured when he suggests that no President "in these times"
would appoint an incompetent person to high foreign affairs
posts.

Ambass·adorships cannot now be bought as contributors

must "appear to be competent and prove to be so if they stay
in the work.

Foreign affairs are too important to the

repu~

tation of any President t6 play loose with the choice of
either political executives or ambassadors." 51

He bases

th.is argument on the hope that, in a democracy, attitudes
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of political leaders are more crucial than their skill.

The

man who wants the political post, including ambassadorial
ones, is pre-selected as someone who can be trusted to be
''·

such a political executive in a democracy.

He is

elig~ble

to be a leader, and according to McCamy "Only his kinq.'
should be eligible. 1152
In a free society, Mccamy asserts, "only those who are
interested in public work should be considered eligible for
that work."

If, in the American system of picking political

leaders from the President on down, the

obje~t

is to get the

most competent from among these eligibles it is then the
best of systems.

In the.case of leaders for foreign affairs;

.Mccamy says the system has worked better than not, for "the
quality of political chiefs is high." 52
Searching for the Best Man
Arguments recognizing the merits of both sides in the
problem of career vePsus noncareer appointments have emerged
from the general debate and these are perhaps most sensible
insofar as attempts to apply a measure of objectivity in
analysis.

Essentially these views agree ·that despite some

obvious bad points, the role of the noncareer appointment
is· a desirable one and they should, under certain circumstances, always be ·considered when ambassadorial appointments are

made~

The first of these comes from Elmer Plischke's The
Conduat of AmePiaan DipZomaay.

Plischke feels that both
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types -- the successful man from private life and the professional diplomat -- have advantages and disadvantages.
The latter tends to be "more philosophically" inclined and
has a greater professional detachment less subject to having his emotions played upon.

The career diplomat ofteq

is prone to conduct himself and his activities primarily
with a view to continuance in his assignment, a promotion,
or at least with such discretion as to prevent the marring

ot his

car~er.

Plischke argues that

the career diplomat inclines to hedge in the
making of decisions and to pass the buck
[generally to the Department of State] while
the man from the outside [viewing his status
as· a short term thing] is more likely to arrive
at his own evaluations and decisions. Occasionally the career diplomat becomes so adept at
fence-straddling that his position appears
pitifully ridiculous to the outsider. The
political appointees, on the other hand, are
sometimes willing to accept only the more desirable, ·or less difficult assignments. 54
The criteria for selection should not necessarily be
whether the appointment comes from within the foreign service ranks, rather that the emphasis should be placed on the
individuals' capacities and abilities, according to Plischke.
The chief of mission ought not only relate well to people
but be willing to understand them and their country, know
the social, political and economic conditions of the

state~

be able to exercise leadership and command the respect of
his staff and hosts.
Sometimes political appointments result in diplomats who have little interest in their assignments
other than the enjoyment pf a' comfortable life
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overseas. But that is not to say that all appointments made outside the career service are undesirable nor does it imply that all designations from
the foreign service are to be preferred in positions where a sympathetic understanding of the
local situation is most desireous
Plischke· stated.

55

Where diplomatic problems are largely

in the nature of business and trade, however, "it may be
...

more logical to obtain someone with a business background
directly from private life." 56
As do many critics of the American conduct of foreign
affairs, Plischke reserved his strongest criticism of the
diplomatic appointing systems for the tendency to place men
f.rom an "undemocratic stronghold of exclusiveness and wealth
in the government service" particularly in the principle
world capitals.

"We are still likely to find that some of

the prize diplomatic plums are left to the multimillionaires."

But he acknowledges that not all appointments go

to the wealthy and that "some men of wealth [the author
cites Dwight D. Morrow as an example] have proved to be of
exceptiona1·value to. the service." 57
A second viewpoint acknowledging both the good and the
bad attributes of the professional and amateur alike, and
studded with case histortes to back up his arguments, is
presented by E. Wilder Spaulding in Ambassadors Ordinary and
Eztraordinary.

Spaulding deals mainly with the American

spoils system and its effect on diplomacy.

In

do~ng

so, he

speaks with an 18 year background as hist9ria1:J., editor and
officer for the-. State Department, an eight.year service with
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the United States Information Service and as a professor of
history at Harvard.
For Spaulding, the question of getting the best diplomats from the spoils system or from the career system is
on~

that will always be debated as long as America's

cal system continues.

pot+~i~

While Presidents in their election

campaigns continuously argue for ambassadorial placement via
a merit basis, they nevertheless continue to appoint diplo·t

mats from the spoils system.

,

Spaulding himse+f leans to-

ward favoring emphasis on using the prof ~s~ional diplomatic
corps as the amateurs "have too often made bad bureaucrats
as well as poor representatives of their country."

However,

he finds the "new blood" argument is often a convincing one
in that several outstanding persons "have contributed far
more than protocol and routine to the service." 58

The role

of the noncareer appointment should be considered, he states,
but only "if the power of appointment is pr.operly used." 5 9
It is understatement to say Spaulding is
the spoils system's usage for making

diploma~ic

c~itical

of

assignments:

"In the op1nion of thoughtful men and w9.men," he writes, "it
is doubtless the patronage system of appointment of chiefs
of mission at the important posts which has damned the
system [of American diplomacy] and lowered the prestige of
United States Ambassadors more than any other factor."
I

Created largely in Andrew Jackson's presidency, the spoils
system

. -,

·v
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has provided a rich fund of enticing rewards for
political hacks and lame ducks as well as genuinely
worthy statesmen -- awards that can be dispense-Cf.· by
the president with honorable mention going to the
United States Senators, who must approve the nomination, and· to the party in power. 60
However, it was

relativ~ly

recently

t~at

a career

foreign service of any size could begin to fill the
the
1·

highe~

levels of diplomacy.

neeq~

at

Even during the first half

of the twentieth century, the author. acknowledges, the service was still "comparatively young and

small."

patheti~ally

Due to these circumstances, amateurs were necessarily relied
upon to fill the expanding needs of state for the United
States.

Plus, there were other arguments in favor of the

nonprofessional:

Fresh blood was continuously injected into

the service; men of prominence and ability from outside the
normal service's narrow training were enlisted; their appointment helped insure placement of politically sympathetic men in key positions·; and, perhaps, they improved relaI

·tions between Congress and the

administr~tion

more so than.

would a "colorless" unknown from among "the State Department
Boys~rr6l

In addition to these factors,

Spaul~ing

states the

appointee from the spoils system might carry more prestige
abroad, represent more diverse geographic areas than those
within'the career ranks and, if he is independently wealthy~
his money makes the prestige posts "more affordable•

II

.

Finally, "the spoils system often provides a dignified retreat for worthy or unworthy officials whose usefulness is
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at an end."s2
Spaulding returns to the basic objections to the
L

amateur diplomats,·that being their inexperience and their
"inability to serve satisfactorily as a member of the team."
J.'

He also state·s· that, too often, the

,.

'

amateurs~"do

not know

how to deal with foreigners ... they are either stubbornly
opinionated in· their Americanism or so impressed ... so
flattered by the new intimacy with great names abroad, that
they lack balance."

This tends to lead the State Depart-

ment to discount their judgment and often forcing the
~

amateur to fall back on his relationship with the White
House.
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What follows is Spaulding's analysis, ranked by

pro~

fession, of the performances of .American amateur diplomats.
These are worth noting in that, even given. their lack of
professional training and expertise, each group has the
potential of adding strength to amba.ssadorial assignments.
Newspapermen have at least one trait in common with
diplomats in that they must both be effective reporters.
Both should possess keeness of observation, ruthlessness in
.

separating the wheat from the chaff and facility in
sion, according to Spaulding.

But problems arise as their

respective audiences are fundamentally different.
.

.

expres~

journalist writes for the world while the

.
~iplomat

The
"often

needs the assurance that the world will not read what he
is reporting."

There have been some noted journalists who

r
I
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t

have been successful as diplomats

Josephus Daniels, Robert

Worth Bingham, and Walter Hines Page for examples -- and
others who were not so good._

But on the whole, Spaulding

generalizes, though journalistic integrity is not aiways
incorruptible, "his integrity as a sound reporter should
make him more useful to the Secretary of State than his
col le.agues from many other professions." 6 4
'

.

".Men of Letters" in the early days of American diplomacy emerged from the spoils system at a time when the
nation was smaller and
a distinguished author could not help knowing many
of the distinguished statesmen of his party or section; they wrote their campaign biographies or
supported their .causes in book and periodical and
it was only natural that there should be a pay-off
in the form of an assignment to a foreign post.
At the same time, Spaulding asserts, those were the times
when there was no career diplomacy to "decry" the appointment of a Washington Irving, a Bayard Taylor or·a James
,t'.

Russell. Lowell.

.

The "Men of Letters" perhaps serve best in
.

\

cultural posts especially when there are no:troublesome
i$sues involved between Washingt~n and the host.country.
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College presidents and ambassadors have much in common, Spauldin·g states, as both must be adept at negotiations,
have a certain aura of distinction and intelligence, administrative abilities and ''a

geni~s

for getting to know people,

working with them, and persuading them."

~paulding

is sur-

prised that so few college presidents are appointed to diplomatic posts but "the eminent ones have usually been very
,\
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b~sy

men with no desire to expatriate themselves over long

periods of years."

The record of those university presi-

dents who stayed for any significant period seems to show
that ..th~y "made tolerably good ambassadors." 6 6
Historians, however,.have proven to be a generally
mixed lot.

In Spaulding's opinion they "don't always make

good diplomats," (an.d, incidently, "diplomats rarely make
-

top-notch historians").

'l

Some, like Charles Francis Adams

and John Hay, rank among the greatest.

Others, Spaulding

states, such as William E. Dodd, make great historians but
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are."unsuccessful" ambassadors.

Women as ambassadors are hard to assess as there have
been so few of them to hold high diplomatic posts.
l,

Of the

·t

. ) .

.

six Spaulding considers they have made, as a group, "a very
fair record of accomplishment," and certainly enjoyed good
press as well.

Yet, with the exception of one woman who

rose through the care.er ranks, . all played· p9~i tics.

"Each
I

was a political appointee of the most blatant sort" and none
had previous diplomatic experience overseas prior to their
ambassadorial or ministerial appointment.

68

Businessmen and basically political appointments are
reserved for special criticism by Spaulding.

They are

)

nominated by the President and/or the. Senate "because
like them or simply because they have the

cor~ect

t);1e~

political

backing," but seldom because "they know that they. will be
credible and effective representatives of Americans overseas."
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The tragedy of the system, according to Spaulding, is· that
money and politics play a much greater role than the requirements of competent and experienced representation abroad.
":'

.

'(

'

·(

Y~t,

on the whole, "most of the big'-money. men' were ·able, ·and

some of them became very good ambassadors." 69
Thomas A. Bailey, considered one of the deans of American diplomatic historian.s, also takes the position that
amateur diplomats.should not be excluded from consideration
when it comes to making ambassadorial assignments.

The basic

premise of his primer for diplomats, The A.rt of. Diploma'ay
The Ame.riaan Expe.rienae, is that the best ·diplomats "are

born, not made."

While they can learn from books and experi-

ence, "if they do no.t. have

~he

proper

qua~i ties

of mind,

character, temperament and personality, they are almost certain to fall short of completely satisfactory performance. ~'" 7 0
His contention is that while professionals might, on
the whole, be preferable to amateurs, the latter have nevertheless made a generally good mark on American diplomatic
history especia+ly if (and when) they
cri~eria
t'f
I

•

m~asured ~p

to his

regarding intelligence, integrity, dignity, .tact,

charm, discretion and patience.

(Foreign language abilities,

while desirable, are not essential for "if we must choose
between .the agile tongue
and an agile brain,
we must settle
'
.
for the brain_ that makes use of interpreters.
speaks Russian is still a fool.")

A fool who
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From his reading of diplomatic history, Bailey states
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that all embassies "are now significant outposts, and diplomacy is much too important to be left solely to the diplomats."

Where overprofessionalization, overbureaucratiza-

tion, overcautious diplomats of the striped pants variety
dominate, then a "judicious. leavening by talented newcomers
has its place." 7 2
Bailey finds that, though the practice of appointing
"fat cats" from

th~

spoils system persists to some degree,

in recent decades it has been increasingly reduce4.
appointin~

Still,

prestigious men to prestigious posts and wealthy·

men to wealthy posts continues to have a role to play.
Prestige adds to· self confidence and might.serve to impress
the host government as a compliment to it.

Personal wealth,

in countries where the expense account is managed.by a never
overly generqus
Congress, remains in some cases as a neces• t:
sity for bridging the gap.between salary and allowances on
one hand, and necessary expenses on the other.
.
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'

Some Criteria for Judgment
Having reviewed the many, varied; and often conflicting attitudes toward the question of caree~ versus ~on
career appointments

~o

ambassadorial positions.it is useful

to extricate and summarize some of the criteria against which
the success or failure of an administration's diplomatic
choices can be judged, particularly in cases where

a

co'ntro-

I•

versial appointment from the "-spoils system" is made.
Four broad areas are worthwhile to look at:

the cir-
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cumstances surrounding the appointment itself, the abilities
(contributions) and the detractions of the nominee, the am-

his post of 'assignment, and the recep-

bassador's record at

tion and reaction by the host country.

Specific questions
f

include:
1.

Motives foP the appointment:

What were the

reasons of the administration for choosing a
particul~r

nominee for an ambassadorial position?

Political pay off, exile or "out"?
undesirable incumbent?
policy need?

To "bump" an

To reflect a specific

To provide a "dignified retreat"

for a supporter?
2.

CongPessional Responsibility:

Did the Senate
I

adequately scrutinize the nomination?

Did the

appointee serve to improve Executive Branch
relations· with Congress?
3.

Relations
personal

~ith

the PPesident:
,
...

~elationship

nomination?

D~d

Was the appointee's

an important factor in his

the appointee "fall back" on his

relationship with the White House during his
te.nure?

Did the nominee adequately portray the

administration's political position and philosophy to the host government?

Did the

~ppo~nt~e's

own views sympathize with th9se of the administration?

Did the nominee have a strong influence on

the,administration?

...:- r
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4.

Pe rs ona l· wealth:

Was.ft per son al wealth a factor in

choosing the nominee for a particular post and
did his weal th serve to enhance or· detract from
his performance of duty?
5.

Did the appointment

Cultural abilities:

hav~

a

knowledge of the conditions, history, eta., of
.his host country prior to his ·appointment?
he know the language of the country?
vital factor to his
6~

Private career:

Did

Was that a

m~ssion?

Did

appointee's private

th~

vocation· contribute.to the operation and ·major
activities of his assignment?
7.

Character suitability:

Did the appointee reflect

a high degree of character while ambassador (i.e.,
temperament, personality, intelligence, manner, ·
interest)?
8.

Representative image:

Was the ambassador "repr·e-

sentative" of 'the people of the United States,
t_hat is, did he serve as a reflection ("museum
piece·") of an average American citizen or of an
... l

....

elite ·class of society?'
9.

Relations with embassy staff:

Did the ambassador

utilize his embassy staff and to what degree?

Did

he serve as a "member of the team" or operate
despite it?

Did the ambassador command the res-

pect of his staff?

Did the appointee from outside
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the

caree~

foreign service ranks help to enliven

the work of the professional staff serying him?
Did

~e

bring fresh ideas into the operation of

the embassy?

Outstanding talents not otherwise

in the embassy staff?

Was his leadership dynamic

or passive?
10.

Diplomatic skill:

Did the appointee exhibit

diplomatic skill, that is, was he adept at the
conduct of diplomacy and negotiations with a
foreign government?
handicap?

If experienced, was this a

Was he "over-awed" by his hosts and

fall into supporting their interests with unqualified admiration?
11.

Respect and popularity:

Was the ambassador able

to gain the respect of his hosts?

Did he enjoy

a degree of popularity especially with the host
officials in his country of assignment, as well
as others?
12.

AdministPative and leadership abilities:

Did the

ambassador exhibit "professionalism" especially
with regard to the suitable running of. an embassy
bureacracy?

Did he exhibit executive abilities?

Did the ambassador make decisions at the post or
pass the buck to the State Department?
app~intee

Did the

have previous experience in government?

Was he willing to take on difficult assignments?.
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13.

Politiaal sensibilities:

Did the appointee re-

flect good political judgment in assessing the
problems of the host country?
objective stance?

Did he maintain an

Philosophical detachment?

Stubbornly opinionated?
14.

Reporting:

Was the quality of the ambassador's

reporting (i.e., perceptions, accuracy, conciseness, objectivity, eta.) considered adequate by
the State Department?
15.

Host aountPy Peaeption:

What was the quality of

the welcome extended to the ambassador during his
stay at post? _How long a period of inquiry before the host country approved of a nominated
ambassador?

Was

th~

appointment treated seriously

by the host government?

Did the ambassador relate

well with the host government as well as with
persons of an unofficial status?
16.

Personal pPestige:

Did the ambassador's personal

prestige add to his effectiveness as ambassador?
Was.the ambassador a "Somebody"?

Did his per-

formance enhance the prestige of the United
States?
Plischke, in the introduction to Spaulding's

previously

cited book, has suggested it was relatively simple to assess
the success or failure of a particular diplomatic appointee
at the conclusion of his service, but it is quite the oppo-
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S'ite case to determine either this, or·even his ability or
latent inadequacy, at the time of appointment.

"Those

charged with forging able careerists and appointing equally
competent non-careerists to ambassadorial assignments bear
a heavy burden of respons.ibility for the diplomatic fUlUfe
of the country." 74
Although hindsight does make for easier historical
judgment, to render the most effective conclusions it is·
more important to look at the problems, ·advantages and disadvantages which existed at the time a diplomatic appointment was made and carried out.
As a case study for utilizing these criteria, it is
appropriate to look at an appointment made by a Presidential
administrati9n which, despite its clear intentions to reduce
the number of noncareer appointments in favor of the professional foreign.service, still drew from the spoils system"
in assigning amateurs to some of the major capitals of the
world.
In 1928, four years after the passage of the Roger's
Act which essentially established a career foreign service
for the United States, Herbert Hoover's presidency seemed to
represent the quintessence of leadership· committed to the
prof essionalization of government of the highest order and
in the best interests of the people.

Hoover, lacking the

brilliance of a professional politician but nevertheless an
able politician, was viewed as the most technocratic of
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American Presidents.

He seemed determined to move in the

clear direction of government by experts rather than amateurs.
Yet, despite these ideals, Hoover still allowed amateurs to
represent

th~

United States abroad.

As a representative case study, the appointment at·
diplomatic amateur Senator Frederic Mosley.Sackett as Ambassador to Germany in 1930 is examined here.

However,.before

fully understanding the Sackett appointment it is.importaµt
to know more of those who bear the responsibility for making
the appointment in the first place; to look at the conditions, philosophies, principles and pract1ces -- in sum, to
examine the environment in which the Hoover Administration
was operating when it decided to send Sackett to Berlin.

CHAPTER II
THE HOOVER COMMITMENT
It is symbolic that the day the thirty-first President
of the United States was inaugurated was a cold and rain
drenched one.

On March 4, 1929 a "rain spattered" Herbert

Hoover, in a somber inaugural address described as a "somewhat disappointing literary effort," spoke generally of the
need to build up the "instrumentalities of peace" for a
world which was then essentially at peace and to continue
supporting maintenance of the means for the pacific settlement of controversies between nations. 1
"In the creation and use of these instrumentalities,"
Hoover said, "we should support every sound method of conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlment."

Yet, des-

--
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In that

same speech, Hoover made it clear American business was "very
near his heart," ?-nd that he would give it as free a course
as possible under his administration. ·2

In view of America's

agreement to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 along with the
world's major powers to outlaw war as an instrumentality for

\

'ii 7
settling disputes, Hoover implicitly enhanced the position
of diplomacy as the chief means for settling disputes
between nations.
Such a

promis~

warranted specific attention in

Hoover's first State of the Union message to Congress on
December 13, 1929 wherein the foreign relations of the
United States was the foremost subject for discussion.

·In

order to improve relationships and mutual unders.tandings
with nations -- especially Latin American ones -- it was
Hoover's desire to utilize men with long experience in the
American diplomatic corps "who speak the languages of the
peoples to whom they. are accredited, as chiefs of our diplomatic missions in these states." 3

Free from the pressures

of a political campaign, Hoover placed himself squarely on
the side of the professional diplomat when he stressed the
need for a stronger State Department to Congress:
The Congress has by numerous wise and foresighted
acts in the past few years greatly strengthened
the character of our representation abroad. It
has made liberal provision for the establishment
of suitable quarters for our foreign staffs in
the different countries. In order, however,
that we may further develop the most effective
force in this, one of the most responsible functions of our Governmeµt, I shall recommend to the
Congress more liberal appropriations for the work
of the State Department. I know of no expenditure
of public money from which a greater economic and
moral return can come to us than by assuring the
most effective conduct of our foreign relations. 4
In Hoover's view, the "importance of able and experienced American diplomatic representation abroad had been
neglected as a factor in preserving peace."

He later boasted·
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that before his administration was terminated he had reversed the trend in using Latin American postings as political rewards by promoting career men to 18 out of 19 countries
in that area and by sending career men to 13 other nations.
But these he considered "lesser posts" where men of "ou"t;standing" stature would be hard pressed to go.
commitment to the

profession~l

Despite his

career man however, Hoover

sent to the "five or six great countries" of Britain, France,
Germany, Italy and Japan men ·from outside the Foreign Service; former Vice-President Charles G.

Da~es,

former Senators

Walter Eqge and Frederic Sackett, Governor W. Cameron Forbes,
former Treasury

Secret~ry

William R. Castle.

Andrew Mellow, John W. Garrett and

These were men chosen from "outstanding

citizens whose public service and personal distinction carried additional weight," but nevertheless were not professional career men.

5

They were politicians, millionaires,

Republican party supporters, businessmen, lawyers -- all
patronage appointments.
The American Diplomatic Corps:

1920s Status Report

World War I created an acute problem for the American
foreign service in that there were not enough personnel in
its ranks to

~eet

the increasing demands of a relatively

young nation thrust into world leadership.

6

In addition,

because of the war, commercial matters became of increasing
importance as the United States was transformed from a
debtor to creditor nation -- from being an exporter of raw
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_materials to an exporter of finished manufactured goods.
After the war, as international competition became keener,
American merchants turned more and more to their government
for aid to secure not only government contracts, concessions,
and loan
well.

agreemen~s,

but a modicum of protection .for them as.

Basically, the demand was to· open the.world to the

American economic market.

7

When Warren Harding and the Republican Party recaptured the White House in 1921 the question of the status and
role of the professional diplomatic corps was raised and, in
light of the post war conditions prevailing at the time, the
responsibilities of the corps were enlarged.

Historically

the party to favor professional diplomacy, and at_ the same
time commited to government aid

i~

the expansion of trade,

the diplomatic service under the Republicans became "an
important tool" in fulfilling this commitment.

In addition,

the new administration's opposition to American entry into
the League of Nations left the diplomatic machinery as
America's "only means of international conimunication." 8
Harding himself was elected by a majority large enough
to free him from many political debts which could have been
paid with ambassadorial postings.
~ampaign

And although during his

he asserted that America's diplomatic appointments

"should not be· regarded as mer.e temporary resu.l ts of political football in the United States," he still used the
spoils system.

But it was to the credit of the

~epartment

1.
50

of State and especially Harding's Secretary of State, Charles
Evens Hughes, a known advocate of the merit system for determining promotions, that the cause of the professional diplomacy was advanced further than ever before in American
history.

9

Largely due to the influence of Hughes, no career diplomats holding upper service positions before Harding's election were asked to leave when the new administration took
.office.

In subsequent appointments, preference for career

men was shown by Harding and, by 1922, over 35 percent of
all higher·posts were held by career men -- a proportion
reached before ·only under the Taft Administration.

Their

posts were in all parts of the world and included three
ambassadorships.

Depsite some charges of partisanship in

some appointments, "the public was generally satisfied with
the administration's record" 10
Hughes was distressed that he could not at the time do
more for the career men.

"The man.who entered the Diplo-

matic Service," the Secretary told Congress, "with very few
exceptions, had private means of support."

And, "it is not

a good thing for the Diplomatic Service to be recruited, even
on a merit basis, exclusively from men of families of fortune."

Yet the foreign service drew mainly from this elite

source due in large degree to the inadequate salaries paid
to career men of the corps.

1i

It was during the Hughes tenure that the momentum be-
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gan toward getting legislation to improve the lot of the
career foreign service and it remained for Calvin Coolidge
to sign into law the reform Rogers Act of 1924 -- with nonpartisan backing in Congress -- which substantially raised
the status and salary of the career foreign service officer.~ 2

When Hughes left office in 1925, nearly 40 percent of
all upper service posts, including a third of the ambassadorships, were held by career

men~

For

th~

rest of the decade,

dominated by Republican administrations and politics, the
cause of professional diplomacy in America was advanced as
there was an increas~ng reliance placed upon career men. 13
Mainly because of the President's disinterest in
foreign affairs, his Administration placed a great deal of
control for foreign policy in the hands of Secretaries of
State, Hughes and Frank B.

~ellogg.

Of the 25 appointments

made under Coolidge, 15 were given to career men and, by

1927, over 45 percent of the major posts were in career
hands. 14
The pressures for the elevation of the status of the
foreign service did not end in 1924, and an incident occurring in the midst of the-election of 1928 was significant in
demonstrating the growing self-assured assertiveness of the
career personnel

~uring

the period.

Just prior to the elec-

tion a score of career men in ambassadorial and ministerial
posts decided to break with prece4ent and not submit their
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resignations to the new President after March 4, 1929.

A

few political appointees were also taking this attitude but
most were those who had come up through the ranks of the
diplomatic and consular services who disliked the idea of
being deprived of their posts in order to make room, possibly, for polftical appointees, or at least being demoted
to secretaryships if no ambassadorial or ministerial positions were open to them.

According to the New York Times,

"Any move by foreign service officers to remain in their
posts would be regarded as startling, and would' doubtless
provoke a storm of controversy in Congress." 15
Secretary of State Kellogg asserted that the administration's position that the "career men" were still personal
appointe.es of the President, as were all the top official·s
in the State Department.

"Governmental circles" began to

argue that Congress should create a grade of minister "to
which career diplomats could be appointed whether on assignments abroad as resident plenipotentiaries or not," as this
would mean professional diplomats would not have to be
terminated as a result of an administration change nor would
they have to resign from the foreign service when appointed
to an ambassadorial position.

Kellogg argued that the State

Department never looked into the politics of a man in the
foreign service when it wished to appoint a minister, and,
besides, it was hard to get qualified men for top posts
within the service due to lack of funds and an inability to

·1
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pay adequate salaries. 16
It remained for "silent Cal" Coolidge to assert the
power of the Presidency over the appointees in this, the
most serious breach in the hitherto constructive relationship between the Executive and the professional foreign
service officers.

Coolidge rejected the notion of the

career men not resigning claiming their action was "miconstitutional and savors of an attempt to set up a self-perpetuating body."

Such an action, he pronounced, would be

highly irregular and not in accord with long standing custom.
The appointees were the representatives of the President in
carrying out his instructions and policies and that if they
did not resign the President had the power to remove them. 17
Perhaps out of regard for avoiding disagreement with
his chief, Secretary

~f

Commerce and Republican party nominee

for the Presidency, Herbert Hoover, did not speak out on
this issue during

th~

1928 campaign, despite his indications

of support for more professionalism in governme_nt.

But once

assured of the office, Hoover became the most outspoken
pres~dent

in favor of the advancement of the professional

diplomat.

·His favoritism for professionalism peP se, how-

ever, would be tempered not only by the economic conditions
of the world during.his administration but by his

ow~

pre-

dilections for business politics as well.
The Hoover Apprenticeship
After Hoover's inauguration and soon after his appoint-
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ment of Henry L. Stimson as Secretary of State, the entire
State Department personnel from the previous administration
was retained

witho~t

acceptance of the resignations which

came from all ranking officials including ministers and am.

bassadors.

~:

However, given Hoover's "definite ideas abo-qj:

improving that branch of government," a considerable shakeup
in the foreign service was taken for granted by the press
and expected in the State Department. 18
Both President Hoover and Secretary Stimson would be
noted for sustaining the progress of the career foreign
service during 1929-33 such.that by the end of

th~ir

term

in o_ffice, 51 percent of the upper service posts -- including nearly half of the ambassadorships -- would be filled by
professionals. 19

This trend towards professionalism in

Hoover's thoughts had been gaining ground beginning with his
own observations of the conduct of American diplomacy right
after World War I, continuing throughout his term as Secretary of Commerce during the 1920s, and perhaps culminating
in his outspoken pronouncement after his Latin America tour
to appoint more career professionals to high diplomatic posts
in that region.
In his memoirs, published in 1951, Hoover recalled his
impressions of the post World War I period when balance of
power politics and military alliances continued as a
"national necessity" for the major nations in Europe.

The

United States, however, was ill-adapted or prepared to en-
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gage successfully in these practices or even understand
them.

The· whole system of American government with its

"shifting administrations and policies" prevented the United
States from developing experienced personnel which could
comprehend and deal with the complexities of European politics.

"With our changing elect ions, " Hoover wrote, "we can

never have the continuity in foreign policies upon which
such men could act with assurance in these fields, if they
did know."

Further, if. confirmation of American naivete in

politics was needed, one "needs only to analyze our group of
peacemakers who, with little experience in foreign af·fairs,
worked in a sort of daze over the forces they met at Paris.

20

Despite America's alleged inability to deal on a par.
with European diplomats, as Secretary of Commerce, Herbert
Hoover was convinced of the desirability of America taking
advantage of foreign investment opportunities.

The resources

of his department were mobilized to awaken American

business~

men to these ·opportunities and to aid those who were "willing
to participate" in foreign economic activity.

21

Hoover

maintained a conviction that American investors "deserved"
~heir

government's guidance.

22

Hoover continued gradually to develop a distaste for
direct political involvement in European affairs.

Although

he tried to be realistic about America's prominent and growing role in world affairs (he originally supported American
entry into the League of Nations) his disillusionment with
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the conflicts in Europe, the horrors of World War I which he
saw first hand while serving as Chairman of the Commission
for Relief in Belgium and as Director of the Federal Food
Administration during the Great War, and with the bitter
battle over the Versailles Treaty, caused him to fall back
on reaffirming the ideology of American nationalism. 23
As Secretary of Commerce, Hoover built up an amazingly
effective force of commercial attaches working abroad almost
totally independent of the regular foreign service.

Hoover's

own "foreign service" in Commerce proved more competent in the
surveillance of American business interests and

opp~rtunities,

a relatively new mode of foreign work for which the regular
diplomatic corps seemed ill-trained to perform.

This acti-

vity was the source of constant friction between Commerce and
State, at least at levels below the secretaryships of each department.

Under the Rogers Act of 1924 general jurisdiction

over all American governmental activities abroad was placed
under the Secretary of State.

However, Hoover's attaches

proved quite adept at working outside the eye of the-local
embassy.

This contributed to Hoover's idea that the regular

diplomatic corps, though seemingly professional in the ordinary modes of diplomacy, required effective training in order
to meet the needs of the modern world of the 1920s. 24
Beyond the perceived need for a professional foreign
service to work in the

complexit~es

of post war international

politics, much of Hoover's foreign policy views were formed
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during his years as Secretary of Commerce and, not surprisingly, many had an economic bent but with a decided distaste
for official political involvement on the part of the United
States.

Hence, Hoover was most actively involved in the en-

couragement and benign supervision of private sector loans
to the nations of Europe (and especially Germany) as an acceptable means for aiding in the reconstruction of the
European economy which, he believed to be closely involved
with America's .
.The war debt and reparations issues caused a lot of
bitterness among Europeans toward America, mainly due to the
terms under which American assistance was offered.

Perhaps

the most severe American government qualifications for loan
approval was that of concluding war debt agreements with the
United States first before any substantial loan assistance
would be encouraged.

As Secretary of Commerce, Hoover ex-

erted a dominant influence in implementing the government
position on war debts.

Earlier, in 1922, while Hoover was

a member of the World War Foreign Debt Commission, he proposed cancellation of pre-armistice debts.

Yet as Congress

and perhaps American public opinion was against such an
idea, it was dropped.

As the British and French mounted a

propaganda campaign for cancellation and asserted. that
American f ~ilure to guarantee the payment of German reparations and other financial obligations were

aggravati~g

the

international transfer problem, Hoover became more insistent ·
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upon separating the questions of debts and reparations al- ·
together.

25

Eventually

a major principle in Hoover's loan policy

was to discourage further loans to debtor countries who
failed to strive for balanced budgets and economic. stability.
Hoover's initial policy toward Germany during his years in
Commerce was to encourage private sector loans from America
with the sanction of the United States government in the
hopes that financial recovery could be spurred without
threatening the reparations plans
Plan.

worke~

out under the Dawes

As long-term observation determined increasing dangers

of default on loans to German industries, Hoover pressed for
closer·governmental supervision of these private sector
loans.

But with the private sector calling the shots, there

was little real cont:rol exerted.
According to economic historian Joseph

Br~ndes,

neither

Hoover "nor Hughes and Kellogg, certainly not Mellon were
willing to appear in a position of curbing American enterprise.

Hoover, it is probable, hoped that American bankers

would make the right choice voluntarily ... " 26

Yet, in the

1920s there were considerable speculative excesses and
Hoover's inability to exert stricter controls over the loans
to Germany while he was Secretary of Commerce perhaps also
reflected limitations of his own influence in a Republican
administration.
Hoover was intensely concerned with the Latin American
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region as a "huge market" for American products and as a
source of raw materials and under his auspices an official

corps of experts on Latin American economic affairs was
developed within the Commerce Department. 27

.Over the ques-

tion of loan standards to Latin America Hoover was
odds with the State Department.

ofte~

at

His belief that loans

·should be on a "business basis" rather than enforced via
"dollar diplomacy" and because he opposed use of military
intervention and/or non-recognition as forms of pressure
seemed to contradict the long standing policies practiced
since the Wilson Administration.

28

Brandes has asserted that American public opinion was
turning away from the direct extension of political influence in ·Latin America along the "old lines of dollar diplomacy" and that Hoover's emphasis on policies "justified the
economic interest of the entire hemisphere" and, unencumbered
by political.considerations, they gained favor in post war
America.

Frowning on the use of "coercive measures" Hoover

felt more government supervision of investments, particularly. before they were made, was required.

Hoover did not

sanction armed intervention, preferring instead "the pragmatic bargaining of the international market place." 29
Hoover has reinforced this thesis himself.

Dissatis-

fied with American "dollar diplomacy" attitudes by threats
and intimidation on behalf of speculative citizens when their
investments went wrong, and especially dissatisfied over the.
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character of American loans in the area, Hoover declared
that "American citizens venturing their capital and energies
in these states were doing so at their own risk, and that
our interventions on their behalf if they were unjustly
treated would be purely moral representations." 3 0

Hoov~r.

believed the best preconditions for a loan were to consider
countries who balanced their budgets, refrained from requesting unnecessary or unproductive loans, and eschewed
armaments and warfare.

This counsel was expressed not only

to Latin American nations., but to the great powers of
Europe as well. ·
The President's Policy
Once safely ensconced as president-elect, Herbert
lioover journeyed to several Latin American countries largely
to demonstrate to the south-of-the-border nations "an entirely different attitude" that his administration would
take toward that region.

Hoover regarded improvement of

relations in Latin America as "especially vital, for it
seemed to me that in the future outlook of the world, we in
the· Western Hemisphere not only shared mutual interests,
but common threats to those interests;"

He wanted to empha-

size a new policy -- good neighborliness -- and one of the
concrete results of his visit was a·commitment to improve
American diplomatic representation in the area.
"During my journey I had the opportunity to observe
the character.of our Ministers and representatives," Hoover
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later wrote.

"Some of them ·were 'career' men doing magni-

ficent service.

But some were political appointees who were

eyesores to the countries to which they were accredited and
to us.

I determined that we must reorganize the whole ser-

vice." 32
This, he considered, was one of the achievements of
his Latin America policy; the removal of ·pol.itical appointees
from his own party's administration as ministers and ambassadors and the sending to each post a professional "or otherwise independent person who had a background of experience
and a familiarity with the people, their language, customs
and culture." 33

Certainly no other Chief Executive before

Hoover had made as strong a commitment toward the professional diplomat.
In early 1929 there was no great pressure on Hoover
to make hasty appointments to the diplomatic posts around
the world.

Wi~h

time for reflection on the matter, the New

York Times speculated that, due to Hoover's interest in
developing foreign trade relations, men more familiar with
business affairs than ·were "nine out of ten professional
diplomats" would be sent into the field.

"That this can be .

done is clear from the work of the Commercial Attaches.
They have combined political and social contacts with a proper regard for economic interests." 3 i.

But in a short while

the New York Times reported the White House would make "few
changes of major importance."

Many of the appointments in
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Europe, made previously by Coolidge,

~ere

carried over for

a time and, for the then vacant posts in London and Paris,
career men were not suggested for.posting to these.

Instead

the Times suggested that in choosing ambassadors for these,
men with "personal weight and attractiveness of character,
together with representative quality not required by law but
demanded by an old and honorable tradition," combined with
diplomatic propriety and expertness be sent to London and
Paris.

3 5

Aside from drawing upon the.business and professional
world, particularly for Europe, it was nevertheless under,stood Hoover would make better use of experienced foreign
service officers and "encourage their natural desire for advancement."

Assignment of political appointees, except in

some notable instances, would be to countries where their
reputations would be an asset and the "handling of economic
questions through diplomatic channels will not require the
training which the permanent foreign service is supposed to
give."

Career men, the Times stated, should go to the more

demanding

p~sts

-- Latin America, for example -- where the

furthering of America's ."material interests" in areas· where
the "best opportunities" existed for the extension of
American business.

36

Hoover's promise to strengthen United States representation in Latin America made sense as it would provide an opportunity to show if the "career men" would be up to the
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!·

task of furthering American material interests.

It was

clear to the Times that Hoover was not impresseq with the
foreign service due in large part to the growing differences
between the Departments of State and Commerce when the

Pres~

ident was Secretary of the latter.
But nothing has appeared to indicate that, whatever feeling the commercial attaches of the
Department of Commerce may have had, and have,
against the career men of the State Department
Foreign Service, it will influence Mr. Hoover
now that he is President in dealing with our
diplomatic representation abroad. Instead, the
career men are to have the opportunity ... to
test their ability as business agents for the
United States. 37
Nevertheless, in Latin America and the Far East, all
major posts (with the exception of one) went to professional
career men, prompting two of Hoover's contemporaries to
write that the United States gained "a Foreign -Service of
the first rank.

Never in our history was peace more assured

to the American people or did the United States stand in
higher esteem of the world than on March 4, 1933," when
Hoover left the White House.

38

_

Despite the gains of the foreign service in the 1920s,
the New York Times' diplomatic correspondent noted that
morale in the service, by 1929, was at an all time low.

In-

adequate .salaries still prevented many from going to the top
posts (and hence most of the ambassadors in the grander posts
still had to be men of private means).

Resignations within

the service began to increase as officers saw little in the
way of a future· with the State Department.

"Some of this
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reported dissatisfaction is due to a continuation of the
practice of giving most of the outstanding Ambassadorships

to noncareer men." 39
Since the State Department was identified as Hoover's
foremost "Instrumentality of

Pe~ce,"

both he and his Secre-

tary of State, Henry L. Stimson, actively sought to
streng~hen.it.

With additional Congressional increases in

allowances for the top echelon positions,. it became easier
to place career men without private incomes into ambassadorial and ministerial positions in most areas of the
world.

40

The Stimson Influence
No less than his predecessors -- Hughes and Kellogg
Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson depended greatly on his
personnel in Washington and especially in the field.

41

As

the number two spokesman for American foreign affa1rs, and
.Perhaps the most predominant spokesman after President Hoover
became engulfed in the problems of the deepening Great Depression, Stimson attempted to control as much as possible,
the appointments to tQe top echelons in the State Department .~2
When Stimson took over the State Department he was
barely known by Hoover who had selected him on the basis of
his reputation

a~

a loyal party man with a keen sense of

foreign affairs, and even then only after both former Secretary of State Hughes and Senator William E. Borah had de-
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clined the job.

Although Hoover and Stimson would have

sharp disagreements over policy and action -- frankly admitted to in their respective memoirs -- Hoover would later
compliment Stimson for his "integrity of character, his
loyalties and his long experience in public affairs" as
having been a "contribution to American life in its best
sense."

The Secretary, Hoover stated, "was a man of integ-

rity, sagacity, loyalty, and patriotism, as befitted that
office." 43

However, when he came in 1929 to take over the

State Department,

Stim~on

felt this was the one assignment

of all his years of public service for which he was least
prepared.

44

At the top echelons Stimson assembled one of the most
highly regarded and capable "team" of policy officers ever
seen at the State Department up until that time.

Relying

much on the experience of others, Stimson retained the

majo~

assistant secretaries from the Kellogg period and added
several prominent new members drawn from professional businessmen, lawyers and economists with experience in some form.
of foreign affairs.

45

Yet, as time went on and America entered the throes
of the Great Depression and as the problems of the Hoover
Administration grew, Stimson found it difficult to get private citizens of "standing and ability" to help him at the
State Department.

The series of refusals Stimson received

was indicative of the preoccupation of "able men" (especi-

1
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ally after 1930) with their own affair~.

Stimson woul~ later

write that, at the time, "the needs of the nation, and the

world, were given second rank." 46
As for the placement of representatives in the field,
Stimson became a most ardent supporter of the professiqnal
career man's promotion to ambassadorial and ministerial
positions in most areas of the world.

In that the chiefs of

mission in the Latin American nations were mainly career
officers, Stimson credited Hoover's promise to strengthen
the diplomatic service in that area.

But he also realisti-

cally knew career men went there because "the men who had
earned political rewards.were not ordinarily eager to serve
in Latin Amerl.ca." 47
Stimson felt the view of many Americans in 1931 "to
assume that their foreign service does not match that of
other.nations," was wrong.

He saw that the career officers

of the State Department both in Washington and abroad as
executing their assignments "with their accustomed skill and
devotion."

The critical events in Europe and the Far East

during 1931-33 reinforced Stimson's conviction

"tha~

Ameri-

can professional diplomats were at least as good as any in
the world -- their difficulty was that their country seldom
supported them with effective policies." 48
Unlike Hoover, Stimson did not speak in terms of the
desirability of appointing noncareer men of distinction to
the major world.capitals.

Yet in view of his Republican
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partisanship and his own career, it is unlikely that Stimson
did not support Hoover's opinion that men of distinction

should be sent to the greater. posts of the world.

What is

important to understand is Stimson's general philosophical
attitude ·which indicated perhaps more a preference for allowing the conditions of the time and the demands of the specific job to determine ·the desired qualifications of an individual needed to meet the challenge.

His philosophy

harkened to Wilsonian morality wherein public opinion could
be depended upon to support righteousness in world politics.
Honest diplomacy backed by the decency of mankind would make
for wonderful relations with everyone on the international
scene.

49

-.

As the Great Depression settled over the United States
during the 1930s, American public opinion lost its purity of
cause and demanded that the great major powers of Europe pay
their war debts lest "the American taxpayer, who had troubles
of his own, would have to .pay." 5 0
sophic idealism for

eco~omic

Stimson, forsaking philo-

pragmatism, felt it best to

cancel the obligations outright but Hoover, more vulnerable
to the American public, continued to feel that they should
be repaid.

German reparations, Hoover insisted, were not to

be·related·to the debts owed by the Allies.

But the German

economy remained of vital interest to the United States due
to the extent of the huge loans made by private American
bankers.

If these loans, bad as they might have seemed to
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Hoover, were jeopardized any further, then the world-wide
Great Depression would mean greater catastrophe for America's

own sagging economy.

5

i

In Europe the challenge to American diplomacy was
\

seemingly clear.

But did American diplomats measure up to

that challenge?
The Context For American Diplomacy Toward Europe in 1930
.In general, the Hoover Administration closely reflected
American public opinion, at least as far as foreign policy
attitudes were concerned, even after the Crash of 1929 and
entrance into the Great Depression.

The mood of the country

throughout the 1920s seemed, for the most part, against a
policy of extensive world commitment as "the immense prosperity of the United States concentrated American attention
on domestic rather than foreign affairs."
~arding

Plus, neither

nor Coolidge were leaders in the realm of_ foreign

affairs, in large part because the former was basically intellectually mediocre while the latter was "incapable of
powerful or effective leadership."

Hoover, on the other

hand, was not like his predecessors.
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A major historian of the period, Robert H. Ferrell,
has described Herbert Hoover as "one of the most learned
and capable men ever to ri.se to the presidency.

In sheer

mental power, in administrative ability, the thirty-first
President of the United States has had few equals." 53

His

experience in foreign affairs was superior to Stimson's and
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he was, according to Ferrell, "the best-traveled American
l

l.
I

l

President" since John Quincy Adams.

Unfortunately Hoover

was to become a victim of circumstances effectively beyond
his control.

By late 1930, the Great Depression had swept

over America and Western Europe casting with it a "depression psychosis," a loss of self-confidence and a "timidity
of statesmanship" on the part of nations which even Hoover
could not overcome.
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Hoover strongly believed the "Great" Depression did
not really start in the United States until after the European economic collapse.

Economic failures in many countries,

particularly Germany, were responsible for the economic
crisis which pulled the vulnerable American stock market
down in October, 1929.
whic~

Europe was "the great storm center"

"burst into a financial hurricane" after the spring of

1931 as a direct result of the economic consequences of
World War I.

Although he was certainly alarmed over the

"growing tide of speculation" and inflation of credit during the 1920s, Hoover believed the first 17 months after the
Crash did not constitute a major depression and was instead
a mere recession and that· even during the first three months
of -1931 the American economy was beginning a strong convalescence.

The Crash itself, he felt, was but a

readjustment of the economic system.

sal~tary

External influences,

Hoover believed, cui that recovery short.ss

,This attitude,

plus the belief that the "rotten banking system" contributed

i
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to the economic malaise, as Ferrell points out, explains
much of the policy towards Western Europe during the re-

mainder of the Hoover Administration.
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When Hoover took off ice in 1929 he mirrored public
sentiment by serving as a "business" administration and in
this he inherited much of the traditional

Republi~an

foreign

policy to which he had himself significantly contributed during the 1920s.

Throughout that period the Republican leader-

ship sought to enlarge America's economic superiority in the
world while at the same time

crea~ing

a favorable political

climate to reinforce its economic opportunities.

They be-

lieved superior management techniques would help them achieve their "economic goals without any substantial political
or economic cost.

Political commitments were to be avoided,

a signal made clear from the start of the Harding Administration.

Insofar as economic issues were concerned, the basic

Republican posture was to avoid them on an official level
~hile

at the same time supporting assistance to Europe in a

private sector capacity.
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Initially, American foreign policy tinder Hoover, whil.e
not necessarily vying for economic predominance, pragmatically sought to promote European stability. and American
interest.

sel~

When the depression struck, the dilemma became a

frantic attempt to accomplish this aspiration short of
directly involving the United States in the political and
territorial controversies of Europe.

In the midst of the
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catastrophe Hoover held economic factors as primary in both
national and international a·ffairs.

But like it or not, as

Stimson stated, the United States could no longer lead a
"life of isolation" from its neighbors as it had during the
1920s

b~come

too dependent upon the rest of the world fQ.f

its trade and commerce.

America, he said, had become the

champion of the "commercial and non-military stabilization
of the world." 58
American officials, bankers and businessmen turned
their attention on the economic and financial aspects of
international problem.s and tried to resolve them through the
use.of "experts," the .application of "business methods," the
mobilization of private voluntary cooperation from within
the financial community, and the subordination of political
factors in order to meet the perceived economic and world
peace challenges faced throughouf the 1920s. 59

Despite the

depression, this faith in economic expertise and business
methodology held by the Republicans was not shaken.
Throughout the 1920s American _foreign policy makers
recognized the importance of restoring European economic
stability in general and of specifically resolving the
Franco-German problems in order to insure America's own
economic stability.

In v·iew of prevailing American public

opinion, financial leverage via the private sector was the
best alternative available and culminated in the Dawes Plan
of 1924 and later the Young.Plan in 1930 wherein American
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loans were held as bait to gain acceptable reparations accords and debt .settlements as well as forces to curb inflationary practices and incite the balancing of European
budg~ts.

Yet political aloofness, at least superficially,

was maintained, as exemplified

~Y

the co-opting Kellogg-

Briand Pact which enabled the United Stated to avoid a
direct role in the collective security programs on the
Continent. 60

Nevertheless, by August, 1931, America's acti-

vities in Europe were so extensive that the, Journai of the
American Banker's Association declared .that "the last ves-

tige, the last pretense of following Washington's advice to
avoid European entanglements [has been] thrown aside ...
Our isolation is at an end, we sit in the seats of the
m~ghty

... " 61
In the view of many Republican policy makers the en-

tire program for European as well as American economic and
political security rested upon the "existence of a prosperous, republican and contented Germany."

Hughes believed

that "there could be no econom.ic re.cupera t ion in Europe
less Germany recuperates."

un~

Most Americans, whether business-

men or farmers, and whatever their political feelings,
agreed that prosperity in Europe depended upon Germany's
economic recovery.
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In the period after World War I, the German Government
seemed somewhat grateful for American financial a,ssistance
and actively sought to encpurage American good will.

Their
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first ambassador to the United States after the war reflected
a sympathy for business pragmatism and was chosen to further
a close economic relationship and because it was felt he
could get along well with the big-business mentality seemingly prevalent in Washington and interest America in
in the Weimar Republic.

inv~~fing

Other successive German

sent to Washington worked to .. protect Germany from excessive
political and economic demands emanating from France. 63
At the same time, Americans seemed happy to invest in
Germany and this investment wielded unofficial political advantage and aided in attempts to promote a short-lived
Franco-German

rapproachement.

6

~

However, America's total

relationship with Germany by the 1930s was nevertheless
extremely limited in that successive Republican administration policy makers, including Hoover, continued to treat·
economic and political relations with Germany as separate
matters thereby making a total aid package to Germany impossible.

The Americans were "hesitant and timid" in pur-

suing economic diplomacy on an official level as they were
committed to free enterprise principles and encouraged aid
only from the private sector. 65
Just how limited American policy was became evident in
the inability of the Unted States to assist the European
powers to stabilize their economies and to deal effectively
with the immense national security problems involved.

This

is not to say the· United States could have dealt with such
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problems; rather, the extremity of American policy not to
become involved in European conflicts that did not relate
to vital American interests severely restricted America's
ability to interact on even a diplomatic level.

American

leaders realistically knew they could not resolve the "incendiary issues" separating France a:r;id Germany.

Recognizing

that "lasting peace depended upon mutual accomodation," the
United States did not or could not forcefully move beyond
the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact or the London. Naval Conference
of 1930 in attempting to resolve the issues involved until
the spring of 1931 when Hoover belatedly became aware of the
critical financial situation in Germany and announced a
moratorium of war debt settlements.

By late 1930 it was,

perhaps too late for the Hoover Administration to do otherwise.
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********
It is within this historical context that an analysis
of Hoover ''s ambassadorial appointments to European embassies
must be made.

Despite the pressing demands thrust upon the

United States (especially by France, Germany and Britain),
demands which would seem to require the best of American
diplomatic expertise and professionalism, the President sent
men from outside the professional foreign service to interact on his behalf with the critical policy makers in Europe.
This is not the

only.b~ckdrop

against which the drama

of diplomacy in the 1930s was played for in the short span of
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time since the Great War the entire stage for the conduct of
diplomacy had changed.

Technological advancements in com-

munciat ions enabled greater control over diplomacy by the
policymaker~

at home thereby bringing their in:f luence on

issues to a higher level than ever before.

The growing com-

lexities of economic change and expanded private business
activity forced governments to be more responsive to a
larger constituency within

th~ir

own borders now interested

in the conduct of foreign affairs.

And by virtue of the

spread of democracy -- albeit fragile in most

c~ses

-- new

challenges were offered to the traditional forms of diplo-.
matic conduct including a direct threat to the once cherished
aspect of secrecy in affairs.
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Wilsonian idealism was not simply cast aside in the
period following 1920 despite America's seemingly inward
turn away from international. involvement.

Rightly or

wrongly many believed that one of the causes of the Great
War lay in.the failure of a sinister kind of "secret diplomac·y" and that

~f

future conflagrations were to be avoided

and American security protected a "new diplomacy" with new
t~chniques

and methods to satisfy a democracy was still de-

manded in the period.
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Clearly, America recognized in-

adequacies within its own foreign service.

Forced into

relying upon diplomacy to a greater extent than ever before,
the United States after World War I undertook unprecedented
expansion and the reinforcement of its State Department.

1

I

I
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Not only were more capable men enlisted, a heavier reliance
was placed upon professional career men in the field and
mqre of them were ·sent to bolster American diplomatic posts
abroad.
Towards a more professional American diplomacy was a
policy goal held not only by political administrations in
power but an ideal genuinely held by the American people as
well.

Yet a concurrently held faith was in the ability of

the wealthy citizen to play a meaningful role in the service
of his country; that in a democracy, such as that in the
United

Stat~s,

all citizens, if capable, could serve to

foster the image of their country's liberalism whatever his
professional calling might be.

This is not to say that one

ideal necessarily contradicts the other for Americans have
always held a high regard for professionals in all walks of
life.

But it also seems that Am,ericans have retained a

streak of skepticism about placing total and unchecked control in the hands of experts.
Idealism is one thing; political practicalities often
prove to be quite another.

With this in mind it is worth-

while to examine one ambassadorial case in point wherein the
Hoover Administration, professing a commitment to place professional diplomats in top level posts, sent to Germany a
political appointee having little or no experience in diplomacy.
The question then, as now, is more complicated than
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simply asking were amateur diplomats, as ambassadors; so
bad?

An examination of one such political appointment from

outside the foreign service, that of

~rederic

Mosley Sackett

who went to Germany on behalf of the Hoover Administration
and the United States in January, 1930 will help sqed ,llrht
on the questions raised.

A successful businessman-lawyer,

United States Senator, Republican party partisan with strong
ties to the Hoover candidacy in 1928, and having no real
experience in the workings of American diplomacy, Sackett
seems to fit into many of the stereotypes commonly tagged
on to the amateur appointment from the "spoils system"
especially at a time when his own elective position in the
Senate seemed jeopardized.

1
1

CHAPTER III
A CASE STUDY: AMBASSADOR
FREDERIC MOSLEY SACKETT'S
ASSIGNMENT TO GERMANY
When a new Presidential administration publishes its
diplomatic appointments list at the start of it's term,
little criticism is characteristically voiced over. the professional career men who
ministerial posts.

a~e

.selected for ambassadorial or

It is usually assumed that since they

are professionals there is little place for critical judgment over their competency or ability to perform their assignments.

More attention, however, is reserved for those

assigned from the noncareer ranks; men and women who may
have little long term affect upon the nation's conduct of
foreign affairs but who, for the· time that their administration is in office, receive a disproportionate amount of
attention.
Perhaps, too, their noteriety stems from the location
of their assignments.

In recent years America's diplomats

in Moscow, Tel Aviv and China have seemed more pivotal to
the conduct of American foreign policy than those in the
European capitals.
ily to London,

But in 1928-33 Americans looked primar-

Pa~is,

Berlin and Rome as the central loca-

tions of world leadership, the capitals where the real power
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and the control of destinies were held; hence, anyone appointed as ambassador plenipotentiary to these posts was inevitably singled out for special attention, both by contemporaries and later by historians of the period.
In choosing Herbert Hoover's ambassador to Germany,
Frederic Mosley Sackett, as a case study for this exercise
it is interesting to note that; for the most part,. historians
dealing with the broad story of America's role in European
affairs in the period between wars have been largely indifferent to his role in the events which passed at the time
and his influence upon them.

Even in the rare cases where

statements on Sackett are made, their superficiality· indicates more of a slight-of-hand pass over. of Sackett without
any.real scrutiny of his record as ambassador nor of how he
came to get that assignment in the first place.

In general,

contemporary comments of Sackett's job as ambassador are
overlooked.

Evaluations of his record are tied to the harsh

.judgment that since America's foreign policy toward Europe
at the time failed, Sackett's ambassadorship was a failure
as well.
In The

Or~gins

of the Seaond World War, Arnold Offner

called 'sackett "a very poor analyst of the political scene"
who spent much time encouraging American investment in Germany and who became a "sympathetic, if sometimes indiscreet"
spokesman for Germany's Weimar Government "in its battle to
end reparations."

In addition Offner has asserted that
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Sackett saw little reason to worry over the turn of events
in Germany which eventually led to Hitler's installation in
the sea.t of power in Germany.

Offner has reinforced this

assessment .of Sackett in other writings without really citing specific primary evidence to adequately support his'
judgments. 1
Other critics have chastized Sackett more for the
background of his appointment than for his performance in
the events while assigned to Germany.

No less than his

colleagues in London, Paris and Rome, Sackett appeared to
emerge from America's peculi"ar form of spoils rewards.

His-

torical commentator on the Department of State, Graham H.
Stuart, summed it this way:
The appointment of Senator Frederic M. Sackett as
ambassador to Germany was perhaps most deserving
of criticism because of his complete lack of experience in international affairs. But here too,
it could be argued that Mr. Sackett was a very
successful businessman who had proved his ability
in the public service as Federal Food Administrator for Kentucky and a man who was capable of improving our trade relations with Germany. Furthermore, since Dawes, Edge and Sackett had all.been
good friends in the Senate, they would be inclined
to cooperate·in carrying out their duties abroad. 2
Perhaps the most .even-handed assessment of Sackett is
in Edward W. Bennett's Germany and the Diplomacy of the
Financial·

Crisis~

1931.

Bennett views Sackett as having been

decidedly pro-German and preoccupied with the "dangers of
communism" and being more or less a puppet used by German
Chancellor Heinrich Bruning and his foreign minister.

The

latter believed he had Sackett in his vest pocket, and both

believed Sackett was politically

..
naive.
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''Certainly Sackett

was favorably inclined to Germany, " Bennett states, "although he.did not always report as the Germans expected him
to."

Perhaps Bennett underestimated Sackett's influence in

encouraging American responsiveness in the German finan_cial
f".'·1

crisis, but he at least gives the ambassador a fair

he~~lng

on the basis of historical evidence before making his judgments.

3

The object of Chapter III of this paper is to describe in some detail, and in the context of the time described in Chapter II, the' background and political career of
Frederic Sackett and to closely scrutinize the circumstances
of his appointment as ambassador to Germany.

Significantly

Sackett's performance as ambassador and the assessment of·
his job by his contemporaries are considered with emphasis
placed upon S'ackett's ability as a nonprofessional diplomat
as well as his role in the specific events occurring in·the
Weimar Republic at the time.

4

This is done with a view to~

wards judging Sackett's record against the criteria established in Chapter I.
Mr. Sackett Goes to Washington
The political career of Frederic M. Sackett
began in the midst of the business oriented 1920s.

The as-

cendency of the businessman essentially began during World
War I when an "army of businessmen" many of whom were trained·
in professional business schools, went to Washington to help

l
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President Wilson administer "the greatest government operation in the history of the century," as the nation mobilized
to participate in the fighting of the First World War.
Later, in the nation's attempt to "return to normalcy,"
business interests found friendly receptions on the part of
the Harding and Coolidge Administrations.

Coolidge especi-

ally changed both his administration and the Republican
party into a "businessman's government" wherein all prosperity rested upon business leadership.

5

In a world for the

most part at peace, the growing movement to insure the continuation of peace was significantly supported by business
interests inside the United States.

6

In this atmosphere it is not surprising that wealthy
businessman Frederic Sackett-was elected in 1924 on a Republican ticket to serve the State of Kentucky in the United
States Senate.

Sackett easily won his primary nomination

for the position and based his successful campaign on his
appeal to businessmen.

7

Although not a native son of Ken-

tucky (he was born in Providence, Rhode Island and was a
graduate of Brown University and the Harvard Law School) he,
had marrjed into a wealthy Kentucky family and quickly established himself as ari activist in Kentucky affairs.

Sackett

served as president of the Louisville Board of Trade in 1917
and again in 1922; was appointed Federal Food Administrator
for Kentucky working with Herbert Hoover during the war
years; was a member of the

~~ntucky

State Board of Charities

i
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and Correction from 1919-1924; and was director of the
Louisville branch of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank until his election to the Senate in 1924.
Soon after Sackett married the former Olive Speed in
April, 1898, his business successes made him financially
comfortable.

However, he continued to pursue business in-

terests and in the course of his career was president of the
Louisville Gas Co., the Louisville Lighting Co., the Pioneer
Coal Co., and Black Star ·Coal Co., and was vice-president
for the Jellico Coal Co., and the Louisville Cement Co.

In

addition to these, he· worked as director for the Fidelity
and Columbia Trust Co., and the American Tar Products Co.
After his 1924 nomination victory in the Republican
primary, the Louisville Herald Post commended the Republicans
for putting forward "t.he best man that party has available."
Later, when Sackett won his Senate seat, the same paper
noted he ha.d received considerable support from independent
voters in the State "who admired his character and ability.!'
Although the newspaper regretted the defeat ·of the Democratic
candidate in the election, the Herald Post felt Sackett would
mak~

a good Senator despite the fact he was a "rock-ribbed

conservative.,."

In March, 1925 the Herald Post editorialized

that Sackett would be acceptable for he at least "looks the
part" and was "broadminded," with various experience, knowledgeable of public affairs and eminently successful.
sa·ckett, despite his origins in New England, was a "wholly
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satisfactory and representative Kentuckian of the modern
type·, the type that does things rather than· the ~ype which
talks', very_beautifully, ·of past things done." 8
I

Sackett's Senate career was rather lackluster.
most significant committee assignments during
term were essentially business oriented:

h~~

His

six-year

Banking and Cur-

rency, Interstate Commerce, _Commerce and, in his last two
1

years, the influential Finance Committee.

But given the

atmosphere of most of the 1920s, these committees played
,

merely a support

rol~

I

I

for Republican administration pqlicies

emanating from the White House -- mainly that of non-interence in business affairs

and Sackett' s. own role, perhaps

due to his own intended low profile and short experience in
the Senate, was a minimal one.

Only after the Depression

and the consideration of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff got
way did Sackett play a slightly more active role.

unde!~

However,

Sackett's record shows a more active participation in the
affairs of one relatively minqr committee, that of the District of Columbia which concerned itself mainly with road
improvements in the capital city.
·For the

mo~t

9

part, Sackett spent his time in the Senate

defending the interests of his state's coal mining industry
especially insofar as interstate coal· transportation rates
and the protection of Kentucky's favorable rate status were
·concerned.

Otherwise Sackett made few significant statements

in the Senate until April 20, 1928 when he undertook the de-
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fense of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover (then running
for the Presidency) against "partisan attacks"

if

the Senate

over charges that during Hoover's tenure as Federal Food
Administrator he had engaged in price fixing against the
interests of farmers. 10
Perhaps the only real public commotion stirred by
Senator Sackett was the .occasion he introduced an amendment
to a bill dealing with the 1930 Census.

·sacket~'squght

to

exclude aliens from _the census count which would be used as
a basis for Congressional reapportionment.

His contention

was that it was .un-American and not in keeping with the
ideas of the ·Founding Fathers to consider aliens in arriving
at the numerical representation for a branch of

~overnment.

Since most of the five million aliens in the United States
at the time were located in the·major urban areas, Sackett
contended their numbers would shift ten representatives to
those areas, depriving the rural sections of representation
in favor of the cities "with their alien hordes."

Sackett

was publicly chastized for his amendment by the New York
Times especially for the implication that foreigners "are

not as good as the native born."· The Times added that
"Fortunately, the reapportionment bill in the Senate is in
charge of Senator Vandenberg of Michigan who has denounced
the Sackett amendment as unconstitutional."

With the Con-

stitution against Sackett, the Times ·added, "to base the
proposed [census] reduction solely on racial origin is to

1
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carry xenophobia to an extreme."

In the Senate debate on
I

the issue, Sackett was vigorously opposed by botp Republicans and Democrats aµd the amendment was

overwhe~ingly

de-

feated.11

I..

Whell the Presidential Election of 1928 rolted arou~d,
Senator Sackett became most active in the campaign on behalf
of Herbert Hoover.

'In his memoirs Hoover specifically cites

Sackett as one of a group of men who informally took over ·
the pre-convention effort to generate support fot Hoover's
nomination, an effort for. which Hoover was:obviously grate.

ful. .i

2

In that same election year, Kentucky was considered
a "pivotal state" in which neither

De~ocrats

nor Repµblican

coul9 claim a safe or clear edge.

In 1924 Kentucky went for

Coolidge and the Republican party and Sackett was himself
able to ride into off ice on the crest of a "Republican
national trend and a popular President who carried Kentucky
by a sizeable margin."

In previous elections, however, the

State had gone heavily for Woodrow Wilson and, in 1920, for
James M. Cox.
Senate, a

The same year Sackett was elected to the

De~ocratic

governor was installed in the Kentucky

Statehouse and though the Republicans gained back the statehouse in 1927, Democrats bad won most of the other state
posts. 13
.

'

Certainly a fact not lost on Sackett was that the
Republican party had never carried the state in any election

I

..,
I

I

s1

;,

in which they had .. l.pst the Louisville vote.

This prompted

him to take a keen interest in insuring that his 1 home town
I

and state went for Hoover in 1928.

Complicating matters

I

..

was that the Republicans feared large interparty1defections
.

I

caused by a long time d~pression in the Kentucky\ coal industry (with the Republican party being h.eld basi.caily respon·sible for it) and by the Interstate Commerce· Commission's
decision to raise railroad freight rates, which worked ·
against Kentucky mining interests, would virtually giv~ the
state's electoral· votes to the Democratic party. I Nevertheless, Hoover carried Kentucky in 1928. 14
I

Although the stock market crash and the en+u±ng Great
t

Depression

~ere ~till

unimagined events for the future, by

the ·spring of 1928, the

di~contented

state of affairs within

Kentucky politics indicated an uncertain and difficult
fu~ure

for· the Republicans.

Sackett enjoyed his position in

the Senate however and, in early October, 1929 announced

~is

candidacy for renomination in the upcoming Republican· primary.
in on·

His confidence was
th~

inner

~ouncils

bolst~red

by a reputation for being

of the party-in the Senate, his

~e-

cent appointment to the more influential Senate Finance Committee, that he was thought to be a close friend of President Hoover and, perhaps, by the fact that in 1924 he had.
defied a long held political axiom in his home state that no
one from Louisville could win a Senate seat and that he was
the only one to break the axiom in 90 years. 15

1
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Although his announcement that he would seek re-election generated speculation that his bid would be hotly contested, the LouisviZZe CouPieP JouPnaZ, which had supported
Sackett's Democratic party opponent in 1924, stated that the
incumbent "seems assured of renomination." 16
Summons From the White House:

Sackett's Appointment

Frederic Sackett's appointment as American ambassador
to Germany was, in part, made to save the Kentucky Republican party from the embarrassment of an intraparty struggle
and to avoid the possibility of. Sackett's defeat in his
general election bid in 1930.

Republicans had noted the in-

creasing strength and influence· of a rising young state representative, John M. Robsion, who had proven to be a
skilled organizer - smart politican and a native son of the
Kentucky mountains.

~ackett,

on the other hand, "was a city

man in a rural state, weal thy in a poor sta.te, and had an
Ivy League education and Eastern birth." 17

Although Sackett

himself may not have realized it, clearly the regular Republican machine was worried about Sackett's ability to win
in 1930.
Kentucky politics was not the only factor involved in
Sackett's appointment however, as while Hoover was not
totally innured to the political situation there, it only
concerned one of several crucial "off-year" election contests in 1930.

Conceivably, and perhaps coincidently,

President Hoover recognized

t~e

long stressed need from

l
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within his own administration for an ambassador who would
quickly grasp the main issues involved in the American relationship with Germany and be able to deal with them inside
the realm of Hoover's own economic philosophies.

Sackett's

business background·, his unquestioned support of Hoover, his
prestige as.a United States Senator, and perhaps even his
personal wealth could have been strong attractions for making this ambassadorial appointment.

Hoover has indicated

that a man of Sackett's outstanding "public service and personal distinction" would enable him to carry "additional
weight" in representing American foreign policy to Berlin;
that is, presumably more weight than that of a career diplomat .18

At any rate, the political difficulties seemingly

faced by the Kentucky National Committee in re-running
Sackett for the United States Senate, and its desire to dump
Sackett from the state ticket, made his appointment as ambassador to Germany opportune for both the committee and for
Hoover's own diplomatic needs.
Certainly there was no rush made to get Sackett out of
the way after his early October, 1929 announcement to run
for re-election; the President's summons to Sackett did not
occur until December 25, 1929, almost three months later.

In

addition, Hoover had been under pressure for nearly a full
year from his top advisors in the State Department to find a
new ambassador for Berlin, though the post was not actually
vacant.

His advisors wanted a man who was business oriented,
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willing to tow the administration's line and keep a low profile.

In light of his resume, Senator Sackett seemed a

likely candidate to fill the order in any case.
After his appointment Sackett related that his nomination came as an "Xmas present in reality" even though the
President had asked him to leave
firmation by the Senate.

immedi~tely

after his con-

Despite the haste of his depar-

ture, Sackett was correct when he said "I suppose a number
of men have been in line for the appointment but it came unsolicited to me.

n.1 9

In the latter part of 1929, when it became generally
known that Ambassador Jacob Gould Schurman would be leaving
Germany, several suggestions were sent to the White House
by prominent Republicans recommending possible successors
for the President's consideration.

One came from former

Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg suggesting Silas ff.
Strawn on the grounds he was an "able diplomat, has plenty
of means, is a business lawyer of great ability, generally
interested in national commerce and attends meetings international commerce [sic]."

Kellogg said "I know of no other

one who would fill that bill better than Silas H. Strawn of
Chicago," and he was sure both Senators from Illinois would
support him.

Hoover's friend, Henry M. Robinson, a promi-

nent California banker and a member of the Dawes Commission
and hence considered knowledgeable about Germany's economic
conditions, relayed second hand the suggestion of one

j
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Walbridge S. Taft of the firm Cadawalader, Wickersham and
Taft of New York.

Taft, a graduate of Yale and Harvard Law

School, had recently resided in Berlin with an "outstanding
position" and was "financially able to do the job and ·
eminently qualified," as well.

Robinson barely knew Taft

and, without a strong endorsement passed it on to the Wqite
House "for what it is worth."

Also referred (by an unknown)

was Ira Nelson Morris, a former Commissioner General to
Italy, Panama and Sweden, and an honorary Consul General at
Chicago for Rumania.

He had resigned from the foreign ser-

vice in 1922 and was engaged in private ·financial
nesses.

busi~

20

Retiring Ambassador Schurman made an interesting contrast to Sackett, his successor, and while seemingly popular
with his German hosts during his stay, was not so popular
among many of the foreign service personnel.
Schurman, of German origin and a former president of
Cornell University, was seen as too often taking the German
point of view which, in the opinion of Assistant Secretary
of State William Castle, was "exceedingly unfortunate."

In

Castle's view, the American ambassador in Germany should be
"willing and able to get along with the Germans, but determined to uphold

vigo~ously

American Rights,

mans seemed more c:>r less willing to ignore."
ing letter to Hoover, Castle saw
German for the good of America.

21

sc:~mrman

w~ich

the Ger-

In a complain-

as being too pro-
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An anti-Schurman feeling within the State Department
grew out of compiaints coming from Americans working in
Germany.

The most prominent came from the Agent General for

Reparations, S. Parker Gilbert, who as early as May, 1927
complained that Ambassador Schurman had been talking tow
much in public about the Dawes Plan "without instructions
from home."

Gilbert fixed an unofficial complaint through

Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon and continued his criticism
of Schurman throughout the rest of the year.

22

Finally, in January, 1928, Castle felt the need to.
reprimand Schurman for alleged statements the latter made to
the German press concerning a controversy between Gilbert
and the German Government which the State Department considered ''clearly a political issue in Germany," and therefore
none of the Ambassador's business.

After reminding Schurman

of State Department-regulations concerning public statements on political issues made by diplomatic officers,
Castle said Schurman's remarks "whatever may have been the
precise words, have been of grave embarrassment to this
Department."

Schurman was reproached and his remarks re-

pudiated by the State Department.

23

But the problem did not end.

Then Counselor of Embassy

in Berlin, Dewitt Clinton Poole, noted in June, 1929 that the
situation with Schurman was growing worse " ... as the result
I should say of rapidly advancing age," (Schurman was 74)
and he expressed to Castle his hope for an early change.

1

I
~

9~

Poole (and, he adds, John Cooper Wiley, a secretary at the
embassy) insisted that he had tried to cope with "the situation" for three years but, "I do not hesitate to say that our
efforts have been in large measure successful."

Poole

characterized Schurman as !'entirely out of touch with reparations and business questions and even got political questions tangled ... "

Though it seemed to suit the German in-

terest that Schurman remain because of his friendly public
attitude and because he did not "meddle too much" Poole said
that as long as he were there to back Schurman up, the Germans could live with the Ambassador.

The·Germans, he said,

felt that "the combination of Schurman and Poole produced
as good a situation as one could hope to have and it would
be (in the German view] the part of prudence to keep it undisturbed if possible." 24
A year after his reprimand of Schurman,

Cas~le

finally

suggested to President-Elect Hoover that Schurman be dropped
from the'new administration's list of foreign service appointments.

Though most changes recommended for the foreign

service would not have to be made immediately, Castle considered a· change at Berlin to be urgent.

"Schurman invari-

ably takes the German side in all negotiations and is a
dangerous talker," he told Hoover.

In his brief on Schurman

sent to Hoover, Castle added that the ambassador "is a very
careless speaker and is continuously getting the Government
in hot water."

A very different type of man was needed,
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Castle argued, especially during reparations talks with the
European powers.

25

In appoint.ing a successor to Schurman, Castle wanted
Hoover to consider someone with ta.lents of a high order.
"It is not a particularly pleasant position and, therefore,
needs a man full of the spirit of service, a man trained in
business rather than an intellectual like Doctor Schurman
is needed." 26
Despite this appeal, Hoover delayed nearly a full year
before replacing Schurman, who did not formally resign his
position until January 21, 1930.
In announcing the Sackett appointment to Berlin on
December 30, 1929 the New York Times noted that two of three
top.diplomatic posts in Europe had gone to members of the
Senate (Walter Edge was posted to Paris).

The third, London,

went to millionaire former Vice President Charles G. Dawes
who had been a member of the Senate the- previous year.
Meanw~ile,

27

the reaction in Berlin seemed favorable to

the Sackett choice.

Reporting the reaction of the German

press, the Times said Berlin was presuming the appointment
to be definite.

DeP Montag stated that Hoover "chose a

personality with a thorough economic and financial experience since the speciaJ status of the United States demands
at the Berli.n post a self-reliant and resourceful man on
economic questions."

Though expressing surprise at Sackett's

appointment specifically, DeP Montag said it was generally

1
I
l
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known that Hoover intended to select a member of his wartime
relief organization.

28

Sackett's appointment met with a "cordial reception"
in Berlin, the Times reported, with special accolades coming
on the grounds that Sackett "is reported to be a man of
mature economic financial orientation."

This qualification

constituted, in German opinion, a valuable asset for Sackett
because of the increased German-American post war relationship.

29

The Berliner Tageblatt viewed Sackett's appointment as
a compliment in that it placed Berlin on a_par with London
and Paris in American esteem, and "gives Berlin the future
benefit of the service of a man whose influence with Mr.
Hoover and the American Senate, where issues of foreign
policies are decided, will be amply vouchsafed," according
to a Times report.

Tageblatt stated that Sackett's appoint-

ment was a "New Year's gift to Germany" as he not only
''wields weighty influence in his own political party, but
also possesses sympathetic understanding for problems confronting Germany."

In his brief on the German press reac-

tion, Schurman informed the State Department that the
Tageblatt had stated Sackett's appointment was for domestic

as well as foreign political reasons.

It was desirable

I

"that Berlin have an Ambassador who can use his influence

I

with Hoover and the Senate," where the important decisions

Il

were made.

I

I

Stressed in other newspaper reports was that

..
I
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Sackett was an old friend of Hoover's which could be an
asset, especially where German economic interests were at
stake.

Schurman further reported a statement in the December

31, 1930 Deutahe AZigemeine Zeitung that "contrary to

European practice, there is strictly no diplomatic career in
America.

America has, on the whole, fared well with diplo-

mats who have not spent their entire life in the foreign
service."30
As for the most watchful journalistic eye over
America's own diplomatic appointments, the New York Times
was itself generally critical of the.Berlin assignment by
Hoover, viewing it as "frankly a departure from the older
way of sending men of peculiar distinction" to represent the
United States to the leading

~apitals

of Europe.

Sackett's

appointment was seen as "something of a drop" from the cal.iber of previous ambassadors to naming a businessman . . "But,"
the Times grudgingly stated, "the President is fully entitled
to follow the new line of foreign representation, so long as
he is convinced it is for the best interest of the nation."
Hoover's choice confirmed "his preference for a businessman
and a former Senator· in an important diplomatic position." 31
The Times further speculated that Hoover was motivated
by a desire to "bestow .an honor" upon Kentucky which had
given him a great majority in the Election.of 1928.
But his.main.interest is doubtless to
his idea of the immense importance of
tions with Germany and other European
is paying a compliment to Germany, as

emphasize
trade relanations. He
he did to

~
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France, by going outside the routine diplomatic
service to choose an Ambassador who stands apart
as the President's special selection to do a
special work. 32

As an "educated man of agreeable manners and distinct
social gifts," Sackett would no doubt be accepted by Germany
and, according to the Times, he would do what he could to
''rebuild the bridge between the two countries, over which
for so many years passed representatives of the culture and
science of either to the great benefit of both. 1133

Although

Sackett's appointment was seen as being in keeping with
Hoover's "plan" of naming businessmen to certain important
posts, it was also seen as solving "a troublesome political
situation in Kentucky" where it was expected that the government there would appoint the likely Republican state primary
candidate, State Representative John Robsion, to fill
Sackett's soon to be vacated senate seat until an election
in that state could be held.

34

Back home in Kentucky, a menacing political situation
had indeed been solved.

The Louisville Herald Post, in

announcing Sackett's appointment, proclaimed it "the highest
honor of ·the kind that has ever come to a Louisville citizen," and editorially praised Sackett as one of those in
whom the White House reposed high confidence.

In going to

Berlin Sackett would be important because "his intimate
knowledge of finance is a positive asset. 1135
But the impact upon Kentucky state politics was clear
and more to the point.

"This wholly unexpected termination

1
\
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of the senatorial career of the Louisville statesman ...
came like a bolt from the blue in political circles in
Washington," ttie Herald Post reported.

And according to the

Louisville CouPier JouPnaZ, up until the moment of the

announcement, it was .felt Sackett's greatest concern waM to
win renomination.

36

The Washington correspondent for the

HePald Post emphasized the administration's official explana-

tion -- that Hoover wanted a man in "close contact with his
economic policies" in the Berlin post.

"The President is

said to feel that Senator Sackett is thoroughly competent to
represent not only the American viewpoint but the Hoover
policies. 1137
Nevertheless, the announcement was met with guarded
enthusiasm, almost a sense of relief, by Kentucky Republicans.

One newspaper stated Sackett would be leaving the

"distasteful" game of politics "in which he felt he had to
engage for the purpose of retaining his Washington position.
He is to be congratulated on escaping from such a campaign
for re-election as seemed to confront him." 38
It was political pressure from a faction supporting
Robsion's bid for the Republican nomination for Sackett's
Senate seat that "led Sackett to abandon his announced fight
for renomination and take the diplomatic job," according to
one correspondent.
by surprise.

Still, the appointment took Washington

The capital city's "social, political, diplo-

matic and official circles are still buzzing today with

1

!
I
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gossip over the revelation that the President had plucked
another Senator for the diplomatic corps as a means of meeting party vicissitudes." 39
Indications were that pressure on Hoover to make the
appointment had come from Republican National Chairman
Claudius Huston and Kentucky State Committeeman J. Matt
Chilton of Louisville as a means for gracefully getting
Sackett out of the way of the seemingly more attractive and
youthful Robsion in the primary contest in hopes of preventing an adverse political situation in Kentucky from growing
worse. 4 o
The New York Times political analysts had anticipated
a bitterly fought primary campaign between Sackett and
Robsion.

With Sackett out of the way, Republicans could

then unite behind Robsion.

Still, the Kentucky Democrats

were judged to be· very strong and, if united, had an excellent chance of defeating native Kentuckian Robsion; a
"chance that would not have been so good against Mr.
Sackett."41
The State party machine was grateful to Hoover for his
action.

In

a.t~legram

to the White House, Chilton and other

prominent members of the Kentucky State Republican organization thanked Hoover for Sackett's appointment, ironically
adding that " ... while political considerations had nothing
to do with appointment the result thereof has brought harmony to the Republicans of Kentucky and the Republicans
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throughout the state are jubilant.'' 42

Clearly, Kentucky

Republicans were happy to see Sackett leaving.
Despite the benefits for the Kentucky Republicans,
Sackett's appointment caused a minor political headache for
Hoover.

To send the Senator to Germany was, in effect, to

exile one of his staunchest allies in Congre·ss and specif ically from the influential Senate Finance Committee, in the
wake of the repercussions caused by the October, 1929 Stock
Market Crash.

Soon after the appointment was announced some

Washington observers speculated that Sackett's confirmation
by the Senate might be delayed in order to prevent renegade
Senator Robert LaFollette from obtaining a position on the
Senate Finance Committee.

Some Republicans hoped Sackett's

exit could at least be delayed until after the committee had
acted on the Smoot-Hawley Tariff bill.

43

Whatever the fears, Hoover conveyed Sackett's nomination to the Senate on January 9, 1930.

Senator William E.

Borah, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
moved the nomination be confirmed without referal to his ·
committee and this was done by acclamation without discussion or objection.
media~ely

Sackett's letter of resignation was im-

read into the Congressional Record.

On January

10, 1930 John Robsion was quickly appointed to fill Sackett's
unexpired term in the Senate.

44

Sackett's tribute in the Senate, offered on the occasion of his departure, is barely worth noting.

The only one
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offered, and a short one at that, crune from Republican
Senator Royal

s.

Copeland of New Work who cited Sackett's

work with the Committee on the District of Columbia as his
most outstanding service in the Senate.

"I feel that the

country is to be congratulated," Copeland said, "that we are
I

I

sending a man so tactful and useful and forceful to the

1

great German nation across the water ... " 45

l

Hoover's desire th.at Sackett leave as soon as.possible

1

l

I

for Germany left little or no adequate time for briefing by

l

the State Department on the conditions in Germany, American

I

foreign policies, and the ambassador's new duties.

l

Initial-

ly, only a few days in London and Paris (and the latter stop
was cancelled) were allowed Sackett for "consultation" with
the American ambassadors in each capital.

On January 22,

1930 Sackett and his wife sailed from New York bound for
Europe, a scant 12 days after his confirmation as ambassador
plenipotentiary by the United States Senate.

46

On the same day as Sackett's departure, Outlook magazine reported that politi.cs had clearly played a major role
in boosting the former Senator off the American shore.
Sackett himself had become worried over the Kentucky political situation and did not "relish a fight or possible defeat" at the hands of Robsion.

Hoover was worried about his

paper thin margin in a Democratic party controlled Senate
and, on the advice of the Republican National Committee got
a

thought-to~be-loser

out of the way by sending him to
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Germany.

"Thus," Outlook reported, "domestic rather than

foreign politics accounts for the elevation of a second-rate
Senator to a first-rate ambassadorship. 1147
In the case of' Frederic M. Sackett's appointment to
Berlin, Outlook asserted, even though little could be

e~

pected from him as ambassador, Hoover did indeed bring harmony to the party.

48

Ambassador Sackett and His Reception in Germany:
Despite the.fact that Frederic Sackett's appointment
was greeted at least as being logical mainly because of his
business background, key persons in the State Department'
were nevertheless wary of the ability of the apointee to get
off to a good start, particularly since the

Coun~eler

of

Embassy in Berlin, Dewitt Clinton Poole, had just resigned
from the foreign service in order to start a teaching career
at Princeton.

49

Even before Sackett's confirmation by the

Senate Under Secretary of State William R. Castle it was
suggested that Poole might return to Germany for a temporary
period in· order to help the new ambassador get started.

How-

ever, after meeting with Sackett, top officials at the State
Departmen~

seemed impressed enough with him so as to make the

need for a special trip by Poole as "less likely," and in
fact it was not made.

50

Poole was persuaded to meet with Sackett in Washington
to spend but a few hours briefing the new ambassador on the
Berlin assignment.

As short as the meeting was, it was
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apparently enough to give Poole a very favorable impression
of Sackett.

Soon after, Poole transmitted his assessment

of Sackett to his friend, the Acting Counselor of Embassy in
Berlin, John Cooper Wiley.

Poole described Sackett with his
~

'1'··

customary adjective -- that Sackett was "a peach" -- anti.
emphasized Sackett would be a "delightful change" after
their stormy relationship with Ambassador Schurman.
sure you find Sackett well disposed," Poole wrote.

"I am

51

In almost no time at all, Wiley was echoing Poole's
high rating of Sackett and even went to lengths to defend
him from his critics.

Though his relationship with Sackett

was still quite new, Wiley chastized Time Magazine for a
critical story about the new ambassador which he felt was
unfair.

In a personal letter to a Time editor, Wiley de-

fended Sackett's quick departure from Washington as one made
on short notice at President Hoover's request and not as a
"slip away" as Time alleged.

Wiley was cheered by Sa.ckett's

apparent discretion in refraining from uttering "banquet
platitudes" since his arrival in Germany and he was pleased
"to find an ambassador who does not wear his embassy as a
cloak to his own vanity and who is not centered on selfadvertising," which to Wiley seemed an innovation.

Wiley

further characterized Sackett's Senate career as "influential
and dignified" and praised him for having precisely the personality, capacity and knowledge, and cool point of view
that are needed for the post.

"He will have great success
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as Ambassador to Germany," Wiley remarked, and concluded his
letter with "as a chief, he is a peach." 52
Perhaps Wiley was merely trying to score points with
his new chief, however, the relationship between Sackett and
Wiley remained on very good terms throughout Sackett' s
tenure in Berlin.

Poole's influence did not only extend to

Wiley but was imparted upon several contacts he made who
would be going to Berlin.

One example comes in a letter to

Poole from a former colleague who was being transferred to
Berlin from the Hague.

"

I want to tell you that your

new Ambassador is quite what you called him in your telegram
to Wiley," wrote one W. deHaas.
The latter seems to be exceedingly happy about his
new chief and so is everybody. To all appearances
Mr. and Mrs. Sackett conquer the heart of everybody
they meet. Evidently due to you, Mr. Sackett has
met me very cordially and our relations are very
good indeed. I greatly appreciate the waf he takes
things on and tackles them straight away. 3
Sackett's niece, during a visit to Germany while he
was ambassador, noted the excellent relationship between
Sackett and his staff, especially the younger members towards
whom he seemed "paternalistic."

She said Sackett was "very

thoughtful and kind with them and I think they genuinely
loved him."54
Upon Sackett's arrival in Germany to take up his assignment, Wiley reported to the State Department that the new
ambassador received significant praise from the German press
which highlighted Sackett's business background in their re-
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ports.
The press greeted with satisfaction the fact that
Mr. Sackett came from the Senate and attributed
his appointment to the President's policy of
sending abroad successful businessmen to look
after America's economic.interests. Most commentators inclined to the view that the new
American ambassador would concern himself in
no small degree with economic and financial
questions, a field in which he enjoyed high repute in the United States.ss
Sackett received much favorable press comment by holding a news conference within 24 hours of his arrival in
Germany, ·even before he had presented his credentials to
President Paul von Hindenburg.

The New York Times noted

that Sackett, in handling the foreign press, "was equipped
with something more than a correspondence course in

diplo~

macy" when, in responding to a question as to whether or not
he carried specific instructions from Hoover, he said "We
had a most pleasant trip coming over." 56
After Sackett presented his credentials to Hindenburg
on February 12, 1930 and informed the President of Weimar
Germany that his diplomatic instructions were the typical
extensions of "fruitful cooperation," and ·"increasing
friendly intercourse," and fostering "mutual understandings"
topped by a '.'sincere conviction that German fortitude and industry" would solve the problems of the present and the
future, the new ambassador settled into a relatively calm·
first year in Berlin.s 7

Sackett sought to maintain the

Hoover Administration's philosophy of staying out of financial diplomacy of an unofficial nature, specifically in
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matters concerning private sector loans,

He also wanted to

keep the American Embassy out of any direct dealings concerning reparations or the creation of the Bank for International
Settlements.

56

However, Ambassador Sackett did play a cheerleader role
in encouraging an increase in German-American financial rela·tions, mainly as regards to trade; and initially advocated
increases in American foreign investments overall.

In a

major speech before the American Chamber of Commerce in
Berlin, Sackett pointed out that a new era in American affairs had started in recent years as its commercial life had
clearly become interdependent with the prosperity of other
countries.

American business and finance, he argued, had

begun to appreciate that due to the surplus production of
goods in America, their own prosperity was literally interwoven with the internal economic conditions of every nation:
In an industrial country like America with its
ample proportions and mounting surplus the expanding productive capacity seriously demands that
that its foreign commerce be encouraged and
safeguarded. There is no illusion prevalent
at home that an export trade can permanently
prosper unless through imports or by other
method of transfer there shall be created an
equivalent exchange of value.s with the world
at large. In 1929 the export trade of America
amounted to $5,150,000,000. I cite these figures
in no boastful sense but to give a clue to the
economic reasons which influence America's
foreign policies.- 59
Sackett added that the "importance of encouraging overseas

i.

exports is one of the foundations on which America has built·

I

her modern policy in the field of economic relationships. 1160
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Right after Sackett's speech, the New York Times continued its barrage of criticisms over the appointment of
politicians to diplomatic posts and on how United States
Senators, after becoming ambassadors, turn up in
an international view:

Europe.l:;~ith

"And now comes Ambassador Sackett in

Berlin; another former Senator, a Republican and therefore
presumably a high protectionist, making a speech about the
'interdependence of national prosperity and the prosperity
of every other country.'"

The Times chided Sackett for "pil-

ing one heresy upon another" by asserting Americans today
were convinced

thei~

prosperity was interwoven with the

world at.the same .time that high tariffs were being passed
by Congress.
Such examples of rapid and useful education in
the school of diplomacy suggest a change in our
system. Why not have an alternation of Senators
acting as ambassadors? Let each high tariff
Senator be made an ambassador for two months
and then [be] superceded and called back to
vote on a Grundyized tariff with his eyes fully
op~ned to what it means in our domestic production and our foreign commerce. 61
The harsh criticism of the Times was unique in
Sackett's diplomatic career for he rarely became involved in
controversy

du~ing

his time in Berlin, and few eyebrows were

ever raised insofar as his performance as ambassador was concerned.

One notable exception causing unintended publicity,

however, was his address given at the World Power Conference
in Berlin in June, 1930_.

Sackett forcefully hit American

utilities for selling power at an alleged fifteen times the
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cost of producing it and stated that until the cost of power
to the consumer was brought into line with the cost of manufacturing it then utilities were unjustified in claiming
their quality service was offered at a low cost.

Chicago

utilities magnate, Samuel Insull, in Berlin for the con~
ference, had tried beforehand to get the ambassador not to
deliver his speech but when news of this leaked both foreign
and American press seized on it as a denounceable "effort by
a powerful businessman to 'fix' an ambassador of the United
States." 6 2
The incident was all the more interesting because
Sackett at that time was "believed to be a stockholder in
the Louisville Gas and Electric Company." 63

Although the

controversy elicited mild responses, including a condemnation of Insull by Senator George Norris and denials of the
Sackett charges by American utility executives, the whole
event occurring as it did after the stock market crash
worked to enhance Sackett's prestige as a businessman willing to protect the consumer interests in the face of a growing unpopular attitude toward large holding companies.
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A frequent criticism made of noncareer ambassadors is
that they are prone to making more trips back to the United
States during their tenure than a professional would ordinarily make.

In nearly two and a half years while assigned to

Berlin, Ambassador Sackett made only

thr~e

the United States:

for personal business

The first

m~inly

voyages back to

109
reasons, the second to deal with problems concerning
Sackett's coal fields in Kentucky and coincidently to brief
officials in Washington of the difficult financial situation
in Germany, and the third at his own expense to assist in
Hoover's Presidential campaign of 1932.
When Sackett arrived in the United States on September
20, 1930 for his first trip home he told the press he intended to both vacation and attend to private affairs.
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While on leave in Kentucky, he wrote that "the short time at
my disposal will all be taken in Kentucky looking after my
business affairs, which need considerable attention" 96

;

this

trip is understandable given not only the state of the growing depression in the United States but also the fact that
when he departed for Germany a scant eight months before, ·he
had little time then to settle his financial affairs.
Sackett's niece later recalled how much the honor of his ambassadorship was costing Sackett:

"While in Germany, and of

necessity spending his own money fairly lavishly as an Ambassador," she wrote, "his securities at home were going down
rapidly~"
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Naturally Sackett took time to meet with State Department officials in Washington and brief them on the difficult
economic situation in Germany.
trip, he was not.

But an alarmist, on this

Conditions there were much the same as

elsewhere in the world.

Business was slow and unemployment

was high, but he was confident that the obstacles .to pros-
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perity that existed in Germany, as in America, would be overcome.

He added that Europe was looking to the United States

to start the recovery from the depression which, in Hoover's
view, had paradoxically started in Europe.
was being sounded.
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Yet no alarm

The United States seemed to be slow+y

recovering from the initial effects of what was still perceived by Hoover as a very brief economic recession "until
April, 1931, when the earthquake of financial panic reached
us from Central Europe." 69
After Sackett returned to Germany he continued to enjoy a relatively easy period in German-American relations
and his esteem as Ambassador there seemed to grow.

The

local Louisville press, which closely followed Sackett's
career in Germany, characterized him as "the right man in the
right place" ar,id as "the good silent ambassador" who did not
waste time and attended to business.

On January 24, 1931

after a year in Berlin, Sackett had "won the confidence of
every American in Berlin, and formed a most satisfactory and
effective contact with German authorities.
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Very soon,

however, life for Ambassador Sackett became a great deal
more complicated.
Sackett and Germany's Financial Crisis:
Sackett's celebrated second voyage to America, though
indeed significant in further directing Hoover's attention
toward the deepening economic and political problems endured
by Germany, has perhaps been exaggerated insofar as its

1
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original motive is concerned.

In his memoirs Hoover des-

cribed it as an "urgent mission."

Elsewhere it was termed

an "emergency journey" to inform the President of the "disastrous financial crisis'' which was, according to

Reich~

chancellor Heinrich Bruning, then developing in Germany.
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As portrayed by Sackett at the time, Hoover envisioned
Germany as a "great nation rapidly disintegrating" under the
burden of unbearable debts and the cost of war.
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Urgent through the mission may have become, that was
not Sackett's original intent for the trip.

As early as

February 26, 1931 he had requested to take his annual leave
from the State Department for sometime during late spring
and this was routinely processed and approved by the department.

Between the time he requested leave and his April 24,

1931 sailing date from Germany, Sackett could not help but
be preoccupied with news from the coal fields of Harlan
County Kentucky of the United Mine Workers' strike which affected Sackett's own

depress~on-plagued

mining interests,

especially those in Harlan.and Bell Counties where his Black
Star Coal and Pioneer Coal Companies were located.

An ex-

plosion in the neighboring Black Mountain.Coal Company mine
on April 20, 1931 in addition to the on-going "Harlan County
War" between miners and mine owners certainly did not ease
his anxieties.

On April 18, six days prior to his departure

from Berlin, Sackett told the press that his ·trip home was
his annual vacation leave and that while home he would at-
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tend the Associated International Chamber of Commerce meeting in Washington during May.

At the time he sailed, both

the Ambassador and.the State Department in Washington denied
attaching any political significance to his voyage.
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To further intensify Sackett's personal business concerns, almost as soon as he stepped off the boat he was
greeted with news of the bloody May 5-6, 1931 "Battle of
Evarts" between coal miners and National Guardsmen in Kentucky.

Here the coal miners' strike reached fever pitch.

And throughout May, events in Kentucky were alarming:

Evi-

dence of IWW participation was allegedly found; "Reds" were
blamed by the Governor Kentucky for the strike; the National
Guard was placed on alert; arrests in Harlan· County (of the
police chief and the assistant city clerk of Harlan, and of
the local UMW president) were being made.

Thus, at the time

of Sackett's return trip to Germany, emotions in Kentucky
were far from cool.
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However, while Sackett himself was preoccupied with
his own threatened business situation during a time of
deepening economic depression in the United States, this does
not diminish the impact his reporting of the effects of the
world depression in Germany.

His goal was to convince

President Hoover that major American action would be required to avert both economic and political disaster in
Europe which, Sackett believed, would seriously affect the
United States.
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Sackett's major attempt to alert Washington to Germany's increasingly difficult situation occurred after his
December 19, 1930 m~eting w.ith·· Chancell~r Bruning to review
the volatile political situation facing the latter's conservative-to-moderate government.

B.riining had impressed:

upon Sackett the threat of revolution within Germany if the
social situation which was aggravated by the economics of
war reparations was not eased in the long run.

The Chancel-

lor ~xpressed the idea that the "building up of arms by almost all neighboring lands" near Germany would lead to increased agitation for the Reich to enlarge the size of her
own military.
nal discontent.

This, he feared, would lead to further

int~r

Bruning sought America's help and based

much of his argument upon the role of Germany being the def ender of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.

Sackett

raised the question of Hoover hosting an international economic conference, which Bruning seized upon as America's
chance to take a major lead in solving not only Germany's,
but the world's financial woes.

"I stressed the urgency of

the whole proposition," Bruning wrote, "which would not only·
be suitable for the talents of the American people, but
would also simultaneously deliver the peoples of Europe from·
a certain dull despair." 75
Duly impressed by Briining's appeal for help, Sackett
sent.a detailed and confidential letter to Hoover portraying
the dire straits in which Germany found herself and stress-
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ing that the Chancellor was the strongest character of Germany representing the responsible body of opinion within the

:Reich.

B.riining was "not at all confident of the Government's

ability to prevent serious disturbances" especially as the
financial depression worsened, Sackett reported.

The Chancel-

lor feared such internal disturbances would come from Moscowdirected communists rather than from the followers of Hitler
and that part of the economic depression was due to "unrea-.
sonable liberal credit terms offered Russia by the industrials" of major western powers seeking to capture the Russian market.

But the real difficulty stressed by Bruning

was the reparations question.
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Bruning told Sackett that if Germany were to be saved
from chaos, a new study of war reparations was required, and
the American Ambassador agreed.

Though well

aw~re

of

Hoover's feelings that war debts owed America by the European
powers and

repa~ations

payments made by Germany to the

European nations which opposed her in the war were separate
issues, Sackett told the President that "my personal experience here leads me to think that we can very well maintain ourselves in any such discussion.

Our position is in

reality little understood, even by responsible ministers,
and we in America have soon got to meet reparations again in
the open anyway."

Besides, Germany was "bound to ask a new

consideration_ of the Young Plan payments," Sackett added.

A

world economic conference to study methods of overcoming the
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world wide depression and hopefully to deal with disarmament
matters from an economic point of view might be useful,
Bruning suggested according to Sackett, "because disaster
here [Europe] would affect world trade everywhere."

Sackett

echoed the dire warnings of Bruning with the conclusionj. "t;hat
if internal explosions in Germany should erupt suddenly, "I
am fearful it would definitely prolong the economic difficulties which we are facing in the United States and the repair of which you [Hoover] recently reminded our people was
being delayed by conditions not within but without our borders."77
Although favorable results were "eagerly awaited" after
Sackett's effort, hopes in Germany were soon disappointed.
In a polite but brief letter to the American Ambassador,
Hoover mentioned he was grateful for receiving the information in Sackett's December 27 letter and thanked him for it.
Without a concrete position from Hoover, Sackett was placed
in an awkward position of having to confront Briining's builtup hopes with lukewarm news.
greatly

i~volved

He explained that Hoover was

with the American depression·and had taken

no position on the matter of the economic conference.
Sackett did not regard Hoover's response as a final indication of an American reluctance to become involved in European
economic questions. 78
Undaunted, Sackett and the American Embassy staff continued to send reports to Washington concerning Germany's
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growing financial and political plight.

Deep in the throes

of the depression in America, Hoover found. little time nor
apparently wanted to devote much attention to international
affairs.

However, during this same period, between

and May, 1931, Sackett became most alarmed at the

Jan~ary

growi~)~

threat to American interests which financial instability in
Germany foretold.
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Further complicating problems, a proposed Austro-German
Customs Union designed to unite the economies of the two
major Central European powers was announced on March 21·,
1931 setting off a "firestorm" of reaction by the French and

British Governments which viewed it as a potential repudiation of the ·1919 Versailles Peace Treaty -- "one of the keystones of which was the political separation of Germany and
Austria," Hoover wrote.

The President felt, however, that

the proposal was "scarcely a serious menace" at the time and
did little to encourage it.
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Renewed appeal to Hoover for

an economic conference at this time also brought little response and there was little American support for reparations
revision as the President continued to stress this as a
separate issue ·from the question of war debts owed the
United States by the World War I allies and feared the American people would not consent to get the United States involved in the political ramifications of European economic
squabbles.

By mid-April, 1931, faced with making more fin-

ancial constrictions on the Germaµ people and growing politi-

l
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cal opposition -- particularly from the extreme Right and
Left political wings -- the Bruning Government increased its
pressure to get the United States to consider some form of
increased economic

support.

8

~

Knowing Sackett was returning to the United StateS, in
I'

late April, 1931 for a routine home leave, Bruning arranged
to see the American Ambassador on the day before his departure to impress upon him that while Germany would do what it
could to meet its obligations, it was not certain that the
German people would accept additional sacrifices.
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At the

eleventh hour Bruning attempted to use Sackett to get a dire
message urgently across to Hoover about the growing German
.financial problem and its political threat to the Bruning
Government.

But this attempt·, and indeed the crisis itself,

occurred at a .time when Sackett sensed American "unwillingness to help the Bruning Cabinet" and when the Ambassador's
own interests were focused on the coal mines in

Kentucky.~~

Regardless of his business preoccupations, Ambassador
Sackett appropriately went first to Washington to convey
Briiningrs assessment of Germany's economic plight.

Prior to

meeting with Hoover, Sackett dined with Secretary of State
Henry Stimson and, no doubt, discussed major issues in
Europe.

Sackett presented Stimson with a glowing picture

of Bruning as "the discovery of Europe" and indicated that
he would not endeavor to raise difficult reparations questions until it was "absolutely imperative."

But despite the

1
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significance of Briining's warning of trouble for the future,
Stimson seemed more impressed with Sackett's work in having
"quietly engineered" a meeting between Bruning and the Prime
Minister of England (set for June 5-6, 1931 at Chequers in
England).

Stimson, not noted for giving undue or exaggerated

praise of subordinates especially within the ambassadorial
ranks, registered in his diary that "Sackett himself is one
of the best of our Ambassadors."

He added, "I have been re-

ceiving the best of reports I have from any of the embassies
through him and the meeting tonight rather confirmed my estimate of his good services." 84
As a lawyer and business executive with experience in
public affairs, and being in a position to observe and keep
his government informed, Sackett's credibility within the
administration was considered high.

Undoubtedly, Sackett's

report to the President during his May 6, 1931 visit had a
profound impact upon Hoover even though Sackett clearly
stated that, in his opinion, the situation in Germany was
not yet urgent.

The Ambassador did advise that the situa-

tion was developing to potential crisis proportions and

al~.

though there was no immediate danger, Germany could well
collapse by the autumn of 1931.

Though skeptical of

Brlining's use of the threat of communism, Sackett used it in
an attempt to alarm Hoover, and said that because of Germany's economic and political turmoil there was a real
danger of internal revolution which, if it happened, would

1
j
~
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greatly affect the rest of Europe and, in turn, the United
States.
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Further affecting Hoover was Sackett's analysis of the
political problems in Germany.

In his diary on the events

surrounding the global economic problems he faced,

.

Hoov~f

recorded that Sackett painted the gloomiest picture. of Germany and the Ambassador was convinced that unless the tide
turned soon in the economic realm, the German situation would
collapse.

Especially aggravating the problem was the with-

drawal of capital from Germany at alarming rates and the increased restrictions being placed upon credit.

Unemployment

was increasing and internal disturbances were becoming extreme.

To a president already in an anxious state of mind

over the American depression, such a report must have been
unsettling.
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Sackett's report gravely impressed Hoover, however, as
he continued to divorce debt problems from reparations payments, the President did not see what could be done.

Per-

haps a moratorium on intergovernmental debt payments was discussed at their meeting, but it was certainly not an original
idea stemming from this session nor the first alternative
considered as Hoover, at this point in time, preferred readjustments to the Young Plan installments as a more suitable
means of softening the economic crisis.

87

Sackett was unable to get from Hoover an immediate
response to the problems in Europe beyond an expression of

120

support for "liberal minded" men in Germany and elsewhere.
Hoover did promise to undertake an in depth study of the
situation and to discuss the matter more with Sackett when
he returned from home leave· the following June.
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The Presi-

dent began making inquiries and gathering reports (many of
th.em independent of Sackett's previous reporting from Germany) and reviewed past reports from the American Embassy in
Berlin

almost all of which served to reinforce Sackett's

gloomy viewpoint.
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Events began to steamroll as the crisis in Europe
acutely developed during May, 1931 especially after the
startling collapse of the largest bank in Austria, the.
KreditanstaZt, increased runs upon banks in Central Europe.

which presented growing threats to American securities there,
followed by a .severe drop in foreign orders for American
wheat and cotton.

During the last few days of May and the

first days of June, German difficulties became so evident
that "they were being openly discussed in the American
press," Hoover noted.

"The situation had developed far more

quickly than Ambassador Sackett anticipated. 1190
Hoover, now admitting that the deepening affects of
the depression had disrupted the whole fabric of intergovernmental debts "beyond the capacity to pay" under normal conditions, asked his Secretaries of State and Treasury -- Henry
Stimson and Andrew Mellon -- to come up with a plan to relieve the pressure on the world economy.

The failure of the
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Austrian Kreditanstalt on May 11, 1931 -- the "most important
banking institution in the old Austrian Empire," in the

President's recollection -- had confirmed for Hoover
Sackett's view of the impending crisis.
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When Sackett revisited Hoover on June 2, 1931, 'the
President's alarm was most apparent.

He ordered the Ambas-

sador to cut his "vacation" in Kentucky short and return at
once to Germany so as to assure the Bruning Government that
the United States would assist in the financial crisis
especially with regard to easing the debts and reparations
issues, and so that Sackett "might advise upon his arrival
the reaction from the German Government."

Prior to his de-

parture, Sackett told Stimson he hoped Germany would not ask
for a moratorium but felt that changes in the Young Plan to
accomodate growing inflation would be preferable.

Stimson

noted that Hoover had moved to the position that reparations
and debt revisions would be difficult to pursue as that would
"open the door to all kinds of demands all over ... "

Sackett,

Stimson wrote, was very concerned about the losses to American financial holdings and hoped American banks would adopt
an accomodating stance toward Germany.
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Hoover's growing preference for a moratorium was no
doubt bolstered by late reports from Germany which indicated.
that, sooner or later and probably by the end of summer, the
Reich would "precipitate" a discussion of reparations revision with "interested allied powers."

Sackett's Counselor

l
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of Embassy in Berlin, George Gordon, informed Washington the
Germans would force the issue of reparations revisions because of their internal economic situation.

In essence, he

said, "the buck is rapidly being passed" to the Americans if
an economic crisis was to be prevented at all.

Furthermore,

Hoover learned that from the point of view of Wall Street
and· particularly the House of J. P. Morgan and Company, the
fear that Germany would not be able to pay her debts would
have "almost as bad effects upon her immediate credit situation" in the United States "as the declaration of a moratorium."

Morgan official Thomas Lamont expressed support for

a delay in repayments.

However, though Hoover was mindful of

Wall Street's opinion he was not dictated to by the banking
community.
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In the course of his hasty departure from the United
States, Sackett did not publically disclose any discussions
he might have had with Hoover . involving war debts and

repa~a.

tions problems and reiterated to the press a denial that he
had discussed these issues with Briining. 94

Sackett left the

United States on June 4, 1931 and before he arrived in
Europe, Hoover was clearly leaning toward his momentous
decision to extend a one-year moratorium on intergovernmental war debts rather than push for revisions.

On June

5, 1931 Hoover expressed the fear that America was in the
presence of a "great crisis" which would seriously affect
American interests and was of the opinion that the
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.. most constructive thing that can be done in
the world economic situation today is that payments of intergovernmental obligations arising
out of war ... be deferred for payment ....
to give the world one year for restoring domestic economies
and recover from the depression.

95
·.:.. ·

Fearful of adverse French reaction against conces~ion
to the Germans, Hoover tried to keep secret his decision for
a war debt moratorium until technicalities could be worked
out between the nations involved and Congressional support
could be assured.

However, leaks of the plan reached the

press prompting Hoover's decision to make a premature

an~

nouncement of the plan, on June 20, 1931, before France could
be officially informed of it.

Not until July 5 was agree-

ment with the French reached and only then after terribly
difficult negotiating sessions with a suspicious French
government which attempted to demand political concessions
in return for cooperation.

"It was," in Robert Ferrell's

words, "a big tangled mess." 96
In this interim period between Sackett's departure
from the United States to the announcement of the moratorium,
the American !1mbassador to Germany played a key role in the ·
delicate circumstances surrounding the affair.

Having been

instrumental in alarming Hoover to the crisis, it was now up
to Sackett to keep his government as keenly aware as was
possible concerning the attitudes and activities occurring
withfn Germany, while at the same time pursue his own government's best interests.
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Rumors floated among international press circles that
something was soon going to happen insofar as an American
response to the European economic situation was concerned
and Sackett did little to clarify the situation for reporters.
Sackett' s hasty June 4 departure from Washington, combi~ied
with his seemingly coincidental meeting with Chancellor
Bruning and Foreign Minister Julius Curius as they were returning fro"m the Chequers Conference in England, helped
heighten anxiety.

Sackett's meeting with the two prominent

Germans may have been more than chance as his departure from
New York was remarkably well timed to coincide with the
Chancellor's departure from England.

The

A~bassador's

pas-

sage bookings were also made on the same vessel on which
Bruning and Curtius were scheduled to return to Germany.
For the purposes of press
ally

considere~

~nformation,

the Ambassador natur-

it "courtesy to remain aboard" even though,

he said, he had intended to disembark at Cherbourg.

Sackett

told the press the meeting gave him the opportunity to "ex- ·
change views" with the German officials who were fresh from.
discussing economic relations with the British.
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Sackett did not publically comment on the content of
the shipboard conversations with Bruning and Curtius, but it
was believed by the watchful press that he briefed the Germans on how best to win American backing on reparations aid
and encouraged them to continue attempts at improving their
own economic position.

Washington had indeed been alarmed

1
!
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at both press and American Embassy reports of a "German
Manifesto" which indicated the Reich might declare a unilateral debt moratorium unless the war reparations could be
renegotiated, and without indicating Hoover was inclined toward a moratorium himself, Sackett counseled the Germans not
to force any action until international public opinion was
prepared for it.
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Upon disembarking at Bremen in Germany, both Sackett
and Bruning were noncomittal about their shipboard talks and
the Ambassador informed the press that an international conf erence on debts and reparations would be unpopular with the
American people.

Hoping to facilitate a change in public

opinion, at least in the American circles where it counted,
Sackett and the embassy staff in Berlin continually sent back
I.

cables to Washington advising that "widespread outbreaks of
public disorder were likely to develop at any moment and that
there was doubt that the German Government could survive." 99
Between June 11, 1931 and the announcement of the
Hoover Moratorium on June 20, 1931 Sackett frequently reported from Germany predicting dire consequences -- both
politically and economically speaking -- unless the United
States Government took official action to simmer down the
pending domestic· crisis, all the while making it seem the
Germans "were at once considerate of American interests and
also dangerously close to a unilateral moratorium."
Sackett's reports had a cumulative affect upon Secretary of
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State Stimson who, by mid-June, 1931 saw the conditions in
Central Europe as more serious "than we have had in any recent years," and had joined Sackett in fearing for the political life of the Bruning Government.

According to Stimson,

the reports from the American Embassy in Berlin substantiated
the premises on which the State Department had hitherto
operated upon; namely, that while Germany was making a real
effort to rectify its financial situation, their efforts were
wiped out by the depression.

Further, State Department econ-

omic adviser Herbert Feis had told

Sti~son.that

publicity

should perhaps be given to the Bruning Government's financial
difficulties as they really needed relief from reparations
payments. 100
Stimson conveyed to Hoover the growing critical nature
of the political situation in Germany as relayed to the State
Department by Ambassador Sackett and his staff in Berlin -especially those reports expressing fears that the Bruning
Government might have to quit the reins of power "unless a
favorable element is introduced into the situation ... "
Sackett feared "a new government representing the disconcerted elements in Germany" would be installed unless some
supportive action to Bruning was initiated by the United
States. 101
report~

The President was ·indeed affected by Sackett's

and by the urgency of the German situation (especi-

ally over outbreaks of widespread disorder) but expressed
the need for a clear-cut statement of need for American help
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"signed by .the highest German authority'' which could help
create a sense of justification for any action he might
take . .J.

02

Throughout the period before the moratorium was announced and during the subsequent two-week period of

ne~btia

tions to secure French agreement to the payment postponements
plan, Hoover and Stimson maintained close telephone contact
with the embassies at Berlin, Paris, London and Vienna.

All

the while, Hoover held to the position.that outright cancellation of war debts owed to Americans, as sought by the
French, would be a guarantee for his own political death.
The moratorium was to be a choice of the lesser of two evils,
the other being the risk of default of large private American loans and of bank liquidations because of the German
difficulty. 103

~nquestionably,

Sackett's reports of the ever

depressing situation in Germany served to inform Washington
that the financial and political structure of the Reich was
more or less falling apart and had aided an indecisive
Hoover in making up his mind.

On

Ju~e

21, 1931 Stimson

placed a transatlantic call to Sackett requesting the Ambassador to obtain a letter from President von Hindenburg asking Hoover t·o help Germany . 1

0 4

The attempt to get a letter was clearly made to stage
an appeal for help although Hoover and some of his contemporaries imply it came unsolicited from Hindenburg. 105

In

fact, Stimson requested that Sackett secure the letter from
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Hindenburg describing the situation in Germany in order to
reinforce Hoover's quest for Congressional support of the

moratorium proposal.

Stimson raised the point that such a

letter might also sway American public opinion which,

a~

the

time, seemed to distrust bankers and felt the German cr:;.rois
was a "a mere scare."

According to Stimson, the statement

should· insist the German situation presented grave problems
for the entire world and stress the sacrifices already made
by the German people.

Already worried over increased runs

on the Reichsbank and the drain on German gold reserves,
Stimson asked Sackett to get Hindenburg's statement by June
21.106
Sackett immediately set to work.

Understanding

Hoover's need for a German plea, the American Ambassador
contacted the German Foreign Off ice which set about drafting
a letter for Hindenburg's signature -- this done "under pressure" as the German President was in East Prussia at the
time.

Throughout the evening and late into the night of

June 20, 1931.Briining and Curtius along with German Foreign
Ministry State Secretary Bernhard von Bulow cooperated with
Sackett to get a message to Hoover via diplomatic cable.

But

it arrived too late to be of service and, in fact, raised
potential for embarrassment for the American President. 107

As previously stated, leaks to the press and subsequent
newspaper stories publishing "garbled" information about the
moratorium plan prompted Hoover to give his story to the
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press.

On the day of H.oover' s announcement but after his

official request to get a letter from Hindenpurg, Stimsop
urgently cabled Sackett that Hoover was making his statement
to the press prematurely.

Having received word that Sackett
~·

had succeeded in procuring the Hindenburg letter, the S~cretary asked Sackett that it be kept confidential so as to
avoid complications to the already delicate German financial
situation and because it was feared the gloomy tone of the
letter would limit the psychological boon of the moratorium
announcement and further depress international morale.

Con-

fidentiality was, by this time, impossible as German newspapers were already aware of the contents of the Hindenburg
message which had been leaked "by some high German official,"
according to Sackett, who claimed that every precaution had
been taken to prevent it becoming public. 108
Throughout the balance of his ambassadorship Sackett
maintained an open relationship with the members of the press
corps.

However, during the delicate negotiations surround-

ing the Hoover Moratorium, he was sensitive to the potential
damage to the bargaining positi9ns of all the nations involved should details concerning the affair be leaked.

Hence,

the Ambassador scrupulously avoided any detailed conversations with reporters.

After the Hindenburg letter was

leaked, Sackett explained he was contacted by a New York
Times correspondent in Berlin about the Hindenburg letter to

Hoover and that is how he learned it was leaked.

Sackett

I
iI
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told the reporter
that as he knew, I was always glad to furnish
such information on international affairs as
was compatible with the public interest, but in
view of the importance of President Hoover's
action which was then in the press, I hoped
that he would not ask me any questions of any
kind on any subject, as my lips were sealed in
the present instance. This he accepted,
Sackett rather pompously stated,
in the spirit in which it was given and willingly
withdrew any question.
Sackett then·explained to Stimson that although he and the
German Foreign Minister had implicitly agreed to withhold
release of the Hindenburg statement as a matter of mutual
courtesy, it was nevertheless leaked by a German source,
"probably a cabinet officer. 11109
The response to Hoover's moratorium was immediate and
hearty.

At the time, the markets of the world felt the

moratorium would halt the depression and, when the announcement was made, the New York Stock Exchange experienced signif icant upturns as the mood of bankers and businessmen improved.

Ultimately however, this valiant effort proved to

be too late.

While from the outset it did forestall dis-

asterous liquidations and was an act of political courage on
Hoover's part, the premature announcement of the plan brought
renewed French intransigence toward concession-making with
Germany.

Also, its desired affects were seriously diluted

as it failed to halt the drain of gold reserves from Germany.
After June 20, 1931 negotiations to secure French acceptance
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of the moratorium proposal geared up and the fqcus of American diplomacy shifted to Paris and Sackett's colleague, Ambassador Walter Edge.

However, during the crucial two weeks

which followed Hoover's announcement, the American Embassy
in Berlin was far from inactive. 1 .io
During this

pe~iod

Hoover continued to maintain con-

stant telephone contact with the major American embassies in
Europe and no move was made without consulting him first.
While the delicate negotiations proceeded, Ambassador Sackett
was called upon to try and get Germany to voluntarily limit
the increase of her naval armament build-up as a suitable
response to the Hoover Moratorium and as a means to try and
appease.French psychology which was

distrtist~ul

of any move

which might .allow the Reich more money to increase its military capabilities.

At the same time, Sackett worked

sympa~

thetically with Bruning_, "in order to avoid his overthrow by
the radical opposition," -- especially from the right wing
by discouraging any concessions which might disturb German
nationalism.

As the financial crisis accelerated despite the

moratorium, Sackett encouraged the convening of an international monetary and economic conference in London,

sched~

uled for the summer of 1931, to discuss other means of helping Germany. 11 .i
Singularly impressed with the activity in Berlin, the

New York.Times made page one notation of the frequency of
appearance which Sackett's official limousine.made in front
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of Chancellor Brilning's residence during the post June 20
two-week period:

"Since June 20, this car has been parked

more frequently in front of the Bruning residence or the
Curtius office than in front of the American Embassy, for
Mr. Sackett is keeping in closest touch with the
Government."

Germ~n

Although working nights and Sundays, S.ackett

was not keeping in much touch with the press as little substantive detail of his visits with the German officials was
printed in the newspapers. 112
In achieving the multipurpose goals of American diplomacy at this time, Sackett was only partially successful.
In the main, the French were disturbed over what they perceived as German insincerity while American negotiators we.re
upset with apparent German aloofness and unwillingness to
deal directly with France until the latter's unqualified acceptance of Hoover's moratorium was clinched.

Although

Sackett repeatedly informed the State Department that internal political conditions in Germany precluded Reich officials
from getting involved in the French acceptance controversy,
Stimson sought to placate the French by insuring that
the Germans did not totally disregard France and attempt to
deal only with the United States and Great Britain to solve
their debt problems. 1 i

3

Sackett attempted to reassure Stimson that Germany
would settle technical problems of the war debt and reparations moratorium with France once the latter accepted the

1
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Hoover proposal in principle.

Foreign Minister Curtius, the

Ambassador stated, wished to emphasize amicable settlement
with France on the finer points of the moratorium proposal
and that both Curtius and Brilning "were well aware of the
need for assisting French psychology," according to

Sac~~tt.

"It was their intention to do what they could. to make it
easier for France to adopt the President's suggestion."
Since the onus was on the Americans to insure this, the task
became Sackett's main responsibility. 114
Stimson definitely felt Bruning could do more, in
Germany's own self interests, to make internal sacrifices.
and he wanted Sackett to push towards getting them to support efforts to improve the financial situation in a more
conciliatory fashion.

"Bruning should be warned that it is

for his own interest to help rather than be captious lest he
produce a situation where France has successfully shifted to
Germany the responsibility of non-acceptance of Mr. Hoover's
proposals," Stimson admonished.

Seizing· upon an initiative

by the British Foreign Ministry, to which Stimson agreed but
with qualifications, Under Secretary of State William R.
Castle asked.Sackett if planned German battlecruiser expenditures were justified in light of the current circumstances
and if Germany could be persuaded to drop the Customs Union
plan -- a suggestion originally raised in American circles
by Ambassador Sackett. 115
Castle wanted Sackett to back up the British in their
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attempts to push for a German quid pro quo.

He added, how-

ever, "I do not wish you to approach the Germans on these

matters on your own initiative ... ," since to do so would
give the appearance that American diplomats were involved
in European political matters in defiance of American foreign
policy

tradition~

They agreed the British should take the

lead in attempts to get the Germans to forfeit the AustroGerman Customs Union proposal while Sackett would pursue the
battlecruiser limitations as this was considered as a disarmament issue within the bounds of American interests.
Sackett promised to "endeayor to elicit a less negative attitude" on the part of the Gennan Government in hopes of
facilitating the negotiations with France.

However, he was

less than optimistic as Bruning did not wish to take any
steps which might be interpreted by his political opponents
as "whittling away President' Hoover's original plan," which
was after all, asserted in the best interests of Germany.
He stated

Ger~any

might be willing to go farther in making

concessions despite its own wishes to get the best deal possible out of a total moratorium, but this would only-happen
if France and the United States reached agreement to delay
war debts without· including a statement on German reparations payments. 116
Meanwhile, Ambassador Edge in Paris suggested France
would "use their key position" to impose certain conditions
upon Germany, namely, naval disarmament, abandonment of the
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Austro-German Customs Union plan and the "cessation by Germany [of political activity] in the French spheres of influence in Central Europe and the Balkans."

At least the

first two demands had already been anticipated by Sackett
and Castle.

Besides, as Castle informed Sackett on June 29,

the American public (and certainly Congress) would be hardpressed to understand German construction of armaments while
the United States sacrificed debt payments, ergo Castle
urged the Ambassador to

stres~

this point to Bruning.

"He

[Sackett] said that he was able to say anything to the Germans," according to Castle. 117
With orders to keep a low profile in concessions discussions, Sackett dodged the issue of the customs union in
subsequent talks with Bruning but vigorously pursued the
I

issue of reducing battleship construction as an aid to disarmament.

His discussions were "balked" almost immediately

as "naval construction is Hindenburg's pet hobby."

Somewhat

upset by Sackett's report, Castle retorted that the Ambassador should even more vigorously stress the need for

Germ~n

concession lest the negotiations with Paris founder.

His

anxiety was undoubtedly raised when Edge reported the French
would abandon their

still-on-pap~r

planned construction of a

22,000 ton cruiser if the Germans would cease construction,
already underway, of like naval vessels.

118

Sackett, however, was aware of Germany's basic unconcern over the French attitude.

If Franco-Ame:ri.can conversa-
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tions over the moratorium had broken down over the question
of German concessions the Bruning Government was well prepared to declare a unilateral moratorium before July 15,
1931, the day the next reparations payment came due.

Dis-

trustful of the security of the transatlantic telephone;
Sackett preferred to cable this information back to Castle.
Sackett further reiterated that direct German talks with the
Fr~nch

over quid pro quo concessions could not commence un-

til after 'the French accepted the Hoover Moratorium in its
totality.

For ·the United States to try to get the conces-

sions, it would have been necessary to use the moratorium as
a political lever and this neither Sackett nor Castle were
prepared to do as such action was considered by American
statesmen to be against the current of public opinion within
the United States.

Since the British were free to engage

in political negotiations, however, Castle said he "would
talk to the British Ambassador" in the United States. 119
Growing increasingly exasperated, Castle asserted that
some expression of appreciation from Germany of the cooperation and support of the nations involved in the Hoover Moratorium, France included, would be helpful in getting final
French agreement.

Ho~ever,

Sackett again blunted Castle's

ire, reporting that in the German view, to publically applaud
the French would be politically dangerous for the Bruning
Government causing a precipitate rise in the tide of internal radicalism.

Specifically, and contrary to the earlier
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reported fears that trouble would come from left-wing extremists, Sackett said he personally felt the danger came

fro1u the "extremists in the Nationalist camp," implying, that
is, from the followers of Hitler.

Although the situati?n

was "not so serious" as Bruning had felt it to be, the Aµlbassador defended Briining's reliance upon (and appeasement
of). the German military as necessary for the "saving" of
Germany.

This reliance was necessary to calm· the National-

ists who were most vehemently against the 1919 Versailles
Treaty the terms of which were viewed as harsh in its treatment of Germany.

Likewise, to accede to the request to re-

duce armaments with its implication of renouncing the
"meager rights" granted Germany in the Versailles Treaty
would revive serious antagonisms both from the supporters of
the German military and from the Nationalists.
~herefore

Sackett

acknowledged that Bruning could not take a firm

stand toward' the Nationalists since his moderate

governmen~.

was a small minority, vul·nerable to the changing whims of
President von Hindenburg, .a vociferous and fragmented
Reichstag, and increasingly strong political oppostition
from the Right-wing in German politics.
the

"m~n-on-the-scene,"

Clearly Sackett, as

sympathized with the interests and

probiems. of the Bruning Government and was hesitant to pursue American interests beyond the point which he felt Bruning.
could not go.

Sackett told Castle:

"From the intimate as-

sociation I have with the Chancellor I feel that the picture
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have given above is his own honest view of the present

situation in Germany. 11120
Despite Castle's (and Stimson's) discontent over the
repeatedly negative attitude of the Bruning Government, the
best commitment Sackett could extract from the Germans was
a guarantee their armaments budget would not be increased as
a result of the Hoover Moratorium savings.

Otherwise, the

Germans held that only a firm stand by the United States· (and
indeed, by Germany) would be effective in getting the French
to agree to a total suspension of

p~yments.

At any rate

Germany had nothing to lose by refraining from concessionmaking. 121

Although Sackett tried as best he could to get the

Germans to soften their otherwise stiff posture, he could not
overcome the often radical nationalistic influences which.
primarily dictated the German domestic position against concessions.
Ultimately, on July 6, 1931 President Hoover's negotiating team in Paris secured French agreement to support the
moratorium as it was originally proposed, with no substantial
concession ·or exhibition of German gratitude.

French

agree~

ment came reluctantly however, only after Hoover threatened
to proceed with the moratorium without France.

Though

fraught with political risks for the American President, the
moratorium negotiations stalled too long. 122

On the same

day Hoover announced French acceptance of the plan, Ambassador Sackett reported that a prominent American bank in Berlin
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would immediately begin withdrawing their short term funds
from Germany.

"If other large institutions in New York fol-

low suit," Sackett cabled, "it will have the effect of a run
on the Reichsbank and you can visualize the result." 123
Bank runs and the drain upon Germany's gold reserves
had been briefly stalled after Hoover's moratorium announcement in June.

But as negotiations for French acceptance

dragged out, the runs began again.

Though it was hoped the

finalization of the Hoover plan would stop these runs, instead they continued apace, adding a new slant to the German
financial crisis:

domestic panic which could well initiate

a political revolution.

Though exaggerating the situation,

Bruning nevertheless impressed Sackett with the gravity of
the situation who then notified the State Department that
Germany was likely to again appeal for help.

124

At least in Washington, the German appeal for a loan
to see its economy through the latest difficulties fell upon
concerned but deafened ears.

In his

report~ng

of the situa-

tion, Ambassador Sackett was resigned to the immediate

posi~

tion of the Bruning Government -- that it could not make
further concessions which would antagonize the political opposition and hence France would "secure nothing from the present German Government" by continually pursuing a demand for
a demonstration of "spectacular" gratitude.

Therefore,

France an,d indeed the rest of the Western world must be prepared to take its chances in supporting the Bruning Govern-·
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ment or be prepared to cope with another government of the
extreme Right.i

25

However, after the strenuous efforts to

secure the Hoover Moratorium on Germany's behalf, neither the
President nor the State Department was in a mood to exert
any more efforts·of an official nature.
Despite Sackett's efforts to get America to do more
for Germany, Castle told him that even if the United States
did something, it was probably too late to avert another
financial crisis anyway.

The ball was now in the German

court, Castle related, and. they would have to halt the gold
drain on their own.

This view was eventually reinforced by

Secretary Stimson who stressed that more visible efforts at
"self-help" in the German program would be necessary in
order for Bruning to impress the United States.

Even Hoover,

who was truly alarmed at the devastating effe.cts German bank
failures would have upon American banks, merely notified
American diplomats abroad that the whole matter was a problem for the bankers and that European banks would have to
find their own solutions.i

26

Sackett agreed that Germany could give "far greater
evidence of attempting to help herself," however he remained
obstinate in defending the Bruning

Governm~nt

and its ef-

forts to avoid being made to appear too conciliatory towards
France and Great Britain.

The Ambassador averred (erron-

eously it turned out) that Brilning would fall should a ·
domestic moratorium on bank withdrawals be declared and, if
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that happened, he now feared an extreme Right-wing government would be instituted. 127

But when it became clear the

United States would take no new initiative to help halt the
drain of German reserves, the government declared its owp
moratorium on

intern~l

banking activity commencing July,13

and in· full force by July 14.
as the final

e~d

of the Bruning

The result, if not as drastic
Gover~ment,

was to push it

further toward the breakdown of its political control within
the Weimar Republic. 128
On July 15, 1931 Stimson recorded in his diary that
"Sackett said that in his opinion Germany had done all she
could in the way of internal restrictions," and that there
l

was no chance of the Germans making a "generous gesture"
prior to the upcoming economic conference set for later that
month in London.

However, faced with the full .impact of the

economic crisis, the Bruning Government was forced to recon-.
sider taking measures hitherto

de~med

undesirable.

Sackett

had attempted to influence the Germans to the American viewpoint of self-help and was of the opinion that Germany had
long been "in the position of being willing to take everything· and give nothing and of simply lying back and asking
for help .... "

Sackett felt the present government was now

prepared to make reasonable concessions in view of the real
danger that it might fall from power if it did not take
act.ion. i

2 9

On July 19, 1931 the American Embassy reported Hinden-
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burg had issued a Presidential Decree to halt the flight of
capital from Germany and two days later .Sackett informed the

State Department that the Germans were in a more conciliatory
mood, ready to talk concessions with France in hopes of getting more economic help.

This was an empty gesture

sine~

they

were perhaps· already willing to yield on the customs union
plan which, for internal reasons, the Germans had
would be unworkable anyway.

decided~

But by this time, the Bruning

Government was grasping for straws, as the mood was setting
in that it was indeed too late to avert a loss of confidence
in Germany. 130
Despite Sackett's appeals on behalf of Bruning, Hoover
could not be persuaded to sanction any more private

loan~

to

Germany, nor would he commit the United States Government to
help the Reich meet its short-term loan obligations.

Dis-

gruntled with Europe's failure to handle her own affairs,
Hoover instead suggested a "standstill" of bank claims upon
Germany until the financial situation could improve.

The

plan was accepted at the London Economic Conference on July
23, 1931, nevertheless the drain on foreign exchange continued at catastrophic rates. 131
Throughout the period after the germination of the
moratorium idea in President Hoover's mind and into the initiation of the standstill agreements, one of Sackett's
major tasks as ambassador to Germany was to keep the United
States Government as free as possible of political engage-

l

I
I
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ments. · After America acted within the economic sphere, the
onus was placed.upon Germany and France to settle their poli-

tical problems and emphasis on further financial difficulties
were to be privately settled by the German Government and
whatever private financial groups were involved.

Altho4~h

Bruning continued to express the necessity for extension of
American initiatives -- including the widening of the standstill agreements and further reparations relief via the
tension of the Hoover Moratorium -- Sackett

r~cognized

e~-

the

limitations of American policy and the restrictions these

.

limitations placed upon his freedom of action. 132
Still impressed by t.he urgency of Germany's desperate
financial condition and of Brilning's increasingly tenuous
polticial posture, and especially of the threats emanating
from both Left and Right wing radicals and from a discontent~?

electorate, Sackett placed his hopes for Briining's

salvation in· another economic conference of the major powers
which "could only originate through the President of the
United States ... "
Bruning'~

Sackett conveyed back to Washington

continued appeals for a moratorium extension at

least until the prevailing depression's ending could enable
resumption of payments.
was no longer

hopefu~

But by late October, 1931, Sackett

.that the German financial crisis could

be solved, despite further American initiatives. 1

33

The situation had deteriorated as the result of a conspiracy by international financiers "selling the dollar
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short" in capricious speculation, Sackett told Hoover, in
order to provide themselves "the necessary soft landing
place" should Germany collapse.

The Ambassador doubted any

further concessions or compromises on the repayment of debts
and reparations "would prevent a complete breakdown eco1iomical ly in Germany."

At any rate, the internal political dif-

ficulties faced by Bruning during the depression were such
that Sackett's efforts to garner foreign political support
for him wer~ fruitlessly doomed from the outset. 13 ~
In Secretary of State Stimson's view, all Germany, its
people and leadership, were "gripped by fear

of financial

collapse, fear of revolution, fear of giving offense to the
naive and innocent but very powerful Americans."

This was

causing a diplomatic impasse, despite the "sentiment of the.
ordinary American" and Stimson's own sentiments which held .
"that the Weimar Republic deserved the assistance and support
of all who loved peace, if only to preserve it as a guardian
against that other Germany which few -- and certainly not
Stimson -- had forgotten."

As the major powers began "en-

trenching themselves in self-righteous attitudes" and fell
into "political impossibilities" the world lapsed into a
rather hopeless situation which became more distressing as
the world-wide depres.sion gr.ew.

Throughout the crisis,

Stimson felt Sackett had kept a cool head in Berlin and was
correctly concerned with the whole psychology of economic
panic.

The Secretary further noted that Sackett handled the
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foreign press in a tactful manner to get them to consider
sympathetically Germany's problems and had tried to work towards improving confidence in the Reich. 135
Sackett's Popularity in Germany:
Ambassador Sackett's efforts to aid the preservation of
the Bruning Government were doomed to failure from the start
as certainly the events which

le~

to its downfall were

outside the American ambassador's personal control.

However,

Sackett's efforts while serving at his post during this
period were extensively observed by the American Consul
General in Berlin at the time, George S. Messersmith, who
rated the Ambassador's performance favorably.

In a personal

letter to Nation editor Oswald Garrison Villard, written in
the midst of the July, 1931 financial crisis, Messersmith
praised Sackett on his work:

"The Ambassador has been

splendid and has been doing an excellent piece of work.

He

has a very clear understanding of the situation, and he is
helpful in many ways not only, of course, to our own Government, but by his counsel here. 11136
Because of his seven years spent observing first hand
the political scene in Central Europe, and for having worked
with three American ambassadors while in Germany, and since
he enjoyed good relations with the State Department staff in
Washington, Messersmith's opinion of Sackett is noteworthy.
He was one who appreciated Sackett's business and banking
background for, in his view, it enabled the Ambassador to be

l
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"quite understanding of the situation in Germany and realized
that we should do what we could to help in order to avoid a
government coming in which would be dangerous to stability."
Messersmith stated Sackett was asked to go to Germany because "the President wanted a good sound businessman at '"the
head of our embassy in Berlin at that time because the problems were, in large measure, economic."

He saw Sackett as

having good judgment, while being quiet, understanding and of
firm conviction.

"He did a very good job during his stay in

the Embassy," Messersmith said . 1

3 7

Beyond his official duties, Sackett was liked by
Messersmith because he was willing and eager to make extensive visits throughout Germany, establishing contacts with
heads of local government, businessmen, bankers· and scholars
outside of official circles in Berlin.

But most of all,

Sackett was praised for knowing how to use his staff and for
trusting in them, something neither his predecessor nor his
I

r

successor seemed completely able to do.
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·For furthering Hoover's moratorium proposals, Sackett
received strong praise in the German press.

In a news story

digesting the German press reports, the New York Times indicated a complete turn about in its own attitude toward the
American Ambassador in Berlin.

In distinction to prewar

days, the Times pointed out that Germany since the war had
been particularly fortunate in the diplomatic re.presentatives
sent from the United States.

Sackett was an ambassador "who
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quickly got into intimate touch with men and things German
and with keen judgment sharpened by wide business experience,
rapidly grasped the essentials of the German problem. 1
Other honors also came to Sackett.

39

On June 28, 1931

he was made an honorary member of the Institute of Foreign
Politics and was cited as "the worthiest representative of
a great people which, wh.ile confident of its own powers, has
faith in the strength of others."

On October 27, 1931,

Sackett received an honorary doctorate from the Berlin College of Commerce.
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While such honors are not unusual for

an ambassador to receive, some were perhaps arranged not only·
out of gratitude but to insure continued support and loyalty
from the American Ambassador.
Sackett's major award was an honorary PhD in political
science from the University of Tiibingen -- Briining's alma
mater -- received in April, 1932.

The suggestion for this

"unusual honor" came directly from the Chancellor and
Tilbingen was picked as it had a well known School of Political Science and Economy "and because honorary degrees are so
rare at Tilbingen that the magnitude of the distinction is
the greater."

The New York Times stated Brilning saw Sackett

as the man who suggested the Chancellor's trip to Chequers.
Paris and Rome the previous June, 1931 which helped begin
the steps towards Hoover's debt moratorium.

In appreciation,

Sackett was cited as recognizing the dangers which threatened
the world economy "through Germany's economic crisis."

148
Sackett had "energetically tried to ward off these dangers,
proving himself Germany's warm hearted friend," according to
the Times correspondent's report.i 4 ~
Associated Press correspondent Louis Lochner reported
favorably on Ambassador Sackett in a July 2, 1931
to the American press.

dispa~ch

According to Lochner, Sackett,

"sooner than anyone had expected," became "<;>ne of Berlin's
most popular ambassadors."

His first press conference a

year and a half before had won him the esteem of the Berlin
press.

In addition, Lochner termed Mrs. Sackett as "one of

the most charming women in t.he diplomatic set."

Of Sackett,

the AP bureau chief stated "He likes conservative clothes
and works hard." 1 42
In Sackett's native New England, the Boston Herald
praised the Ambassador for becoming a "genuine master of an
intricate and difficult situation," especially in his handling of the debt moratorium.

Although Sackett's appointment

was at first considered as somewhat ridiculous, Sackett
"demonstrated conclusively that he was equipped to advise
and confer as one who 'knew his stuff'," and in light of
/

Sackett's performance the Herald c6nceded that most

Ame~i-

cans who had succeeded at business, politics or a profession
"could likewise do excellent work as ambassadors." 143
Certainly by late 1932 Sackett's popularity was at a
high point as credit for his business-like approach to
foreign affairs seemed to win him a great deal of contempor-
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ary acclaim.

Sackett's niece would later reminisce that

finance and economics were the Ambassador's natural element
and, to him, the primary issues of concern involved those
problems..

"He always seemed to feel that the moratorium was

his main triumph," she wrote. ·
The financial plight of Germany was his main
worry and he felt it was central to the feelings
and behavior of the German people at the time.
In his view, they had suffered frightfully during the post World War I inflation, and lived
in constant dread of recurrence. 144
To be sure, this was an exaggeration of Sackett's
motives.

However, until Chancellor Bruning surprised

Sackett with news of his resignation on May 30, 1932, the
Ambassad9r had worked hard to do what he could to garner and
strengthen American support for the Bruning regime which he
viewed as the only hope of preventing Germany's slip into
intractable domestic chaos. 145
The Ambassador and the Election of 1932·:
Ambassador Sackett's third trip back to the United
States was undertaken for the clearly expressed purpose of
helping the Republican Party in the presidential election
campaign of 1932.

One month before Bruning informed Sackett

of his resignation -- an action which Sackett deeply regretted -- the Ambassador was preparing for a possible return, if necessary, to the United States to help the Hoover
campaign.

After learning the Kentucky state Republican

delegation would support the renomination of Hoover at the

l

150

summer national convention, Sackett asked the President if.
"a visit home prior to, or at the time of, the Chicago Convention would be required in the outcome [sic] and have held
myself in readiness to go back to Kentucky should necessity
arise."

But at that point, with the Bruning Government

~till

in shaky cont.rol of Germany, Sackett himself did not feel it
necessary to leave Berlin for the convention "as I look
upon the [Hoover] nomination as now assured" and because of
"circumstances" which "have seemed to require my constant
presence in Berlin this winter and spring."

Personal prob-

lems of his second in command at the embassy, George Gordon,
also demanded that Sackett remain at his post for the time. 146
"Unless, therefore, you feel that I could be of real
service to you by returning to the Convention," Sackett wrote
to Hoover, "I shatl remain here till September and return
then for the campaign and election." 147

Hoover agreed with

Sackett in hi_s decision to remain in Berlin, adding, "But l
shall look forward to seeing you sometime during the Fall." 148
When Sackett sailed for the United States on October
4, 1932 he told the press he was returning to consult with.
Hoover on the outlook of the world economic conference then
being planned "and also hoping to take some part in the· election campaign." 149

Upon his arrival in New York Sacket:t told

the press he had come home at his own expense as "the government had ordered all employees to take a thirty-day furlough,"
and _therefore he was "free to do as I please."

He flippant-
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ly added, "and one thing I please to do is to do what I can
to help in the election. " 1

5 0

The ambassador then hit the campaign tour on behalf of
Hoover both in New York and in Kentucky, as did many prominent Republican office holders in the administration wh4
sensed the desperation of Hoover's chances at winning a
second term while confronting the deepening economic depression and defending prohibition.
Secretary

S~imson

Within the State Department,

zestily undertook the defense of Hoover

and of his foreign policy.

pnder Secretary of· State William

Castle was most active on the campaign trail emphasizing the
debt moratorium as an example of Hoover's "decisive leadership."

And Sackett called upon German-Americans to support

Hoover "who has done so much for Germany." 151
Sackett justified his political oratory by.reiterating
during his travels that he was on a 30 day unpaid vacation
under the terms of the federal economy bill and was therefore
"off the government payroll and entitled to come to.this
country and tell people what President Hoover has done for
Germany."

He frankly admitted his personal interest in

Hoover's re-election and felt that criticism of his-political activity, though he held a diplomatic post, was unjust. 152
Within the State Department, Assistant Secretary for
Administration Wilbur J. Carr was concerned over the Sackett
trip and emphasized that its political purposes be clearly
separated from any official business.

Although Sackett's
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original request was for a "short home leave" to allow for
"consultation with the department on development of policies,

et cete:ea," it was clear to Carr that the ambassador was ·returning to work in the Hoover campaign and.would only be oncall for consultation if need be.

Carr wrote to Castle

Obviously the Department should be extremely
careful not to attempt to put Mr. Sackett or
any other ambassador or minister under orders
for consultation for any period during which
his presence is not required here for the reasons that the activities of these officers in
this country are being carefully scrutinized
and, in my judgment, neither the President nor
the Department can afford to have it appear, in
view of the intent of the Economy Act and the
acute political situation, that they are drawing salary or expenses while in this country
engaged upon campaign work, as practically all
of them are. 153
Despite Sackett's hopes, it was a gloomy and depressing campaign for the

Repu~licans.

According to Stimson,

"the immense undercurrent" was against the party and the
people wanted a change.

With the defeat of Hoover, Sackett

became a lame duck ambassador and on November 12, 1932 he
returned to Germany to wait out the transition of administrations.154
And if the defeat of Hoover was not enough, Sackett
soon saw the appointment of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor of
Germany on January 30, 1933 and the coming to power of the
extreme right wing in Germany -- no doubt a discouraging
turn of events for the ambassador who tried so hard to help
a more centrist government maintain power.
During the interregnum Sackett continued to take an
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active, if disheartened, role in European diplomatic affairs
especially in the preparatory meetings for the world economic conference. 155
By March, 1933 Sackett was set to leave Germany as the
new Roosevelt Democratic party administration took over the
White House.i
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As he prepared to depart, no effort was

spared in showing the retiring ambassador appreciation for
his service.

The New York Times reported Sackett's farewell

dinner given by the American Chamber of Commerce in Berlin
at which Sackett was described as one of the most popular
United States ambassadors sent to Berlin.
event in Berlin's

America~

"Rarely has an

colony attracted a more represent-

ative gathering than that which·taxed the Hotel Adlon's
dining accommodations to greet Mr. and Mrs. Sackett," the
Times stated.

At a farewell luncheon on the eve of his de-

parture, Sackett was not only greeted by the aged President
von Hindenburg (a customary diplomatic function), but by the
distasteful Chancellor Hitler and his top lieutenants as
well. 157
On March 22, 1933 Sackett left Germany to stop off at
Vichy enroute to the United States to undergo the "cure."
Although his resignation submitted to Roosevelt was not effective until the appointment of his successor, the usually
discreet Sackett permitted a final interview with the press ..
He offered no comment nor condemnation of the Hitler regime
but did regret the "disappearance from Germany of liberty of

1l
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the press and of democratic government."

He blamed Germany's

domestic troubles on its economic conditions and pleaded
that Germany-be allowed a major role in the planned world
economic.conference. 158
"During my stay in Germany;" Sackett told

reporter.~,

"I have found economics, as it almost has always been, at the
basis of the nation's politics, and a great many of the
political dangers of Europe can be, I am sure, overcome if
there is a wise treatment of its economic problems." 159

***********
If Sackett was the right man at the right time when he
came to Germany in 1930, the times had significantly changed
when he left in 1933.

Of course it was not known that events

in Germany in early 1933 would, eventually, lead to a resurgence of the German military machine and, eventually, to
World War IL

-But certainly well known -- if underestimated

-- by that t'i'me was ·the pervasive world-wide Great Depression
was causing a breakdown in the world order which had delicately existed in the 1920s.

The conduct of foreign affairs

on the part of all nations in a "business-like" economic
atmosphere, instead of being treated wisely as Sackett would
have hoped, was slowly giving away to a defensive, inward
and cynical form of diplomacy leaving little room for friendship and trust and demanding greater political leadership
than was ever required before.
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Perhaps, for Sackett's sake, it is just as well he
left Germany when he did, while his own personal popularity.
was high and before American and European relationships degenerated any further.

CHAPTEn

IV

CONCLUSIONS -- RATING AMBASSADOR SACKETT
With the selected criteria from Chapter I pages 38-40
in mind, how does Frederic Mosley Sackett's performance as
ambassador to Germany stand up in relation to critical judgment in view of the fact of his nonprofessional status and
relative inexperience in diplomatic affairs?

The following

brief summations give guidance in making an overall assessment:
1.

Motives for the Appointment
Obviously and inescapably, there were strong political

motivations for Sackett's ambassadorial appointment on the
part of the Kentucky State Republican leadership and hence
on President Herbert Hoover who was himself placed in a difficult political situation with the onset of the Great Depression.

After Sackett had declared himself a candidate

for renomination for the United States Senate, and then was
confronted with· potentially strong and attractive opposition
which threatened to split Kentucky Republicans.

In the face

of a seemingly strong Democratic opposition, Sackett's appointment was viewed not only as a political pay-off to the
state of Kentucky fo~ its support of Hoover in 1928, but
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also a chance to get an

i~cumbent

out of the way for a more

attractive candidate.
But conclusions over the mo.tives for the appointment
itself cannot end here, for if political expediency was the
only Hoover objective, this could have easily been accomplished by sending Sackett to a less important post than
Berlin.

Given the·conditions of the time, it was in the

best interests of the Hoover administration to place a man
with Sackett's background.and qualifications in an important
post like Berlin where the problems dealt with concerned
business, finance and economics.

For almost a year before

the Sackett appointment was made, Hoover was under pressure
by the State Department to send a man like Sackett to Berlin.
It can even be considered as within Hoover's own philosophical framework (given his pronouncements during his Latin
American visits) that a successful businessman like Sackett
could be regarded as a "professional" in the sense that he
was an expert in finance problems.

In addition, Hoover

could not have based Sackett's appointment simply upon the
whims of the Kentucky political organization, for he himself
worked with Sackett in administering the United States Food
Administration during World War I and had contact with
Sac.kett while he was a Senator serving on the Interstate
Commerce, Commerce and later Finance Committees while Hoover
was Secretary of Commerce.

In addition, Sackett was known

to be loyal to Hoover personally.
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Although Castle in the State Department considered appointing a new ambassador to Berlin as most urgent when
Hoover took office in March, 1929, it was the last 0f the
great European diplomatic posts to be filled.

Whether or

not the President ever seriously considered appointing

~

career foreign service officer to the post, whicu could have
been done if the need were that serious, is not clear.

How-

ever, when the political difficulties in Kentucky more or
less pushed Sackett into the "availability ranks," Hoover's
need to fill the Berlin post "with just the right man" was
conveniently satisfied.
2.

Congressional Responsibility
As Senate tradition calls for the expeditious ap-

proval of a nominee to a position when he is a member or a
past member of the Senate, no investigations were made into
the Sackett ambassadorial appointment; no questions or reservations concerning the suitability of the appointment or
the competency of the nominee ·were raised.
Sackett's appointment did initially and modestly upset
the operations of Congress mainly because of his removal
from the important Finance Committee which provided an opening for the advancement of the maverick Senator Robert
LaFollett's -- never and administration favorite --.ascendancy to it.

However, this did not ultimately delay

Sackett's confirmation.

One can assume that Sackett's posi-

tion as Ambassador to Germany, taken in combination with his
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former position in the Senate, was not a negative factor in
the administration's relations with Congress especially when
sensitive international problems arose (i.e.'· the debt moratorium) which required consultation with the Senate.
~

3.

Relations with the President
Sackett's personal relationship with Hoover remained

good throughout their· long association and must also be considered when looking at his nomination to the Berlin post.
Hoover favorably cited Sackett in his memoirs both on the
occasion of the President's preconvention campaign in 1928
and in appointing Sackett to Germany.

The President des-

cribed him as one of the "outstanding citizens"-who "carried
additional weight."

Sackett had relatively easy access to

Hoover whenever the need to see him arose, and communciated
(though less successfully) with the President via personal
letter.

However, his relationship with Hoover was not used

to circumvent normal State Department channels and he enjoyed good relations

wit~

its Washington officials as well.

Sackett was a loyal Hoover supporter, thoroughly versed
in the President's political views and policies and he re-_
presented them well to highest government officials in
Berlin.

Sackett's direct influence upon the administration.

is harder to gauge,
underestimated.

t~ough

it has probably been generally

Hoover has cited Sackett for more or less

making him aware of the adverse· political situation in
Germany during the spring and summer of 1931, and he has also
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been given credit for sustaining administration support for
the Bruning Government after the initiation of the debt
moratorium.

It is safe to say Sackett was attentively

listened to by the administration even if the latter did not
always react in accordance to the ambassador's preferences.
4.

Personal Wealth
Although Sackett was certainly a wealthy man which

provided him with time (before October, 1929) to participate
in public and political service his wealth did not hinder
his effectiveness as ambassador.

Berlin was considered a

post which, at the time, was beyond the normal means of a
career foreign service officer to maintain on his own salary.
Sackett did a great deal of entertaining and lived in fairly
expensive residences which, according to members of-his own
family, required expenditures beyond the salary and expenses
paid for by the State Department.

While it may have been

one important consideration, Sackett's appointment was not
based upon his wealth nor
tributions.

amo~nt

of political monetary con-

However, it must certainly have been a consider-

ation in his personal decision to accept the appointment in
the first place.
5.

Cultural Ability
Although Sackett had traveled abroad prior to being

nominated as ambassador, he possessed no special expert
knowledge of conditions in Germany nor of its economic back-

j
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ground prior to his appointment in 1930.

He knew some of

the German language, but his speaking ability was minimal
and required that he undertake private lessons while in
Berlin.

His official business therefore, was

nat~rally

ducted either in English or through an interpreter.

con-

Ho~~

ever, in a relatively short time, Sackett was "quick to
grasp things German" and became well versed on issues there.
Also, his embassy staff no doubt provided a great deal of
assistance to him in terms of German protocol, customs,
traditions. eta.
6.

Private Career
Sackett's background as a businessman and his exper-

ience as a politician greatly enhanced his on-the-job abilities while in Germany, according to the foreign service
people with whom he worked.

Consul General George Messer-

smith was particularly pleased that Sackett was able to
relate quickly and well with economic matters involved in
Germany at the time.

John Cooper Wiley incisively noted the

difference between Sackett's professional approach to economic problems as compared to Schurman's.

Sackett's business

background was especially appropriate because, at the time,
though State Department policy dictated an unofficial involvement, most of the real relationships between Germany and
the United States involved private sector financial investment.

1
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7~

Character Suitability
According to most observers at the time, Sackett was

at least outwardly suited for the role of
appearance was good.

ambassador.

His

The New York Times, members of the

Senate, personal friends and supporters in his home state,
members of the foreign service, and Hoover himself found
Sackett to be charming, conversant, public-service minded,
intelligent (quick to grasp complicated situations, George
Messersmith had said), polite and relatively cool in difficult situations.

Sackett was outgoing -- willing to meet

people and spend time with them -- and was enthusiastically
greeted and liked by his German hosts, as well as the American community in Germany which, like Sackett, was predominately of a business orientation.

In sum, he did not make

many enemies while ambassador and certainly alienated no one
political group, although he may not have become too close
to them either.·
8.

Image Representation
Although Sackett was far from being a member of Ameri-

ca's prestigious or wealthy upper classes, neither was he an
average middle class citizen.

He did perhaps represent what

seemed to be regarded as the American ideal man of the 1920s:
a business man, successful, well-educated, an active member
of his community,

a

good family man and a loyal supporter of

his government and political party.

Sackett reflected a

certain Republican aspiration and ethic which many in America
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thought to be the dream of fulfillment in their "land of
opportunity."

In th.is sense he did perhaps act as a museum

piece.for the United States, although this was not the purpose of his appointment to Germany.
9.

Relations with Embassy Staff
Throughout his tenure in Berlin Sackett enjoyed very

good relations with h.is staff at the embassy, perhaps because he supported their work and relied upon them, was
"paternalistic" towards them rather than interfering and
dictatorial.

Sackett worked especially well with Wiley and

his chief Counsel of Embassy George Gordon, as well as Consul
General George

Messer~nith.

Few, if any, complaints are to

be found against Sackett from his staff as are in evidence
against Sackett's predecessor.

On several occasions, members

of the American Embassy staff in Berlin cited Sackett for
providing insight and guidance to their work.

Although not

particularly inspirational, Sackett did seem supportive of
the work done by the staff and was the type of person who
generated a respectful loyalty from subordinates by. adapting
to their methods rather than by introducing or forcing upsetting changes to their routines.

Unlike Jacob G. Schurman

before him and W:llliam E. Dodd after him, Sackett did not
criticize the way of life led by the career men at Berlin
but instead adapted himself to it, perhaps because he enjoyed
the diplomatic style of social life as well as his staff did.
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10.

Diplomatic Skill
As exhibited in his delicate negotiations concerning

the debt moratorium, during the German July financial crisis,
and his interaction with the Bruning Government in general,
Sackett appears to have· been an efficient, competent emissary to a foreign government.

At least it can be said that

Sackett made no serious blunders which might have alienated
and isolated other diplomats.

He conducted himself with the

proper distance from various and potentially difficult unofficial parties (allowing his staff to handle any direct
associations of this kind) and maintained excellent relationships with the government in power without seriously jeopardizing his objectivity and duty towards maintaining America's
best interests.

His inexperience in diplomacy appears to

have been no handicap and although he was decidedly proBruning Government, th.ere is little to really support the
suggestion of Foreign Minister Julius Curtius that Sackett
was "in the vest pocket" of the Germans.
11.

Respect and Popularity
To what extent Sackett was

~espected

Government is not easy to determine.
to isolate

h~m

paid to him.

by the German

Certainly no attempt

was made, nor were any gratuitous deferences
Ambassador Sackett did at least enjoy a certain

respect paid to the representative of any great nation however.

His popularity in Germany was considerable.
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12.

Administrative and Leadership Abilities
Certainly Sackett's executive skills learned during

his business career, and the fact that he

was an administra-

tor both in private life and in public service, enhanced his
ability to operate an embassy.

In addition, Sackett en~oyed

the excellent services of two experienced career Counselors
of Embassy who normally took care of the routine details of
the embassy allowing Sackett time for making the more important personal contacts within the German Government.

In

addition, Sackett maintained close communication with the
State Department.

This removed the need

f~r

making decisions

on the spot -- a natural trend in American diplomacy since
the introduction of the transoceanic telephone -- but placed
more onus upon the mission in the field for carrying out the
decisions of the administration to a more exacting extent
than had otherwise been the case in diplomacy in the past.
In other words, independent of the Ambassador, most of the
focus ·for decision-making was passed to Washington, although
Sackett was still important in interpreting and transmitting
.

.

the information on which decisions were based and in the
carrying out of day-to-day negotiations with the host government.
13.

Political Sensibilities
It is clear Sackett was thoroughly aware of the poli-

tical situation inside Germany during his tenure there as
ambassador.

He personally maintained close contact with

l

j
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German Chancellor Bruning until the latter resigned in May,
1932 after which cordial relations with successor govern-

ments were maintained until Sackett left Germany.

Unques-

tionably Sackett was pro-host government and especially was
j~owever,

pro-Bruning and did not.attempt to hide his feelings.

he interpreted the crisis faced by the government relatively
clearly for Hoover, falling back on devices only when deemed
necessary to get his own government's attention.

Unlike

other ambassadors, Sackett was not so ·stubbornly opinionated
as to color his judgment and to prompt one-sided reports of
minimal use to the State Department.
14.

Reporting
Generally speaking, major officials in the United

States Government were pleased with the quality of the reporting coming from the American Embassy in Berlin.

Al-

though at one point there was criticism from inside the Department for a lack of interpretive reporting, a complaint
coinciding with the absence of John C. Wiley from Berlin,
St~mson

himself paid Sackett a rare compliment for the

quality of the reports from Germany.

In addition, Sackett's

three visits to Washington during his tenure no doubt helped
to clarify in person any information stated in many of the
important reports sent to the State Department.
15.

Host Country Reaction
Sackett was well received by the official and unoffi-

l
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cial circles in Germany and well liked throughout his stay.
Only a matter of days passed between the time Hoover sent
the nomination of Sackett as Ambassador to the German Government for its approval and their very favorable response .. with
virtually no questions asked.

According to American officers

in Germany and the New York Times, the German press was complimentary in their response when Sackett began his tenure
and were most praiseworthy of his performance when he left.
Of course, due to Sackett's work on behalf of the Bruning
Government, this served to enhance his esteem in the Weimar
Republic despite the eventual downfall of that government.
Sackett was not ignored by the German government although at
times German officials seemed patronizing towards him.

Al-

though Sackett was careful in his unofficial contacts, he
did travel about the country making them.
16.

Personal Prestige
Sackett's positions as United States Senator, success-

ful businessman, and personal friend of Hoover all helped to
increase his stature as ambassador, as these traits were all
considered desirable and beneficial to the self interests of
Germany., Especially noteworthy was the thought that Sackett
would.have a great deal of influence not .only with Hoover
but tn the Senate as well.

Despite America's official iso-

lation from political and economic affairs in Europe, the
United States was still regarded as the most important
country in the world and the one which could objectively
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deal with European problems.

In this light, the German

government was happy to receive the recognition from the
Hoover Administration of the importance of Berlin in post
World War I European affairs that the Sackett

appointme~~

appeared to imply.

* ·* * * * * * * * * *
America's foreign policy towards Europe in the 1930s
was ineffective and especially short-sighted, at least in
terms of its response to the problems in Germany.
its economic power, the

U~ited

Despite

States by its own choice did

not have the requisite political leadership capabilities to
significantly influence or alter events there.

Political

isolationism retained a strong hold over the thoughts and
actions of the Hoover Administration and although Americans,
and especially the financial community, shared a great interest in European affairs, it had placed definable limits
on its policies.beyond which it would not move; or if it
did, it moved timidly and reluctantly. 1
In examining the situation surrounding America's
response to the difficulties in the Weimar Republic and of
Europe in the early 1930s, it is evident the United States
attempted to save a political system by assisting it with
economic means.

The belated recognition that the vicious

cycle of war reparations and debt payments, plus the alleged
misuse of capital development loans, were effectively bleed-
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ing the economic strength of Europe, and the declaration of
the Hoover Moratorium to try and halt that drain was consistent with economic philosophies of most of the men shaping
American foreign policy at the time.

While the United

~.~ates
·. l

sought the cooperation of the several European nations involved, the moratorium was, at heart, a unilateral defensive
action to forestall further bank failures in the United
States and seemingly did not involve intractable ties to
European political difficulties.

2

To take action beyond

this, in the economic realm, would have necessitated increased American loans -- officially sanctioned and perhaps
guaranteed by the United States Government -- yet it was
felt this meant sending good money after bad and naturally
the Hoover Administration could not condone this.

3

Outside economics, the only recourse for action was in
di~ect

Europe.

political intervention in the inter-relationships of
American isolationism during the 1920s was not ab-

solute as the United States did engage in limited political
activity in matters deemed important to its own self interests.

The interwar period of

~he

1920s and 1930s indeed

marked a watershed in increased American involvement in
foreign affairs, probably because of its superior and farflung economic situation.

However, aside from President

Hoover's own restrictive philosophies governing American
political involvements abroad and his distaste for foreign
intrigues in general, it is unlikely that most European
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nations (except Germany perhaps) would have welcomed an "unsophisticated" Uncle· Shylock to presume a right to get involved after it had clearly rejected a leadership role in refusing their 1919 invitation to join the League of Nations.

4

More than this, however, American statesmen by 1930
were again fearful of domestic public opinion and a profound
isolationism which was more intense, dynamic and less tolerable of dissent -- an isolationism born mostly out of economic depression which had grown even less likely to permit ex-·
tensive political commitments in Rurope.

To have flaunted

the .axiom of perceived public sentiment against political
entanglements, they believed, would be committing political
suicide especially during a time of severe economic depression at home.

5

Given this sitatuion, it is difficult to see what other
alternatives or responses open to the United States would,
or could, have altered events _a great deal.
were beyond the control of

~ny

6

Certainly they

one man, and the American

Ambassador to Germany at that time should not be strictly
judged alongside policies which failed
to make them work.

de~pite

his attempts

Untrained in the tradiational conduct of

diplomacy, Frederic Mosley Sackett brought to Berlin a background in practical business and economics which was suited
to the affairs then prevalent between Germany and the United
States.

The motives for his appointment were a mixture of

political necessity coinciding with the practical diplomatic

-.
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needs of the Hoover Administration.
en~oyed

At the same time, he

a prominence which did command more attention from

the administration, more so than might otherwise have been
the case had even a career foreign service officer been in
charge of the American Embassy in Germany.
While it is interesting to speculate on the differences
in the level of influence and action had a career man been
ambassador in Berlin, it is doubtful the outcome of events
would have been significantly changed.

Judged in the con-

text of the times and world relationships in the early 1930s,
his own merits and on the considerations of his contemporaries, Frederic Sackett was a successful ambassador to Germany
for the United States.

NOTES
Chapter I:

The Historical Controversy

1

Frederick van Dyne, Our Foreign Serice -- The ABC of
American Diplomacy (Rochester, N. Y., 1909), 62-63.
2

Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (New York, 1959), 255.

3

Ibid, 255.

4

Ibid, 256-257.

5

Ibid, 242-244.

6

Ibid, 251.

7

Ibid, 253-254.

8

Ibid, 258-259.

9

Ibid, 259-260.

-1

°Ibid,

262-263.

lEllis Briggs~ Farewell to Foggy Bottom -- The Recollections of a Career Diplomat (New York, 1964), 36-37.
1

l 2

Ibid, 38.

- i 3 Ibid

1 4

, 40-41.

Ibid, 42.

lSibid, 44-45.
16

Ibid, 45-46.

17

Ibid, 46-47.

18

High Gibson. The Road to Foreign Policy, (Garden
City, N. Y., 1944), 50.
19

George F. Kennan, "The Future of Our Professional
Diplomacy,'' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 4 (July, 1955), 573.
Kennan did set some criteria for an American Ambassador going

173 .
to Russia which is worth noting. In an excerpt from."The
United States and Russia" written in the winter of 1946 the
former charge d'affairs and yet-to-become ambassador himself, Kennan wrote that the mission must at all times be led
by someone capable of and prepared for hard and tedious work
over a long period of time, someone who has in high degree
the qualities of modesty and patience, who is animated solely
by devotion to the interests of our country, and is genarally
fitted by personality and background to earn the respect of
a nation unexcelled in the psychological analysis of the
human individual. In the case of Ambassador Harriman, for
example, "I can sincerely say that I consider these prerequisites filled." But for the future, Kennan argued, the
State Department should be prepared to use its influence to
see that it is effectively filled. "A vain, fussy, and
ignorant ambassador is capable of breaking its back, and of
doing lastin.g (if not readily apparent) damage to the fabric
of Russian-American relations." Refer to Kennan's Memoirs,
1925-1950 (Boston, 1967) 564-565.
2

°Congressional Record, 85 Cong., 1 Sess., 14833-14839
(Aug 15, 1957); New York Times, Aug 7, 1957, 12:6.
21

Ibid, Aug 6, 1957, 13:1.

22

Congressional Record, ibid. Senator Mike Mansfield,
later to become ambassador to Japan in the Carter Administration, agreed. in general with Humphrey but pointed out that
there were "some of the noncareer ambassadors who, in my
opinion, perform able, distinguished, and outstanding service
representing this country." Most were contributors to their
''respective parties" but they did perform well, he said.
· "There is room for contributors in a democratic system such
as ours. It is fortunate that many of these people have
turned out to be so adept and so capable in the posts to
which they were assigned."
23

Claire Booth Luce, "The Ambassadorial Issue: Professionals or Amateurs?'.' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 1
(Oct, 1957), 105-106.
24

Ibid, 107.

25

Ibid, 115-116.

2 6

Ibid, 118.

27

Ibid, 119.

2 8

Ibid, 120.

29

Graham H. Stuart, American Diplomatic and Consular

1

174

Practice (New York, 1952), 135.
30

Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., .Aillerican
Foreign Policy (New York, 1954), 333.
31 Ibid,

311.

32

Ibid, 332-333.

3 3

Ibid, 333.

3
3

4

Ibid·

5

Ibid·

36

Brookings Institute, United States Forei n Polic
Formulation and Administration Washington, 960). 111.
37 Ibid, 111-112.
3 8

Ibid, 112.

39Ibi'd.
4

°Kenneth W. Thompson, American Diplomacy and Emergent
Patterns (New York, 1962), 89.
41

Ibid, 90. Thompson further asserts that "If history
is past politics and diplomacy, historians should stand in
the front rank of American diplomats. Indeed, by any standard, the list of our professional historians who have
carried responsibility abroad is impressive." He cites
George Bancroft, John Lathrop Motley, Andrew D. White,
William E. Dodd as examples. "Their numbers increase if
diplomats turned amateur historians are added." Not all
amateur historians rank with the foremost American diplomats,
but a few, such as Charles Francis Adams and John Hay, earned
universal and well-deserved acclaim. Of Adams, it is said
that no less than the generalship of Grant and Sherman his
diplomacy preserved the Union by forestalling any move by
the British Navy to throw its full weight to the Confederate
side." Thompson adds that "if historians as a group have
showed any weakness, it has been in accepting and operating
within the limitations of their role as representative and
spokesmen for an American administration." And for some
historian/ambassadors, "discretion and self-restraint have
proven too painful a burden to bear." William E. Dodd is
cited as an example; "Because of his prophetic appraisal and
righteous hatred of Hitler, destroyed his lines of contact
and thereby his usefulness in Berlin."
42

Ibid·, 94.

175
43

Ibid, 86.

4 4

Ibid, 95.

4 5

Ibid, 96.

4 6

Ibid, 99.

4

7 Janie.s L. Mccamy, The Conduct of the New Diploma'li
(New York, 1964), 239-241. McCamy also states that aftW the
1924 Rogers Act, both Secretaries of State Charles Evans
Hughes and Frank B. Kellogg were most supportive of career
men despite President Coolidge's indifference.
4 8

Ibid,. 202-204.

49

Ibid, 241-244. Military men examples McCamy specifically cites are Admiral Alan G. Kirk, former ambassador to
Belgium, Taiwan, and later the Soviet Union; Walter Bedell
Smith, ambassador to the Soviet Union.
5 0

Ibid , 24 5 .

s1

Ibid.

52

Ibid, 246.

5 3

Ibid·

54

Elmer Plischke, The Conduct of American Diplomacy
(New York, 1950), 200.
5 5
. Ibid,

198.

56

Ibid.

51

Ibid, 199.

58

E. Wilder Spaulding, Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary (Washington, 1961), 293-296.
59
60

Ibid, 295.

Ibid, 8. The acid test came in 1913 with Woodrow
Wilson. "If any President could have been expected to justify
the system of a free presidential hand in the appointment of
chiefs of mission, the former president of Princeton, reform
governor of New Jersey, student of American politics, and
victor over Taft's old-line Republicanism should have been
the man. Yet virtually every expert from Graham Stuart to
Walter Mills has criticized the Wilson appointees," Further,
"It was beside the point that Wilson did not know in 1913

l
176
that the world war was less than a year and a half away. No
future President when he rewards his campaign contributors,
.the party machine which supported him, or even the ladies
who entertained him royally in 4fashington society, will know
when a world crisis is in the offing. The fact remains that

Woodrow Wilson named a group of chiefs of mission who were
to be innocents abroad in a world where there was no innocence." Of the first 51 Wilson-Bryan appointees to chi@.f of
mission assignments, only two had previous experience. ..,Ibid,
9.
61

Ibid, 11.

62

Ibid.

6 3

Ibid, 13.

64

Ibid, 58-59.

65

Ibid, 94.

6 6

Ibid, 130.

61

Ibid, 155. This often generalized view of William
E. Dodd is refuted in Robert Dalleck, "Beyond Tradition: The
Diplomatic Careers of W. E. Dodd and George S. Messersmith,
1933-1938" South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Spring,
1967) 233-244; and in Democrat and Diplomat: The Life of ·
William E. Dodd (New York, 1968). Ambassador Dood, Sackett's
successor in Berlin, was Franklin Roosevelt's sixth choice
for the post after five other prominent Democrats turned down
the offer. Still, he was no more or less qualified to be
ambassadqr to Germany, Dalleck argues. A noted academician
specializing in the history of the South, Dodd had no expertise in German politics at the time of his appointment and
could barely reme~ber some of the German language he learned
while a student at Leipzeg 36 years before. What was key to
Roosevelt's thinking however, was that his designs for the
selection of an ambassador to Germany included the desire to
send a man with democratic leanings who would serve as an
American expression of hostility to the objectionable events
going on under the Hitler regime. (This contrasts with
Hoover's desire to place a representative with business expertise to come to grips with Germany's more predominate economic problems.) In Roosevelt's search for an ambassador a·
career man was not really considered for the job as they were
viewed ~s unfriendly to his liberal domestic and foreign
polici.es and because he basically· did not trust them. Dodd
shared this distrust of the career.men and disliked their
lifestyle and described his own staff in Germany as inefficient and "frivolous in the extreme; ibid, 187-191, 214. Insofar as his on-the-job performance, Dalleck's assessment of·

177
Dodd is corroborated by the American Consul General in Germany during. the 1930s, George Messersmith: "I often think
that there were very few men who realized what was happening
in Germany more thoroughly than he did," Messersmith wrote of
Dodd, "and certainly there were very few men who realized the
implications £or the rest of Europe and for us and for the
whole world of what was happening in the country [Germany
during the 1930s] than he did." Messersmith felt that :ijposevelt could have appointed a better known, more spectacul•r
man than Dodd, however he did feel the appointment was made
with deliberation. "The Pr.esident knew the importance of
having the right man there,'' but Dodd' s assignment "was not
too well received in many quarters. 11 ; Papers of George S.
Messersmith, University of Delaware, Dover, Notes for
Memoirs.
68

Spaulding, Ambassadors Ordinary, 179. Women ambassadors discussed by the author were Ruth Bryan Owen, Florence
Jaffray Harriman, Perle Mesta, Helen Eugenie Moore Anderson,
Claire Booth Luce and Francis E. Willis. Miss Willis was the
one "pro" up from within State Department ranks, but was
deprived of previous diplomatic postings before becoming a
Minister.
69

Ibid, 206, 216-217. Cited as examples were William
O'Dwyer (who,. though an unscrupulous politician, was a
"supremely good ambassador,"), Joseph P. Kennedy; playboy
Jimmy "Golden Boy" Cromwell; meat packing heir John Cudahy;
Alanson B. Houghten of Corning Glass Works; steel magnate
Myron Taylor; Macy's Oscar Strauss; and cloth merchandiser
Maxwell H. Gluck who, despite the uproar over his appointment to Ceylon in 1957, had "done us no great harm" insofar
as relations with Ceylon were concerned. Ibid, 236.
70

Thomas A. Bailey, The Art of Diplomacy -- The American Experience (New York, 1968), 35.
71

Ibid, 45.

7 2

Ibid, 46.

73

Ibid, 51.

74

Spaulding, Ambassadors Ordinary, ix.

178
Chapter II:

The Hoover Commitment

1

New York Times, March 5, 1929, 1:3-6; Herbert Hoover,
The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, the Cabinent and the Presidency 1920-1933 (New York, 1952), II, 222; Public Papers of

the Presidents of the United States: Herbert Hoover;

C~~

taining the Public Messages, Speeches and the Statements of
the President, March 4 to December 31, 1929 (Washingtonr
1974)' 8-9.
2

Ibid; New York Times, March 5, 1929, 30:1. In reflecting on Hoover's inaugural address, the New York Times
was critical of Hoover for professing high ideals for world
peace and of the United States for not taking its proper
place in the World Court, all the while turning its back on
the most outstanding tool for peace, the League of Nations.
3

Fred L. Isreal (ed.), The State of the Union Messages
of the Presidents, 1790-1966 in three volumes; (New York,
1966), vol. III, 2748.
4

Ibid. In Hoover's second annual message to Congress,
on December 2, 1930, just after the October, 1929 stock market crash, foreign relations was the last subject dealt
with. By the time of the third annual message, on December
8, 1931, the "world-widen economic crisis was the predominate
theme of Hoover's passage on foreign affairs and the urgency
in Germany was of "highest importance" rather than the need
to restore normal relations in Latin America; Ibid, 2782,
2784; See also Robert Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the
Great Depression, Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933
(New York, 1957), 3
5

Hoover, Memoirs, II, 335.

6

Warren F. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the
United States, 1779-1939 -- A Study in Administrative History (Chicago, 1961), 132 . .
7

Ibid, 139.

8

Ibid, 157.

9

Ibid, 157'."'"'158.

1 0

Ibid, 159.

11
-

Ibid , 16 7 .

12

Ibid, 183-187. Essentially the Rogers Act combined
the diplomatic and consular services into a combined foreign
service; professionalized officers below the rank of minister

179
and ambassador; provided appointment via open and competitive examination with promotion strictly on a merit basis;
established a salary and retirement scale; and gave a
system for representation (entertainment) allowances. See
W. Wendell Blancke, The Foreign Service of the United States
(New York, 1969), 18-19.
13

Ilchrnan, Professional Diplomacy, 210-211.

14

Ibid, 211-212. Especially laudatory of Hughes and
Kellogg for their efforts in promoting the interests of
career men, and for an in depth look at the makings and
"frame of mind" of the professional foreign service in
America during the 1920s see Robert D. Schulzinger, The
Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outloo'k'a:nd
Style of United States Foreign Service Officer, 1906-1928
(Unpublished dissertation, Yale University, 1971) and Dexter
Per.kins, "The Department of State and American Public
Opinion" in Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.) The Diplomats, 1919-1939 (Princeton, 1953), 283, 286.
15

New York Times, Oct. 6, 1928, 5:2.

16

Ibid, Oct. 7, 1928, 3:5; Feb. 12, 1928, 32:6.

11

Ibid, Oct. 10, 1928, 6:2. In diagreement with
Coolidge was prominent New York banker, former journalist
and former special attache for political-economic affairs
(in the- Division of Western Europe Affairs) for the Department of State, and a prominent Republican, William Augustine
Scully. In a letter to the editor of the New York Times,
he argued that the career men's status should not change
with administrations. Scully, who assisted in drafting the
1924 Rogers Act asked: "What worthiness or application has
the Rogers law, providing as it does, the maintenance of a ·
corps of American foreign service officers under the jurisdiction and administration of the Department of State if,
after having been given ministerial or ambassadorial rank
based on long service and efficiency, a change in the political party directing the nation's welfare, reduces his to
a lower grade, with the alternative of resigning? We might
just as logically demote the personnel of our armed forces
after they have obtained what is commonly known as permanent
rank." Ibid, Oct. 21, 1928, III 5:5. The precedent of
career men not submitting their resignations along with the
partisan political appointments at the time of administration changes was broken by Hoover's Secretary of State
Kellogg at the beginning of the new term at a press conference when, "taken off his guard," Kellogg stated that
career men would follow the custom of submitting their resignations, which a number of service men did do. "President Hoover not only refused to accept the resignations of

180
those career men, but increased the number of chiefs of
..
mission draw~ from the career service," according to Graham
H. Stuart, The Department of State: A History of its Organization, Procedure, and Personnel (New York, 1949), 262.
18

New York Times, March 15, 1929, 7:1.

19

Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 212. Ilchman notes
that this stat~s for career personnel was not too greatly
reduced during Franklin D. Roosevelt's Presidency despite
his well known distrust of the foreign service.
20

Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, Years
of Adventure, 1874-1920 (New York, 1961) I, 476.
21

Joseph Brandes, Herbert Hoover and Economic Diplomacy -- Department of Cormnerce Policy 1921-19.28 (Pittsburg,
1962), 10.
22

Ibid, 155. "At a time when the prevailing Republican emphasis was on curtailment of government expenditure,"
Brandes writes, "Hoover succeeded in increasing Congressional
allocations for the foreign activiites of his Departments."
Ibid, 13. See also William Starr Myers and Walter H. Newton,
The Hoover Administration -- A Documented Narrative (New
York, 1936), 540.
23

Brandes, Economic Diplomacy, 27.

24

Ibid, 41. Hoover's "foreign service" in the Commerce
Department clashed with the State Department mainly over the
supervision of capital exports from the United States, according to Brandes, and by.the attempts by Commerce officers and attaGhes to "take over some of the functions of
the consular officials" since assisting American businessmen abroad became the primary function of its people working
abroad. Over a period of time, it seems that Hoover's
people and their publications concerning business conditions
in a given country became in some instances more reliable
than were the State Department reports. By 1927, the Department of Commerce "already was acting as the Administration's
official spokesman on economic foreign policy." Brandes
points out that the problems of cooperation between the
State and Commerce Departments were to remain serious due
their competition up to the time of Hoover's nomination for
the Presidency in 1928. Ibid 41, 45, 48-53, 57, 59; see
also Hoover, Memoirs, II, 79, 85, 117.
25

Hoover, Memoirs, II, 177-179; Brandes, Economic
Diplomacy, 170-174.

1

181
26

Ibid, 183-186. See also Joan Hoff Wilson, "A Reevaluation of Herbert Hoover's Foreign Policy," in Martin
L. Fausold and George T. Mazuzan (eds.) The Hoover Presidency {Albany, 1974), 164-186.
27 Myers

and Newton, The Hoover Administration, 41;
Brandes, Economic Diplomacy, 197.
28

Hoover, Memoirs, II, 210-211; Brandes, Economic
Diplomacy, 199.
29

Ibid, 201-203.

30

Hoover, Memoirs, II, 333-335; Brandes, Economic
Diplomacy, 210.
31

Hoover, Memoirs, II, 210-211.

32

Ibid, 215.

33

Ibid, 334; Ray L. -Wiibur, The Hoover Policies
(New York, 1937).
34

New York Times, March 16, 1929, 18:2.

35

Ibid, April 4, 1929, 1:7; April 5, 1929, 24:1.

36

Ibid, May 19, 1929, III, 1:8.

Ibid. In an e~itorial the Times suggested that when
Hoover talked of placing "professionals" in Latin American
posts, perhaps he really meant competent businessmen; Ibid,
Nov. 9, 1929, 18:3.
37

38

Myers and Newton, The Hoover Administration, 531-

532.
39

New York Times, Nov. 17, 1929, III, 1:8. The Times
correspondent pointed out that Hoover was sending professionals to missions regarded as "on the firing line" and,
in 1929, these important missions were regarded by Hoover
as being in Latin America where the major American foreign
policy mission was completely to change past relationships
there.
40

Wilbur, The Hoover Policies, 585-586. Without
ceremonial fanfare or commentary, Hoover signed an Executive Order on June 11, 1931 which placed more emphasis on
the merit system for professional advancement and also provided for raises in salary scales and post allowances. New
Yqrk Times, June 11, 1931, 20:1.

~

l

182
41 Perkins,

"The Department of State and American

Public Opinion," 286.
42

Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active
Service in Peace and War (New York, 1947), 191.
43

Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression,
35-37; Hoover, Memoirs, I I, 219, 336-337.
44 Stimson

and McBundy, On Active Service, 156; Ferrell,
American Diplomacy, 37.
45

Ibid, 38-39; see also.Robert Ferrell, "Henry L.
Stimson," in Robert H. Ferrell (ed.) The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (New York, 1963) XI,
158.
46

Stimson and McBundy, On Active Service, 194.

47

Ibid, 177.

4 8

Ibid, 193-194.

49

Ferrell, "Henry L. Stimson," 164.

5 0

Ibid, 207-208.

5

~Stimson

and McBundy, On· Active Service, 214-217.

52

Perkins, "The Department of State and American
Public Opinion," 284-285 .
.

53
.

Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression,

5 4

Ibid, 4-5.

39-44.

55

Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, The
Great Depression 1929-1941 (New York, 1952), III, 1-5;
Hoover nad hoped the readjustment of the economic system,
despite the "orgy" of stockmarket speculation preceeding
the Great Crash of October, 1929, would be orderly. Loath
to make the effects of the crash worse, Hoover attempted to
explain the problem as part of the "normal business cycle"
readjusting disequilibriums, but he claims he was not impressed· by optimistic reports of a quick recovery which were
issued at the time. Nevertheless, he hoped the crash would
prompt corrective measures in the weak American banking
system; ibid, III, 19-21, 30.
56

Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression,

13; Hoover, Memoirs, III, 107.

183
57

Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression,

15; see also Arnold A. Offner, The Origins of the Second

World War:

American Foreign Policy and World Politics

1917-1941 (New York, 1975), 45, 52, 64.
58 Melvyn

P. Leffler, "Political Isolationism, Econo-

mic Expansion, or Diplomatic Realism: American Policy Toward Western Europe 1921-1933" in Donald Fleming and Bernard
Bailyn (eds.) Perspective in American History (Cambridg~,
1974), VIII, 416-419; see· also Henry L. Stimson, ''Bases~of
American Foreign Policy During the Past Four Years" Foreign
Affairs (April, 1933) vol. 11, No. 3, 385.
59

Leffler, "Political Isolationism," 419.

60

Ibid, 421, 423-425; Ferrell, American Diplomacy in
the Great Depression, 110.
61

"The End of Isolation," Journal of the American
Bankers Association, 24 (August, 1931), 78-74, as cited in
Leffler, "Political Isolationism," 431.
62

Ibid, 439.

63

0ffner, The Origins of the Second World War, 50;
Leffler, "Political Isolationism," 444-445.
64

Ibid, 65-66.

65

Bernard V. Burke, "American Economic Diplomacy and
the Weimar Republic" Mid-America, Vol. 54, No. 4 (October,
1974), 212.
66

Leffler, "Political Isolationism," 442-443; Leffler
states that the great failure of American policy was that
nothing was done for over a year· after the London Conference.
"Hoover and Stimson, though very much interested in disarmament on the land and the seas, made little e.ffort to
convince the public or the Congress of the need to revise
the nation's neutrality practices. The Administration's
negligence on this matter can only be explained in terms of
the more· pressing domestic economic issues and international
financial questions posed by the Depress. Ibid, 451.
67

Craig and Gilbert, The Diplomats, 4-5.

6 8

Ibid, 6.

184

Chapter III: A Case Study: Ambassador Frederic Mosley
Sackett's Assignment to Germany
1

Arnold Offner, The Origins of the Second World War:
American Foreign Policy and World Politics 1917-1941 (New

Yqrk, 1975), 50; also by Arnold Offner, American Appeasement,
United States Foreign Policy and Germany 1933-1938 (Cambridge, 1969), -10-12; and American Diplomacy and German~,
1933-1938 (unpublished dissertation, Indiana Univ., 196 ),

17.

2

Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State: A History
of its Organization, Procedure and Personnel (New York,
1949), 298.
3

Edward Bennett, Germany and the Diplomacy of the
Financial Crisis, 1931 (Cambridge, 1962), 31.
· 4 For

a more
in issues dealing
Bernard V. Burke,
Weimar Republic,"

specific look at Ambassador Sackett's role
with American economic relationships see
"American Economic Diplomacy and the
Mid-America, vol. 54, No. 4 (October,

1974), 211-233.
5

Wil1iam E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity,
1914-32 (Chicago, 1958), 41, 96-97.
6

Robert H. Ferrell, Peace in Their Time -- The Origins
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (New York, 1952), 13-26. Among
the most significant cited by Ferrell, were peace organizations supported by Andrew Carnegie, ·especially his Endowment
for International Peace.
7

Louisville Courier Journal, Sept. 26, 1924.

8

Louisville Herald Post, Aug. 4, 1924; Nov. 4, 1924;
March 4, · 1925.
·
9

Congressional Record, 69 Congress, Special Session,
42 (March 9, 1925); 70 Congress, 1 Session, 481 (Dec. 12,
1927); 71 Congress, 1 Session, 246 (April 22, 1929). Other
minor committee assignments included Agriculture and Forestry, Executive Department Expenditures, and Military
Affairs. Sackett, not entirely happy with his treatment on
the Finance Committee, complained to Secretary ·of State
Stimson of not getting information about matters spending
before the committee from its leaders; Papers of Henry
Lewis Stimson, Yale University Library, New Haven, Conn.
(microfilm deposited in the Portland State University
Library), hereafter cited as Stimson Papers, July 2, 1929,
reel 164, 100-101.

185
1

°Congressional Record, 69 Congress, 1 Session, 2430
(January 20, 1926), 6836-37 (April 5, 1926), 11262 (June 15,
1926); 70 Congress, 1 Session, 3139 (February 17, 1928),
3153-3154 (February 17, 1928), 3094 (February 16, 1928),
6849-6862 (Spril 20, 1928). See also New York Times, April

21, 1928, 4:3.
iiNew York Times, May 16, 1929, 30:8; May 24, 192a,,
26:4, May 26, 1929, II, 20:2; May 29, 2929, 24:8. The ~imes
reported the Sackett amendment was "voted down with a laugh:
as one Senator moved to exclude from the census "all persons
who had violated the dry laws:" ibid.
12

Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover,· The
Cabinent and the Presidency 1920-1933 (New York, 1952), vol.
2, 191.
13

New York Times, August 5, 1928, II, 12:13; Glenn
Finch "The Election of United States Senators in Kentucky:
The Cooper Period," The Filson Club History Quarterly, Vol
46, No. 2 (April, 1972) 173.
14

New York Times, Aug. 5, 1928, II, 12:13; Sept. 28,
1928, 3:1; Nov. 5, 1929; Hoover was the first Republican
presidential candidate to win a majority in Kentucky, taking
59 percent of the vote in 1928. Partisan percentages in
1928 were nearly equal inside and outside the four most
urban Kentucky counties, however, by 1932 the drought and
depression had taken a severe toll throughout the farming,
mining and industrial centers and Franklin Roosevelt was
given Hoover's 59 percent of the vote in what was "the most
dramatic shift in the state's voting behavior since 1872."
Malcolm E. Jewell and Everett W. Cunningham, Kentucky Poli~
tics (Lexington, 1968), 6-7.
15

Louisville Herald Post, Oct. 9, 1924; Finch, "The
Election of United States Senators in Kentucky: The Cooper
Period," 173.
16

Louisville Courier Journal, Oct. 10, 1929.

17

Glenn Finch, "The Election of United States Senators
in Kentucky: The Beckman Period," The Filson Club History
Quarterly, vol. 44, No. 1, (Jan., 1970), 47.
18

Hoover, Memoirs, II, 335; Two well known Washington
commentators noted the "mediocrity and partisanship" displayed in many of Hoover's appointments: "His record is unsurpassed ... " They also cited Ambassador Sackett as "a
machine politican who dared not face a reelection contest
in Kentucky"; Robert S. Allen and Drew Pearson, Washington
Merry-Go-Round (New York, 1931), 66.

186
19 Frederic

M. Sackett Papers, Filson Club, Louisville,
Kentucky hereafter cited as Sackett Papers, Sackett to Mrs.
Bessie Hazard, Dec. 31, 1929.
20

Papers of Herbert Hoover, Hoover Presidential

Library, West Branch, Iowa, Presidential Papers -- Foreign
Affairs, hereafter cited as Hoover Library PPFA, Kellogg to
Hoover, Oct. 12, 1929; Robinson to Lawrence Richey (secretary to the President) Dec. 16, 1929; Morris reference ~pntained in Sacke.tt Papers, Filson Club, Louisville.
...
21

Castle to Hoover, Jan. 21, 1929, Hoover Library,

PPFA.
22

Papers of William R. Cast.le, Hoover Library, hereafter cited as Castle Papers, Gilbert to Castle, May 28,
1927; Jacob Gould Schurman Papers, Olin Research Library,
Cornell University, Ithica, New York; Schurman's criticism
w~s mainly directed to the way American loans were being
handled. He was 6ritical of Gilbert for being overly critical of Germany. Schurman said the loans were being used for
constructive purposes and not for extravagances as Parker
alleged. New York Times, Nov. 26, 1927, 12:7; United Press
International dispatch, Nov. 26, 1927; Koelnische Zeitung,
Nov. 27, 1927; Berlin Boerson Zeitung, Nov. 26, 1927;
Lokalanzeiger, Nov. 26, 1927.
23

Castle to Schurman, Jan., 1928, Castle Papers,
Hoover Library PPFA.
24

Hoover

Poole to Castle, June 6, 1929.

Castle Papers,

Libr~ry.
25

Castle to Hoover, Jan. 21, 1929.

Ibid.

26

Ibid. Castle suggested Senator Walter Edge as a
replacement for Schurman as he felt he could do a better
job in Berlin than in Paris.
27

New York Times Dec. 30, 1929, 21:4.

28

Ibid; Papers of the Department of State, deposited
in the National Archives, decimal file 123, Sackett F.M./
19, hereafter cited by decimal file number, Schurman to
State Department, Jan. 7, 1930.
29

New York Times, Dec. 31, 1929, 9:1.

30

Ibid; Schurman to State Department, Jan. 7, 1930,
123, Sackett F.M./19.
31

New York Times, Dec. 31, 1929, 18 :_1.

187
3 2

Ibid.

3 3

Ibid, 21 : 4 .

34

Ibid, Dec. 31, 1929, 9:1.

35

Associated Press, Dec. 28, 1929, Sackett Papers,
Filson Club, Louisville; Louisville Herald Post, Dec. 29,
30, 1929.
36

Ibid; Louisville Courier Journal, Dec. 30, 1929.

37

Louisville Herald Post, Dec. 29, 1929.

38

Louisville Courier Journal, Dec. 30, 1929.

39

Louisville Courier Journal, Jan. 3, 1930; Louisville
Herald Post, Jan. 9, 1930.
40

Louisville Courier Journal, Jan. 3, 1930; Louisville
Times, Jan. 6, 1930.
4

lNew York Times, Jan. 2, 1930, 24:2.

42

Chilton, et al to Hoover (telegram) Jan. 7, 1930,
Hoover Library, PPFA -- Diplomats - Sackett FM.
43

Louisville Courier Journal, January 3, 1930; New
York Times, Jan.. 5, 1930, 2:1 and Jan. 7, 1930, 55:4. Questions were al~o raised concerning the status of state
patronage positions whose holders and applicants would be
left in doubt once the Robsion faction gained Sackett's
Senate seat; refer Louisville Times, Jan. 9, 1930 and Louisville Courier Journal, Jan. 10, 1930.
44

Congressional Record, 71 Congress, 2 Session, 12881289 (January 9, 1930); New York Times, Jan. 10, 1930, 14:
4-5.
45

Congressional Record, op. ait.; Copeland's brief and
simple three paragraph tribute to Sackett in the Congressaional Record is compared with over three-fourths of a
page contributed by Copeland and two other Senators (Republican and.Democrat) for Senator Walter Edge when he was appointed ambassador to France; refer to Congressional Record
71 Congress, 1 Session, 5874-75, (Nov. 21, 1929).
46

Cotton to Sackett, Jan. 14, 1930, decimal file 123, ·
Sackett FM/10; New York Times Jan. 23, 1930, 14:2.
47

0utlook, Jan. 22, 1930.

188
4 8

Ibid.

49

Papers of Dewitt C. Poole, University of Wisconsin,
Madison, Wis., Poole to Stimson, Feb. 15,- 1930.
5

°Cotton to Poole, Jan. 3, 1930; Castle to Poole, Dec.

21, 1929, Poole Papers, Madison.
51

Papers of John Cooper Wiley, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, Poole to Wiley, Jan. 23,
1930.
5 2
.

Wiley to Laird S. Goldsborough, Feb. 19, 1930.

53

W. deHaas to Poole, March 3, 1930, Poole Papers,

Madison.
54

Marion H. McVitty to Bernard V. Burke, July, 1966,
in the possession of Burke, Portland State University.
55

Wiley to State Dept., Feb. 7, 1930, 123, Sackett

FM/29.
56

New York Times, Feb. 7, 1930, 6:7; In that same
issue the Times editorialized on Sackett's captivation of
the German press especially with his soft voice, his
courtesy, and his habit of saying ".suh." "It is true that
Mr. Sackett co~es from the South, that his voice is soft and
that his manner is courteous. He also pronounces 'sir'
without a hard 'r'. But this pronounciation is.quite as
typical of his native Rhode Island -- where he lived until
he reached maturity -- as.of Kentucky. And soft voices and
courtesy are found as commonly behind the colonial doors of
Providence, Boston, Portland and Hartford, as behind those
of Louisville. These are well known facts," stated the
Times. "But they won't affect the legend." Ibid, 20:5.
57

Ibid, Feb. 13, 1930, 7:2.

58

Burke, "American Economic Diplomacy and the Weimar
Republic", 222-223; Sackett to Cotton (confidential), March
26, 1930, 862.51/2853.
59

Congressional Record, 71 Congress, 2 Session, 7107-

7109 (April 16, 1930).
60

Ibid. Sackett later restated before the Chamber his.
view for enlarged foreign markets for American exports as
the depression deepened; New York Times, Dec. 26, 1931, 4:3.
61

Ibid, March 17, 1930, 22:2; Earlier, in February,
the acting Democratic floor leader in the Senate, Thomas

189
Walsh, expressed thoughts that the tariff issue would ironically catch up to Sackett in Germany. Sackett had voted for
high tariffs on products from Europe while in the Senate but
was now in the "anomalous position" in protesting to Germany
against a retaliatory tariff. "It would seem in this situa-

tion," Walsh stated, "that in asking Ambassador Edge and
Ambassador Sackett to protest to the French and German
Governments against retaliatory tariffs to be levied as reprisals for our own 'prohibitive' duties on their chief . :
articles of export, the President has forced his Ambassidors
into the position of supporting prohibitive tariffs at nome
and low tariffs abroad." Ibid, Feb. 3, 1930, 9:3; see also
June 12, 1930, 24:1.
62

New York Times, June 18, 1930; Time, June 30, 1930,
17-18; Literary Digest, July 5, 1930, vor:-106, No. 1;
Nation, July 2, 1930, vol. 131, No. 3391, 3; see also
Forrest McDonald, Insull, (Chicago, 1962) and M. L. Ramsey,
Pyramids of Power (New York, 1937).
63

New York Times, June 18, 1930, 16:3.

64

Ibid, June 19, 1930, 19:2, 19:3, 24:6; June 20, 1930,
8:1; Louisville Courier Journal and Louisville Herald Post,
Nov. 1, 1929.
65

New York Times, Sept. 21, 1930, 8:1; A further example <?f Ambassador Sackett's "charm and methodology in
handling the press was noted by the Times when he disembarked in New York: "When Mr. Sackett was asked about
rumors of war from Europe he smiled and replied that it required considerable money to start a war these days."
66

Papers of Nicholas Murray Butler, Columbia University, New York, Sackett to Butler, Sept. 29, 1930.
67

McVitty to Burke, July, 1966.

68

New York Times, Sept. 25, 1930, 36:5.

69

Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, The
Great Depression, 1929-1941 (New York, 1952), III, 38.
70

Miscle. untitled press clippings, Jan. 24, 1931,
Sackett Papers, Fils~~ Club, Louisville.
71

Hoover, Memoirs, III, 64-65.

72

Ray L. Wilbur, The Hoover Policies (New York, 1937), .

73

New York Times, April 18, 1931, 9:4.

409.

190
74

Ibid, May 7, 8, 10, 15, 1931 and June 14, 1931.

75

Bennett, Financial Crisis, 31-33; Eric Eyck, A History of the Weimar Repu·blic (2 vols. Cambridge, Mass. ,
1963, translated by Harlan P. Hanson and Robert G. L.

Waite), II, 314.
76

Sackett to Hoover, Dec. 27, 1930, Hoover Library
PPFA - Diplomats, Sackett F.M ..
77

Ibid.

78

Bennett, Financial Crisis, 35, 37; Hoover to Sackett,
Jan. 12, 1931, Hoover Library, PPFA.
79

Burke, "American Economic Diplomacy and the Weimar
Republic," 227-233; and Bennett, Financial Crisis, 38-39;
both works include detailed accounts of attempts by the
American Embassy staff in Berlin to draw off icianl American
recongition of the financial and political difficulties
facing the Bruning Government between January and May, 1931.
80

Bennett, Financial Crisis, 40-41, 53-81; Hoover,
Memoirs, III, 62.
81

Bennett, Financial Crisis, 113-114. Bennett argues
that, according to Castle, "Hoover had been watching developments in Europe even before Sackett reported to him on May
6." Ibid, 115; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On
Active Service in Peace. and War (New YOrk, 1947), 204-205.
82

Bennett, Financial Crisis, 115.

83

Burke, "American Economic Diplomacy and the Weimar
Republic," 231-232.
84

Diaries of Henry Lewis Stimson, Yale University
Library, New Haven, Conn. (microfilm deposited in Portland
State University Library), May 4, 1931, reel 3, vol. XVI,
46-47, hereafter cited as Stimson Diary; see also Bennett,
Financial Crisis, 88. It should be noted that, while the
ambassador is responsible for reports coming from his embassy, most were drafted by the staff, in this case by
George Gordon.
85

William Starr Myers and Walter Newton, The Hoover
Administration -- A Documented Narrative (New York, 1936),
83; Hoover, Memoirs, III, 64-65. While .Myers and most other
contemporaries of Hoover place this meeting on May 6, Hoover
states it happened May 7, 1931. Ibid, III, 64; see also
Theodore G. Joslin, Hoover Off the Record (Garden City, N.Y.,
1934), 87-89; Joslin, secretary to President Hoover, implies

191
Sackett's visit to the United States in May, 1931, was disguised as a "vacation" so as not to arouse publicity; and
although Sackett's original purpose was to go on home leave,
little actual publicity was given Sackett's White House
visit. Ibid,ii; Bruning did not believe that Sackett was
convinced by the communist scare theory as, not only had the
threat of Bolshevism "lost its edge" since the post World
War I years, but also Sackett "evoked a skeptical reaction"
in his face when the Chancellor raised the subject; seet:
Heinrich Bruning, Memoiren, 1918-1934 (Stuttgart, 1970)
223-224.
86

Herbert Hoover Moratorium Diary, Herbert Hoover
(PPFA) May 6, 1931; hereafter cited as Moratorium Diary;
Myers and Newton, The Hoover Administration, 82-83.
87

Mark Sullivan, "President Hoover and the World Depression" Saturday Evening Post, vol. 205, no. 37, March
11, 1933, 1; Moratorium Diary, May 6, 1931; Myers and New-.
ton, The Hoover Administration, 83; Bennett, Financial
Crisis, 23, 136-137; Charles Dawes mentioned in his journal
on Feb. 11, 1924, the need for a moratorium of reparations
payments but such a plan would have to be mindful of public
opinion and that long run "reasonable assurance" of adequate
reparations would have to be given to the allies. On February 19, 1924, while in Paris, Dawes noted: "Taking the
maximum of what we must provide for in the way of a foreign
loan, banking capital and a moratorium, it seems so small as
compared with the benefits to be derived from it and the
catastrophe to economic Europe if it is not provided, that
failure [to extend American aid] seems· inconceivable." See
Charles G. Dawes, A Journal of Reparations (Londong, 1939),
100-101, 108.
88

6, 1931.

Hoover, Memoirs, III, 64-65; Moratorium Diary, May

89

Ibid, May 7, 1931; Sullivan, "President Hoover and
the World Depression", March 11, 1933,4; Castle to Hoover,
June 1, 1931, Hoover Library PPFA-Financial; see also economic reports for May-June, 1931 in Papers of the Department
of State, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Decimal File
462.00/R296, hereafter cited by decimal file number.
90

Myers and Newton, The Hoover Administration, 83,88;
Bennett, Financial Crisis, 132-137; Hoover, Memoirs, III, 65.
9

~Hoover, Memoirs, III, 67-68; Moratorium Diary, May
11,13, 1931.
92

Myers and Newton, The Hoover Administration, 87;
Moratorium Diary, June 2, 1931; Bennett, Financial Crisis,
l

I .

192
135-137; Stimson Diary, June 2, 1931, reel 3, XVI, 120-121.
93

Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States: 1931, 3 vols., Washington
1946, Gordon to Stimson, June 3, 1931, I, 4, hereafter cited
as FRUS; Gordon to Stimson, June 2, 1931 and Thomas M.
Lamont to Hoover, June 5, 1931, Hoover Library, PPFLFinancial; Bennett, Financial Crisis, 138.
.

94

New York Times, June 4, 1931, 7:3.

95

Ibid; Moratorium Diary, June 5, 1931; Bennett,
Financial Crisis, 139.
96

Robert H.· Ferrell, "Henry L. Stimson" in Robert H.
Ferrell (ed.) The American Secretaries of State and Their
Diplomacy (New York, 1963), XI, 209-212; Stimson and Bundy,
On Active Service, 204; Hoover, Memoirs, III, 68-71;
Bennett, Financial Crisis, 161-165.
97

New York Times, June 10, 1931, 2:4 and June 11, 1931,
8:.5; Bennett, Financial Crisis, 141-142.
98

New York Times, June 11, 1931, 8:5; Sullivan,
"President Hoover and the World Depression" Saturday Evening
Post, March 11, 1933, 5; Gordon to Stimson, June 8, 1931,
FRUS, 1931, I, 9-11.
99

New York Times, June 11, 1931, 8:5; Meyers and
Newton, The Hoover Administration, 89.
100

Bennett, Financial Crisis, 142; Stimson Diary, June
13, 1931, reel 3, XVI, 164-165; Papers of Henry Lewis
Stimson, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. (microfilm deposited ·in Portland State University Library), Feis to
Stimson, June 19, 1931, reel 81, no. 548.
101

Stimson to Hoover, June 13, 1931, Hoover Library,
PPFL-Financial; Moratorium Diary, May 26-29, 1931; Sullivan,
"President Hoover and the World Depression" Saturday Evening
Post, March 11, 1933, ·28; Pierre de L. Boal to Walter H.
Newton, June 17, 1931, Hoover Lib~ary, PPFL-Financial provides a good example of the gloomy political and financial
reports about Germany fed to Hoover by the State Department.
102
103

Moratorium Diary, June 18, 1931.

Hoover, Memoirs, III, 69-72; Stimson and Bundy, On
Active Service, 204-206; Bennett, Financial Crisis, 175; ~
Myers and Newton, The Hoover Administration, 99; Robert H.
Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression (New
Yqrk, 1957), 108. Hoover's secretary, Theodore Joslin,

193

wote that the transatlantic telephone enabled the President
personally to relay instructions to Sackett and Edge and to
discuss issues and get their points of view; see Joslin,
Hoover Off the Record, 108-111. After the moratorium was
announced, Sackett, who did not trust the telephone, told of
his use 0£ American slang in the transatlantic conversations
as a "safe method of guarding against the possibility of
being understood by any listener;" see New York Times, ~uly
8, 1931, 19:2; Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 114.
io 4 Bennett, Financial Crisis, 146, 155, 161-162;

Stimson Diary, June 20, 1931, reel 3, XVI, 196.
105

Bennett, Financial Crisis, 163; Hoover, Memoirs,
III, 68-69; Joslin, Hoover Off the Record, 99; Myers and
Newton, The Hoover Administration, 90-91.
106

Stimson to Sackett, June 20, 1931, FRUS, 1931, I,
32-33; Memorandum of ·Transatlantic Telephone Conversation
betwen Ramsey MacDonald and Stimson, June 19, 1931, Ibid,
30.
107

Sackett to Stimson, June 20, 1931, Ibid, 35;
Bennett, Financial.Crisis, 163; Eyck, The Weimar Republic,
II, 315.
108

Stimson to Sackett, June 20, 1931, FRUS, 1931, I,
33; Stimson to Sackett, June 21, 1931, Ibid,--w7; Bennett,
Financial Crisis, 163-164; Sackett to Stimson, June 22,
1931, FRUS, 1931, I, 37-38.
109

Sackett to Stimson, June 24, 1931, FRUS, 1931, I,
39-42; The New York Times was perhaps not totally fooled by
Sackett's official silence nor did they seem to believe the
letter was an impromptu effort sent at German initiation.
The Times speculated about the oddity of timing of the
letter, see New York Times, June 22, 1931, 1:8, 15:1. The
Hoover Administration did not release the text of the
Hindenburg letter of June 20, 1931 until the following July
21 and it was published by the Associated Press without
comment; Ibid, July 21, 1931, 13:4 .
0

James Thayer Gerould, "The Hoover Debt Settlement"
Current History, August, ·1931, 641-645; Sullivan, "President
Hoover and the World Depression," Saturday Evening Post1
March 11, 1933, 28; ~errell, American Diplomacy, 118; Meyers
and Newton, The Hoover Administration, 95.
.ll

111

Hoover, Memoirs, III, 71-72; Gerould, "The Hoover
Debt Settlement," Current History, August., 1931, 644;
Bennett,· Financial Crisis, 189-196; Sackett to Castle, FRUS,
1931, I, 131-132.

~--

,

194
112

Ibid, July 2, 1931, 1:2.

113 Edge

to Stimson, June 30, 1931, Hoover Library,
PPFL-Foreign Affairs; Stimson to Sackett, June 22, 1931,
FRUS, 1931, I, 49-50; Bennett, Financial Crisis, 176-177.
114 Sackett

to·Stimson, June 23, 1931, FRUS, 1931, I,
50-51; Bennett, Financial Crisis, 180.
~~
115

Stimson to William R. Castle and Ogden Mills, June
28, 1931, 462.00/R296/4174; Bennett, Financial Crisis, 182183; Stimson to Castle, June 30, 1931, 462.00/R296/4220;
Stimson agreed to the proposal to limit battleship construction but felt, for appearances at least, this issue should
be tied to disarmament, "above political questions ... " Ibid;
Castle to Sackett, June 27, 1931, FRUS, 1931, I, 84-85.
116

Ibid.

1931, I , 91-93.

Sackett to CAstle, June 28, 1931, FRUS,
--

117

Edge to Castle, June 28, 1931, FRUS, 1931, I, 96;
Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State (Castle) of a
Transatlantic Telephone Conversation to the Ambassador in
Berlin (Sackett), June 29, 1931, Ibid, 97-98; Bennett,
Financial Crisis, 184, 195; Castle's point was that the
United States traditionally sought to stay clear of political questions at least officially. Somehow, disarmament
was not always considered a political quesiton. While the
American people were mostly supportive of Hoover's moratorium proposal, "such enthusiastic support would quickly
wear off should they get the idea Germany was using the
saved money to build a new battleship." See Memorandum
by the Acting Secretary (Castle) of Conversation with the
German Charge (Leitner), June 29, 1931, FRUS, 1931, I, 98.
118

Bennett, Financial Crisis, 185-186, 191-196; Castle
to Stimson, June 30, 1931, 462.00/R296/4220; Castle to
·Sackett, June 30, 1931 and Edge to Stimson, June 30, 1931,
FRUS, 1931, I, 105-108.
119

Sackett to Castle, June 30, 1931, Ibid, 112; Memorandum by Acting Secretary of State (Castle) to Telephone
Conversation with Ambassador in Berlin (Sackett), July 1,
1931, Ibid, 109-110.
12

°Castle to Sackett, July 2, 1931, Ibid, 129; Bennett,
Financial Crisis, 186, 190; Eyck, Weimar Republic, II, 350392; Sackett to Castle, July 2, 1931, I, 130-131.
121

Sackett to Castle, July 3, 1931, Ibid, 132; Bennett,
Financial Crisis, 188, 190; With regard to a German "volun-

1
195
tary" concession concerning the dropping of a proposed Customs Union with Austria, Sackett never received direct
authority from Washington to pursue this issue with Briining.
He had hoped the British would take up the subject as it was
deemed a "political issue" to be avoided according to American foreign policy tradition. Regardless of the outward
anticoncession stance of the German Government, the financial difficulties of the Kreditanstalt forced the Bruning
administration to ultimate.ly reject the Customs Union P~ft.n.
Ibid, 199-202.
.
122

Statement by President Hoover, July 6, 1931, FRUS,
1931, ·I, 163; Hoover, Memoirs, III, 72-73; Myers and Newton,
The Hoover Administration, 98; Bennett, Financial Crisis,
201, 220; Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 118.
i

23

Sackett to Castle, July 6, 1931, 462.00/R296/4290.

24

Myers and Newton, The Hoover Admin,istration, 97-98,
100; Bennett, Financial Crisis, 220, 222-223, 232-233.
i

l

25

Sackett to Stimson, July 11, 1931, 462.00/R296/

4398.
126

Castle to Sackett, July 11, 1931, FRUS, 1931, I,
250-251; Stimson Diary, July 26, 1931, reel~XVII, 146,
and Stimson's Memorandum to the President from the Secretary
of State, August 11, 1931, FRUS, 1931, I, 321; Meyers and
Newton, The Hoover Administration, 100; Hoover, Memoirs,
III, 72-75. Wall Street bankers were even more reluctant to
tackle the latest financial problems in Germany. Thomas
Lamont of J. ·P. Morgan and Company stated the Germans should
change their attitude and take internal measures to halt the
flight of money from their banks. He added the idea that
America would save Germany should be dispelled. Germans
should do more to "stand on their own feet," he stated;
Lamont to Martin Egan, July 9, 1931, Hoover Library, PPFLFinancial.
127

251-254.
128

Sa6kett to Castle, ~uly 12, 1931, FRUS, 1931, I,
--

Meyers and Newton, The Hoover Administration, 100·101; Bennett, Financial Crisis, 234; Bennett notes the significance of Germany's internal moratorium: "It was during
this period that the German presidential dictatorship passed
the point of ·no return. Efforts to win popular support
through foreign policy had failed, and instead, foreign
policy itself had precipitated a financial upheaval. The
closing of the banks and the effort to check foreign exchange
withdrawals entailed the issuance of a whole series of measures and decrees, 'which,' as [British Ambassador to Germany

196
·Sir Horace] Rumbold reported, 'have brought business to a
standstill, have interfered with liberty to travel, practically destroyed the freedom of the press and have set up a
sort of inquisition into people's private affairs.' Ibid,
237.
129 Stimson

Diary, July 15, 1931, reel 3, XVII, 38-39,
42-43; Memorandum by the Secretary of State (Stimson) on a
Telephone Conversation with the Ambassador in Berl.in
(Sackett) and President Hoover, July 15, 1931, FRUS, 1931,
I, 263; Sackett to Stimson, July 18, 1931, 462.00/R296/4593.
130

Sackett to Castle, July 19, 1931, FRUS, 1931, I,
282-283; Sackett to Stimson, July 21, 1931, 462.00/R196/4639;
Sackett maintained the Germans would still be unyielding on
the battleship controversy but hoped it
inviting Germany to join the Three Power Naval Disarmament
Pact. By doing so, "the threats which other countries feel
are implied in [Germany's] naval construction could be decidedly toned down and German public opinion so satisfied
that the Government could accept." Ibid; Castle to Sackett,
July 24, 1932, FRUS, 1931, I, 551-552; Bennett, Financial
Crisis, 295-304-.~131

Meyers and Newton, The Hoover Administration, 101105; Hoover noted his belief that most of Europe, and especially Germany, had paid the reparations installments and supported their budget deficits from borrowed money. Learning
this, and recognizing the inter-relatedness of the foreign
economies to America's own, Hoover said, "I don't know that
I have ever received a worse shock. The haunting prospect
of wholesale bank failures and the necessity of saying not
a word to the American people as to the cause and the danger,
lest I precipitate runs on our banks, left me little sleep.
The situation was no long.er one of helping foreign countries
to the indirect benefit of everybody. It was now a question
of saving ourselves." Hoover, Memoirs, III, 74-75; Bennett·,
Financial Crisis, 274-279, 305.
.

132

Stimson to the Charge d'Affaires in Paris, Nov. 18·,
1931, 462.00/R296A/30A; Sackett to Stimson, Oct. 3, 1931,
FRUS, 1931, I, 326-331.
33

Ibid; Bruning also pressed for an overseas colony
to relocate a surplus German population and stave-off growing unemployment. He hoped the United States would push
this suggestion on behalf of Germany; Ibid; Sackett to
Hoover, Oct. 31, 1931, Hoover Library, PPFL-Diplomats,
Sackett, F.M.
i

134

Ibid; Bennett, Financial Crisis, 307-309.

197
35

Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 268-272;
Stimson Diary, July 31, 1931 and August 27, 1931, reel 3,
i

XVII, 159, 178-183.
136

Papers of George S. Messersmith, University of
Delaware, Dover, Messersmith to Villard, July 30, 1931.
137

Notes for Memoirs, Messersmith Papers,
of Delaware, Dover.

Univers~ty

·

138Ibid.
139

New York Times, June 28, 1931, III - 3:5.

140 Ibid, June 29, 1931, 18:2; Ibid, Oct. 28, 1931, 4:6.
141 Ibid, April 25, 1932, 5:3; April 26, 1932, 8:6.
1

~ 2 The

Providence Journal, July 2, 1931, Sackett
Papers, Filson Club.
143

Boston Herald (undated), Sackett Papers, Filson

Club.
144

Marion H. McVitty to Bernard V. Burke, July, 1966
(private letter in the possession of Burke, Portland Stat~
University History Dept.). ·
145

Eyck, Weimar Republic, II, 388; Burke, :American
Economic Diplomacy and the Weimar Republic," 228.
146

Sackett to Hoover, April 29, 1932, Hoover Library,
PPFA-Diplomats.
.
l47Ibid.
148

Hoover to Sackett, May 13, 1932, Ibid.

149

N~w

York Times, Oct. 5, 1932, 23:3.

150 Ibid, October 10, 1932, 17:2.
151

0swald Garrison Villard Correspondence, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Mass. Sackett to Villard, Oct. 24,
1932; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 282-288; New
York Times, Oct. 16, 1932, 1:6; Oct. 22, 1932, 8:5.
152

Ibid, Oct. 22, 1932, 8:5; during an appearance before the Board of Trade for German-American Commerce, Inc.,
the German Consul General in New York praised Sackett for
h.is own work in Germany. The Consul stated Sackett enjoyed
"unequaled admiration, respect and friendship in Germany"

198
and that-~aue· to the American initiative with regard to the
Hooyer ,·Mor}l.torium' "Germany was saved from complete economic
and- financial breakdown ... " Ibid.
·
53

Carr to Castle, Oct. 28, 1932, deeimal file 123/
Sackett F .M~ /149-personal _file.
.i

~~Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 289; New
York Times, Nov. +2, 1932, 3:4 .
1 5

.i

55

Ibid~ Jan. 14, 1933, 7:5.

156

American diplomats returning from their posts after
the installation of the Roosevelt Administration were not
able to plead diplomatic immunity as the basis of non-payment of liquor duties for alcohol brought back with them.
Among them were Ambassadors Sackett and Walter Edge from the
Embassy in France returning with 400 and 900 bottles, respectively. "Secretary of Treasury Morganthau, a Democrat,
saw no reason to postpone the operation of customs regula-·
tions in order to accomodate two wealthy Republican exdiplomats," according to Graham H. Stuart in American Diplomatic and Consular Practise (New York, 1952), 228-229.
157

New York Times, March 11, 1933, 8:7.

158

Ibid, March 23, 1933, 10:2 .

.i 59

Ibid.

Chapter IV:

Conclusions -- Rating Ambassador Sackett

1

Charles P. Kindleberger, The World In Depression,
1929-1939 (Berkeley, 1973), 297-298.
2

Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover; The
Great Depression, 1929-1941 (New York, 1952), III, 65-67,
73, 80.
3

Ibid, 78; Henry L .. Stimson and.McGeorge Bundy, On
Active Service In Peace and War (New York, 1947), 209,~13217.
4

Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse -- Its Twentieth
Century Reaction (New York, 1957), 128, 149.
5

Ibid, 228.

6

Kindleberger, The World In Depression, 297.

l

I
l

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary materials*
The Boston Herald
Heinrich Bruning, Memoiren, 1918-1934,
Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1970.

De~tsche

Verlage-

Nicholas Murray Butler Papers, Columbia University, New
York.
William R. Castle Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential
Library, West Branch, Iowa.
Congressional Record
Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, vol. I: The
Cabinent and the Presidency, 1920-1933; vol. III: The
Great Depression, 1929-1941, Macmillan Co., New York,
1952.
Herbert Hoover Moratorium Diary, Herbert Hoover Presidential
Library, West Branch, Iowa.
Herbert Hoover Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.
Herbert Hoover, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Herbert Hoover, U~ S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, 1974.
Fred L. Israel (ed.), The State of the Union Messages of the
Presidents, 1790-1966, vol. III, Chelsea House-Robert
Hector, New York, 1966.
George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, Little, Brown and
Company, Boston, 1967.
Louisville Courier Journal.

*Unless otherwise cited, photocopies of primary manuscript materials are in the possession of Dr. Bernard V.
Burke~ Portland State University History Department.

l

l

l
200
Louisville Providence Journal.
George Messersmith Papers, University of Delaware, Dover.
New York Times, 1928-1933.
Outlook Magazine, 1930.
Frederic Mosley Sackett Papers, Filson Club, Louisville,
Kentucky.
Jacob Gould Schurman Paper, John·M. Olin Research Library,
Cornell University, New York.
State, Department of, Papers of the U.S. Department of
State, National Archives, Washington, decimal files
462.00/R296 and 123, Sackett, FM.
State, Department of, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931, vol. 1, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946.
Henry Lewis Stimson Diary, Yale University, New Haven,
Conn. (microfilm deposited in Portland State University Library).
Henry Lewis Stimson Papers, Yale University, New Haven,
Conn. (microfilm deposited in Portland State University Library).
Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service In
Peace and War, Harper and Brothers, Inc., New York,
1947.
Dewitt Clint6n Poole Papers, University of
Madison.
Oswald Garrison Correspondence, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Secondary materials
Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse -- Its Twentieth
Century_Reaction, The Free Press, New York, 1957.
Selig

The Uncertain Giant, 1921-1941; American
Foreign Policy Between the Wars, Macmillan Company,
New York, 1965.
Adler~

Robert S. Allen and Drew Pearson, Washington Merry-Go-Round,
Horace-Liveright, .Inc., New York, 1931.

201
Thomas Bailey, The Art of Diplomacy - The American
Experience, Appleton, Century, Crofts Co., New York,
1968.
Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the United States,

Appleton, Century, Crofts Co., New York, 1969.
Edward W. Bennett, Germany and the Diplomacy of the Financial Crisis, 1931, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass., 1962.
Joseph Brandes, Herbert Hoover and Economic Diplomacy
Department of Conunerce Policy, 1921-1928, University
uf Pittsburg Press, Pittsburg, Penn., 1962.
Ellis Briggs, Anatomy of Diplomacy - The Origin and Execution of American Foreign Policy, David McKay Co.,
Inc., New York, 1968.
El+is Briggs, Farewell to Foggy Bottom - The Recollections
of a Career Diplomat, David McKay Co., Inc., New
York, 1964.
Brookings Institute, United States Foreign Policy - Formulation and Administration, U. S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, 1960.
Lee H. Burke, Ambassador at Large; Diplomat Extraordinary,
Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague, 1972.
Katherine Crane, Mr. Carr of State, St. Martin's Press,
New York, 1960.
Willi-am Yandell Elliot (ed.), United States Foreign Policy;
Its Organization and Control, Columbia University
Press, New York, 1952.
Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic, From the
Locarno Conference to Hitler's Seizure of Power,
vol. II, Atheneum, New York, 1970.
Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression;
Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933, W. w. Norton
and Company Inc., New York, 1957.
Robert H. Ferrell, Peace In Their Time - The Origins of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc.,
New York, 1952.
Herbert Feis, Diplomacy of the Dollar, 1919-1939, W. W.
Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 1950.

202
Hugh Gibs.on, The Road to ;irorei-Etn Policy, Doubleday 1 Doran
and Company, Inc~, Garden City, New Y~rk, 1944.
John Ensor Harr, The Professional Diplomat, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1969~
Warren F. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United
States, 1779-1939 -- A Study in Administrative
,_
History, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Ill.,
1961.
Henry M. Jackson (ed.), The Secretary of State and the
Ambassador -- Jackson S'ubaommittee Papers on the
Conduct of American Foreign Policy, Frederick
Praeger Publishers, New York, 1964.
Theodore G. Joslin, Hoover Off the Record, Doubleday,
Doran and Company, Inc., Garden City, N. Y., 1951.
Malcolm E. Jewell and Everett W. Cunningham, Kentucky
Polftics, University of Kentucky Press, Lexington,
Ky., 1968.
Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929-1939,
University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif.,
1973.
William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-32;
The University of Chicago Press, Ch~cago, Ill •. , 1958.
James L. McCamy, The Conduct of the New Diplomacy, Harper
and Row, New York, 1964.
William Starr Myers, The .Foreign Policies of Herbert Hoover,·
1929-1933, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1940.
William Starr Myers and Walter H. Newton, The Hoover Administration -- A Documented Narrative, Charles
Scribner's Sons., New York, 1936.
Arnold Offner, American Appeasement - United States Foreign

Policy and Germany, 1933-1938, Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1969.
Arnold Offner, The Origins of the Second World War:
American Foreign Policy and World Politics, 19171941, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1975.
Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's
Foreign Relations, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, Ill., 1953.

203
Dexter Perkins, Foreign Policy and the American Spirit,
(edited by Glyndon G. Van Deusen and Richard C. Wade)
Cornell University, New York, 1957; Kennikat Press,
Port Washington, N. Y .. , 1972.

Elmer Plischke, The Conduct of American Diplomacy, D. Van
Nostrand Co., Inc., New York, 1950.
Robert D. Schulzinger, "The Making of the Diplomatic Mind:
The Training, Outlook and Style of United States
Foreign Service Officers, 1906-1928," (unpublished
dissertation) Yale University, New Haven,' Conn., 1971.
Richard Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., American Foreign
Policy, Rinehart and Company, New York, 1954.
E. Wilder Spaulding, Ambassadors Ordinary and Extraordinary,
Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1961.
Graham H. Stuart, American Diplomatic and Consular Practice,
Appleton, Century, Crofts, Inc., New York, 1952.
Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State: A History of
Its Organization, Procedure and Personnel,. The
Macmillan Company, New York, 1949.
Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat, Harper and Brothers, New
York~ 1959.
Kenneth W. Thompson, American Diplomacy and Emergent
Patterns, New York University Press, New York, 1962.
Kenneth W. Thompson, Political Realism and the Crisis of
World Politics - An American Approach to Foreign
Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New
Jersey, 1960.
Frederick Van Dyne, Our Foreign Service - The ABC of
American Diplomacy, The Lawyers Co-operative
Publishing Co., Rochester, N. Y., 1909.
Harris Gaylord Warren, Herbert Hoover and The Great
Depression, W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1967.
·Sidney Warren, The President as World Leader, J. B.
Lippincott Co., New York, 1964.
H. Bradford Westerfield, The Instruments of America's
Foreign Policy, Thomas Crowell Co., New York, 1963.

204
Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club -- The Founding Fathers of
the U. S. Foreign S'ervice, W. w. Norton and Company,
Inc., New Y~rk, 1978.
~ay

L. Wilbur, The Hoover Policies, Charles Scribner's
Son, New Yqrk, 1937.

Articles
Selig Adler, "Hoover·' s Foreign Policy and the New Left,"
in Martin Fausold and George T. Mazuzan, eds., The
Hoover Presidency, State University of New York~
Press, Albany, 1974.
Bernard v. Burke, "American Economic Diplomacy and the
Weimar Republic," Mid-America, LIV (1972), 211-233.
Robert Dallek, "Beyond Tradition: The Diplomatic Careers
of W. E. Dodd and George Messersmith, 1933-1938,"
South Atlantic Quarterly (Spring, 1967) Vol. 60, No.
2, 233-244.
Robert H .. Ferrell, "Henry L. Stimson," In American
Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, XI, Cooper
Square Publishers Inc., New York, 1963, 137-289.
Glenn Finch, "The Election of United States Senators in
Kentucky: The Cooper Period," Filson Club History
Quarterly, Vol. 46, ~o. 2 (April, 1972), 161-178.
Glenn Finch, "The.Election of United States Senators in
Kentucky: The Beckman Period," Filson Club ·History
Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1 (January, 1970), 38-50.
Franklin Ford, "Three Observers in Berlin: Rumbold, Dodd,
and Francois-Poncet," in Gordon A. Craig and.Felix
Gilbert, eds., The Diplomats, 1919, 1939, Princeton,
New Jersey, 1953.
James Thayer Gerould, "The Hoover Debt Settlement," Current
History (August, 1931), 641-645.
Mark Sullivan, "President Hoover and the World Depression,"
Saturday Evening Post, (March 11, 1933), Vol. 205,
No. 37.
George F. Kennan, "The Future of Our Professional Diplomacy,"
Foreign Affairs, (July, 1955}, Vol. 33, No. 4, 566586.

205

Melvyn P. Leffler, "Political Isolationism, Economic Expansionism, Or Diploma tic Realism: American Pol.icy
Toward Western Europe, 1921-1933," in Donald Fleming
and Bernard Bailyn (eds.), Perspectives In American
History, VIII, Cambridge, Mass., 1974, 413~461.
Claire Booth Luce, "The Ambassadorial Issue:. Professionals
or Amateurs?" ·Foreign Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Ocf1•,
1957),

105~121.

:

Dexter Perkins, "The Department of State and American
Public Opinion," in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert,
eds., The Diplomats, 1919-1939, Princeton, New
Jersey, 1953, 282-308.
Henry L. Stimson, "Bases of American Foreign Policy During·
the Past Four Years," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 11, No.
3, (April, 1933), 383-396.
Joan Hoff Wilson, "A Re-evaluation of Herbert Hoover's
Foreign Policy," in Martin L. Fausold and George T.
Mazuzan (eds.) The Hoover Presidency, State University
of New York Press, Albany, N. Y., 1974, 164-186.

